

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3

4
5 The Consolidated Salmonid
6 Cases

1:09-cv-1053 OWW DLB

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW RE:
PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
(Docs. 161 & 230)

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10 I. INTRODUCTION

11 Plaintiffs San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Authority
12 (the "Authority") and Westlands Water District
13 ("Westlands") (collectively "San Luis Plaintiffs") seek a
14 Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO")¹ and a Preliminary
15 Injunction ("PI") against the implementation of
16 Reasonable and Prudent Alternative ("RPA") Action IV.2.1
17 set forth in the National Marine Fisheries Service's
18 ("NMFS") June 4, 2009 Biological Opinion ("2009 Salmonid
19 BiOp"), which addresses the impacts of the coordinated
20 operations of the federal Central Valley Project ("CVP")
21 and State Water Project ("SWP") on the Central Valley
22 winter-run and spring-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley

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24
25 ¹ Plaintiffs' request for a TRO against the imminent
26 implementation of Action IV.2.1, which took effect as of April 1,
27 Doc. 233, was denied for the reasons stated in open court on the
28 record on March 31, 2010. Doc. 306. The denial of a TRO motion is
not dispositive of the merits of a related motion for preliminary
injunction. See *Office of Personnel Management v. Am. Fed'n of
Gov't Employees*, 473 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1985).

1 steelhead, Southern Distinct Population Segment of Green
2 Sturgeon, and Southern Resident Killer Whales ("Listed
3 Species"). Both motions were filed February 22, 2010.
4 Docs. 230, 233.

5 Plaintiffs State Water Contractors, Stockton East
6 Water District, Oakdale Irrigation District, and South
7 San Joaquin Irrigation District, and Plaintiff-Intervenor
8 California Department of Water Resources ("DWR") filed
9 statements of non-opposition. Docs. 247, 248 & 251.
10 Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors opposed.
11 Docs. 273 & 274.

12 Additionally, San Luis Plaintiffs seek a PI against
13 the implementation of Action IV.2.3 in the 2009 Salmonid
14 BiOp. Doc. 164 (filed Jan. 27, 2010). Plaintiffs Kern
15 County Water Agency and Coalition for a Sustainable Delta
16 joined. Doc. 181. DWR filed a partial joinder in and
17 statement of non-opposition to the motion. Doc. 249.
18 Federal Defendants and Defendant-Intervenors opposed.
19 Docs. 273 & 274.

20 The PI motions came on for evidentiary hearing and
21 argument, in Courtroom 3 of the above-captioned Court
22 from March 30 through April 2, 2010. The parties were
23 represented by counsel, as noted on the record in open
24 court.
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1 jeopardy and adverse modification." *Id.* at 578 (emphasis
2 added). The description of the RPA comprises
3 approximately 90 pages of the 2009 Salmonid BiOp. See
4 *id.* at 581-671.

5 The RPA includes five principle components, with
6 numerous sub-parts, but Plaintiffs currently seek to
7 restrain only:
8

- 9 • Action IV.2.1, which will limit pumping based on San
10 Joaquin River inflow, measured at Vernalis, from
11 April 1 through May 31; and
12 • Action IV.2.3, which imposes restrictions on negative
13 flows in Old and Middle Rivers ("OMR") between
14 January 1 and June 15, or until average daily water
15 temps at Mossdale (a location on the San Joaquin
16 River west of Manteca, California) are greater than
17 72°F, whichever is earlier.
18

19
20 **III. SUMMARY OF MOTION**

21 Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctive relief against
22 implementation of Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3 on the
23 grounds that:

- 24 1) the district court already found that the United
25 States Bureau of Reclamation ("Reclamation") failed
26 to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act
27 ("NEPA") in implementing the 2009 Salmonid BiOp; and
28

1 2) the 2009 Salmonid BiOp is arbitrary, capricious,
2 and contrary to law because:

3 a) NMFS allegedly conducted an effects analysis
4 that improperly overstates impacts attributable
5 to the coordinated operations of the CVP and
6 SWP;

7 b) NMFS failed to clearly define or consistently
8 apply a relevant environmental baseline;

9 c) NMFS failed to distinguish between
10 discretionary and non-discretionary CVP and SWP
11 activities, which overstated the effects of
12 coordinated operations of the Projects; and

13 d) RPA Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3 are arbitrary
14 and capricious, because they are without factual
15 or scientific justification and/or not supported
16 by the best available science.
17

18 Plaintiffs further claim that the implementation of
19 Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3 will cause them continuing
20 irreparable harm and that the public interest and balance
21 of hardships favor injunctive relief.
22

23
24 **IV. STANDARD OF DECISION**

25 Injunctive relief, whether temporary or permanent, is
26 an "extraordinary remedy, never awarded as of right."
27 *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 129 S. Ct.
28

1 365, 376 (2008); *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S.
2 305, 312 (1982). Four factors must be established by a
3 preponderance of the evidence to qualify for temporary
4 injunctive relief:

- 5 1. Likelihood of success on the merits;
- 6 2. Likelihood the moving party will suffer
7 irreparable harm absent injunctive relief;
- 8 3. The balance of equities tips in the moving
9 parties' favor; and
- 10 4. An injunction is in the public interest.

