
In Fa’asao Amerika Samoa v. National Marine Fisheries Service (D. Haw. Nov. 16, 2026), the United States District Court for the District of Hawai’i vacated an Endangered Species Act (ESA) letter of concurrence issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) for a deep-sea mining lease sale. The issue presented to the court was whether the Marine Minerals Administration (MMA) defined the scope of the action subject to consultation under section 7 of the ESA too narrowly and whether NMFS improperly relied on an unduly narrow scope when it concurred that the action is not likely to adversely affect species listed as threatened or endangered.
The MMA planned to sell up to two leases for seabed minerals on the American Samoa Outer Continental Shelf. The leases would initially allow only preliminary surveying but could eventually lead to mining polymetallic nodules from the ocean floor. MMA defined the agency action as the lease sale alone and analyzed only the effects of preliminary activities. After informal consultation, NMFS agreed with the MMA’s determination that the action was “not likely to adversely affect” listed species, including several whales and sea turtles. Two nonprofits sued NMFS and moved for summary judgment.
Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires each federal agency, in consultation with a consulting agency (generally NMFS for marine species), to ensure that its actions are not likely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify critical habitat. If the action agency finds an action “not likely to adversely affect” listed species and the consulting agency agrees in writing, consultation ends without formal consultation or a biological opinion. Properly defining the scope of the action subject to consultation matters because NMFS must evaluate the effects of the entire agency action.
The court reached two holdings. First, it held that NMFS “may not blindly accept the action agency’s defined scope of the project and must endeavor to consider all potential effects of the entire agency action.” NMFS argued that its role is purely advisory and it must simply “analyze the project as presented” by the action agency. The court disagreed, concluding that Ninth Circuit precedent holds NMFS accountable for adopting a flawed description of the action. Otherwise, action agencies could define projects so narrowly that they could effectively preclude NMFS from disagreeing with the action agency’s effects determination.
Second, relying on D.C. Circuit and Ninth Circuit precedent, the court held that for Outer Continental Shelf leases, the agency action covers the entire project, from lease issuance through development and production. The staged review under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) may reduce how detailed the analysis must be at the leasing stage, but it does not narrow what the action is. The court rejected the argument that deep-sea mining is too “nascent” to analyze, noting that the ESA “insist[s] on foresight” when considering a proposed action. The court observed that the MMA “is not leasing for leasing’s sake;” but rather aims to responsibly facilitate the potential development of economically recoverable mineral resources. Because NMFS did not even attempt to consider post-leasing effects, the court called the error “fundamental” and vacated the letter.
The decision contrasts with recent trends in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) law. In Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County (2025), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized deference to agency judgments about the scope of NEPA review and held that agencies generally need not study the upstream or downstream effects of an action. That trend, reinforced by the 2023 statutory amendments and the rollback of the Council on Environmental Quality’s (CEQ) regulations, has narrowed NEPA reviews. In this case, the court followed precedent taking somewhat of a contrasting approach under the ESA, emphasizing that NMFS may not accept an overly narrow characterization of an agency action, and courts have the final say in determining the scope. An agency “may not unilaterally relieve itself” of its ESA obligations by describing the action narrowly.
For practitioners, the scope of agency actions under NEPA and the ESA may be trending apart. A project description that holds up under NEPA after Seven County may not satisfy ESA section 7, where future stages requiring separate approvals may still count in defining the action.
- Associate
Jennifer Seely is an environmental lawyer focused on complex scientific and regulatory systems. Her practice spans permitting, compliance, administrative adjudications and litigation. She represents clients on issues ...
- Partner
Paul Weiland is Assistant Managing Partner and a member of the Environment & Land Use Group. He has represented clients – including public agencies, publicly regulated utilities, corporations, trade associations and ...
Nossaman’s Endangered Species Law & Policy blog focuses on news, events, and policies affecting endangered species issues in California and throughout the United States. Topics include listing and critical habitat decisions, conservation and recovery planning, inter-agency consultation, and related developments in law, policy, and science. We also inform readers about regulatory and legislative developments, as well as key court decisions.
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