11
12 *Winter*, 129 S. Ct. at 374; *Am. Trucking Ass'n v. City of*
13 *Los Angeles*, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
14

15 V. FINDINGS OF FACT

16 A. The Agency Action.

- 17 1. The agency action is the coordinated operation
18 of the CVP and SWP, pursuant to an Agreement for the
19 Coordinated Operation of the two projects ("COA").
- 20 2. According to the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1937,
21 the dams and reservoirs of the CVP "shall be used, first,
22 for river regulation, improvement of navigation and flood
23 control; second, for irrigation and domestic uses; and,
24 third, for power." 50 Stat. 844, 850.
- 25 3. The CVP was reauthorized in 1992 through the
26 Central Valley Improvement Act ("CVPIA"), which modified
27
28

1 the 1937 Act and added mitigation, protection, and
2 restoration of fish and wildlife as project purposes.
3 Pub. L. 102-575 § 3402, 106 Stat. 4600, 4706 (1992). One
4 of the stated purposes of the CVPIA is to address impacts
5 of the CVP on fish and wildlife. § 3406(a). The CVPIA
6 made environmental protection and water deliveries co-
7 purposes.
8

9 4. This case presents a critical conflict between
10 these dual legislative purposes, providing water service
11 for agricultural, domestic, and industrial use versus
12 enhancing environmental protection for fish species whose
13 habitat is maintained in rivers, estuaries, canals, and
14 other waterways that comprise the Sacramento-San Joaquin
15 Delta.
16

17 5. It is of manifest significance to the public
18 interest that DWR, a co-operator and the State
19 contractual partner of Reclamation, disagrees with at
20 least some portions of the RPA and seeks limited
21 injunctive relief against RPA Action IV.2.3.
22

23 **B. Facts Relevant to NEPA Claims.**

24 6. It is undisputed that neither NMFS nor
25 Reclamation engaged in any NEPA analysis in connection
26 with preparation or implementation of the 2009 Salmonid
27 BiOp.
28

1 7. It is undisputed that a March 17, 2010 Order
2 granted San Luis Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment
3 on their claim that Federal Defendants violated NEPA when
4 they adopted and implemented the 2009 NMFS BiOp RPA
5 without conducting the required NEPA analysis. Doc. 288.
6

7 8. NMFS asserts that it did consider a range of
8 alternative RPA actions, including those proposed by
9 Reclamation and DWR, and "carefully avoided prescribing
10 measures that are not necessary to meet section 7
11 requirements." BiOp at 578, 580 & 720 (NMFS endeavored
12 "through the iterative consultation process to avoid
13 developing RPA actions that would result in high water
14 costs, while still providing for the survival and
15 recovery of listed species."). However, this process did
16 not fully or sufficiently evaluate, explain or analyze
17 the extent and gravity of the harms to humans and the
18 environment visited upon Plaintiffs by Project water
19 service reductions and pumping restrictions.
20

21 9. The 2009 Salmonid BiOp phases in some elements
22 of the RPA over time, provides a health and safety
23 exception to ensure a minimum level of water exports,
24 uses monitoring programs and adaptive management to
25 initiate RPA actions when species are present and
26 protections are most needed, and includes specific
27
28

1 scientific studies and engineering programs to refine RPA
2 elements. *Id.* at 579-80, 719-23. In addition, the
3 challenged RPA Actions were modified between the draft
4 and final RPA to lessen water supply impacts, including
5 shortening the duration of Action IV.2.1 from 90 to 60
6 days. *Id.* at 723; NMFS AR 104419.

7
8 10. A legally sufficient NEPA analysis should
9 identify and analyze alternatives that minimize harm to
10 humans and the human environment. Federal Defendants do
11 not claim that they engaged in a systematic consideration
12 of impacts to humans and the human environment and/or the
13 alternatives that would have minimized harm to human and
14 the human environment while still protecting the species.

15
16 11. Federal Defendants did not take the hard look
17 required to achieve, to the maximum extent possible, the
18 co-equal Reclamation Law objective of providing water
19 service.

20
21 C. Facts Relevant to ESA Challenges.

22 (1) Current Status of the Species.

23 a. Sacramento River Winter-Run Chinook Salmon.

24 12. Sacramento River winter-run Chinook salmon
25 (*Oncorhynchus tshawytscha*) ("winter-run") are listed as
26 "endangered" under the ESA. 70 Fed. Reg. 37,160 (June
27 28, 2005). Winter-run critical habitat includes portions
28

1 of the Sacramento River and other waters. Historical
2 winter-run population estimates were as high as
3 approximately 100,000 fish in the 1960s, but declined to
4 under 200 fish in the 1990s. Gov't Salmon Ex. 4 (Second
5 Stuart Decl., Doc. 273-3), ¶45. In recent years,
6 population surveys of winter-run estimated a high of
7 17,344 fish in 2006, followed by a decline in 2007 (2,542
8 fish) that persisted into 2008 (2,830 fish). *Id.* In
9 2009, there was a modest increase in adult escapement
10 (4,658 fish). *Id.* Winter-run are "currently not
11 viable." BiOp at 88; see also 4/1/10 Tr. 175: 11-12.

12
13 13. Winter-run juvenile rearing and migration
14 typically occurs between July and February in the upper
15 Sacramento River, with juvenile emigration downstream
16 through the Delta taking place between November through
17 May or June. BiOp at 81, 94; *Pac. Coast Fed'n of*
18 *Fishermans' Ass'ns. v. Gutierrez* ("Gutierrez II"), 606 F.
19 *Supp. 2d* 1195, 1216-17 (E.D. Cal. 2008); 4/1/10 Tr.
20 167:5-19; Gov't Salmon Ex. 1 (First Stuart Decl., Doc.
21 190-4) at (internal) Exhibit 1a. Historically, the peak
22 emigration period for winter-run occurs during March.
23 Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶47.

24
25
26 14. During the current emigration year (2009-2010),
27 juvenile winter-run began entering the Delta in October
28

1 2009. *Id.* at ¶46. On April 1, 2010, Mr. Stuart, an NMFS
2 biologist, testified that "about 1,600 winter-run"
3 juveniles have been salvaged at the pumping facilities
4 for the season. 4/1/10 Tr. 174:11.

5 15. The estimate of juvenile winter-run production
6 (known as the Juvenile Production Estimate ("JPE")) for
7 2009 is 1,144,860. Gov't Salmon Ex. 1, at ¶3. The BiOp
8 sets an incidental take limit of two percent of the JPE
9 of winter-run salmon, or 22,897. BiOp at 775; 3/31/10
10 Tr. 112:16-25 - 113:1.

11 16. In addition, although winter-run are currently
12 at the "tail end" of their emigration through the Delta
13 (90% moved through the Delta by the end of March),
14 3/31/10 Tr. 172:3-6, Mr. Stuart opined that the "tail
15 end" of the winter-run migration period is "significant"
16 because it "represents fish that would probably show a
17 different life history than fish that occur during the
18 other parts" and, "protecting the tail end would be
19 important to maintain the diversity of that winter-run
20 population," 4/1/10 Tr. 174:19 - 175:8.

21 17. The emigration period for winter-run is all but
22 concluded for this water year.

23 18. Designated critical habitat for winter-run
24 includes the Sacramento River, the Delta, and downstream
25
26
27
28

1 bays to the Golden Gate Bridge. *Gutierrez II*, 606 F.
2 Supp. 2d at 1217. Currently, the value of winter-run
3 critical habitat is "degraded." BiOp at 93.
4

5 b. Central Valley Spring-Run Chinook Salmon.

6 19. Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon (*O.*
7 *tshawytscha*) ("spring-run") are listed as "threatened"
8 under the ESA. 71 Fed. Reg. 834 (June 5, 2005); 70 Fed.
9 Reg. 37160 (June 28, 2005) (critical habitat designated).
10 Spring-run are not currently viable. 4/1/10 Tr. 179:12-
11 15. Spring-run Chinook have been declining over recent
12 years; this past year was one of the lowest adult
13 escapements ever seen. 3/31/10 Tr. 137:22-138:2.
14

15 20. It is estimated that the entire Evolutionarily
16 Significant Unit ("ESU") consists of 3,800 adults.
17 4/1/10 Tr. 180:9-11; Gov't Salmon Ex. 4 at (internal) Ex.
18 7 (March 2010 population estimates).
19

20 21. The emigration period for spring-run extends
21 from November to May, see Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶50,
22 although spring-run may occur in the Delta in low
23 abundance in June, see Gov't Salmon Ex. 1 at (internal)
24 Exhibit 1a. Historically, April is the peak period for
25 spring-run salvage at the CVP and SWP. 3/31/10 Tr.
26 125:14; see also Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶52.
27

28 22. Emigration for spring-run for 2009-2010 is

1 substantially complete.

2 23. During the current emigration year (2009-2010),
3 spring-run began entering the Delta in October 2009.
4 Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶52. Under the 2009 Salmonid BiOp,
5 NMFS uses the release of specially-marked late fall-run
6 Chinook as a surrogate for determining take of spring-run
7 Chinook at the export pumps. BiOp at 776, 782; Gov't
8 Salmon Ex. 4, ¶52; *id.* at (internal) Exhibit 10 (graph
9 showing peak of spring-run salvage in April). For
10 spring-run, the incidental take limit is one percent of
11 the marked fall-run surrogates. 3/31/10 Tr. 113:1-2; *see*
12 also BiOp at 776. Take of the tagged late-fall surrogate
13 releases exceeded the caution level of 0.5% this year,
14 which would have triggered a reduction in negative OMR
15 flows under RPA Action IV.2.3. *See* 3/31/10 Tr. 113:1-4;
16 Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶52; BiOp at 649. However, because
17 Action IV.2.3 was enjoined, NMFS could not implement
18 Action IV.2.3 for several days. *See* Gov't Salmon Ex. 4,
19 ¶52.
20
21

22 24. Designated critical habitat for spring-run
23 includes the Sacramento River, tributaries supporting
24 spring-run, the Delta, and downstream bays to the Golden
25 Gate Bridge. *Gutierrez II*, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1217. The
26 value of spring-run critical habitat currently is
27
28

1 "degraded." BiOp at 101, 104.

2
3 c. Central Valley Steelhead.

4 25. Central Valley steelhead (*O. mykiss*) ("CV
5 steelhead") are listed as "threatened" under the ESA. 71
6 Fed. Reg. 834 (Jan. 5, 2006). Wild CV steelhead are
7 confined mostly to the upper Sacramento River and its
8 tributaries. BiOp at 107. Recent surveys also have
9 detected small, self-sustaining populations on the
10 Stanislaus, Mokelumne, and Calaveras rivers, as well as
11 observations of juvenile steelhead on the Tuolumne and
12 Merced rivers. *Id.* These small populations make up the
13 remaining representatives of the Southern Sierra Nevada
14 Diversity Group ("SSNDG") of CV Steelhead. *Id.* at 198.

15
16 26. Approximately 90% of historical CV Steelhead
17 range is blocked by dams. 3/31/10 Tr. 99:25-100:2.
18 Mortality rates for CV steelhead, estimated by using
19 fall-run Chinook as surrogates, are approximately 70 to
20 90%. *Id.* at 102:21-23.

21
22 27. While there is limited information on population
23 size, one population estimate in 2005 calculated that
24 there were approximately 3,600 female CV steelhead
25 spawning in the entire Central Valley, compared with
26 40,000 spawners in the 1960s. BiOp at 106.

27 28. All available data indicate that the CV
28

1 steelhead population continues to decline. *Id.* at 108-
2 09; *see also id.* at 100:8.

3 29. The SSNDG is one of the population groups of the
4 CV steelhead. 3/31/10 Tr. 98:2-3. Under the Viable
5 Salmonid Population ("VSP") concept and the Lindley
6 (2007) paper applying the VSP concept to Central Valley
7 salmonids, NMFS must maintain all extant populations
8 within the Central Valley, in order to maintain the
9 viability of the Distinct Population Segment ("DPS") as a
10 whole. *Id.* at 98:3-7.

11
12 30. The SSNDG is a very small population,
13 represented by very few adult fish moving back into the
14 system and potentially only a few hundred to a few
15 thousand juveniles moving out each year. *Id.* at 98:9-12;
16 100:12-23. These numbers are an "assumption" because of
17 the limited monitoring data available. *Id.* at 98:12-15.

18
19 31. The risk of extirpating the SSNDG is very high
20 because 100% of this very small population must travel
21 through the Delta, where it is exposed to numerous risks.
22 *Id.* at 103:2-11. Mr. Stuart opined that this diversity
23 group has a "very tenuous hold on survival" and that
24 "[i]t wouldn't take much to extirpate it." *Id.* at Tr.
25 104:11-13. Extirpation of this diversity group would
26 further decrease the viability of the CV steelhead DPS as
27
28

1 a whole. *Id.* at 103:24-104:3.

2 32. The CV steelhead DPS as a whole is not currently
3 viable. *Id.* at 99:8-11.

4 33. Juvenile CV steelhead typically emigrate through
5 the Delta from late September through June. Gov't Salmon
6 Ex. 1, at (internal) Exhibit 1a. "Peak entrainment
7 typically occurs between mid-February and mid-March with
8 a prolonged tail into June." Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶57.
9 CV steelhead are currently migrating through the Delta,
10 including the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers and their
11 associated tributaries. See 3/31/10 Tr. 118:8-10. As of
12 March 15, 2010, approximately 420 wild CV steelhead had
13 been taken at the CVP since October 2009, and 204 wild
14 steelhead had been taken at the SWP. Gov't Salmon Ex. 4,
15 ¶57. The "highest rates of fish collection did overlap
16 with the period in which the TRO [issued in this case
17 against the implementation of Action IV.2.3] allowed
18 increased exports (February 5 through February 10,
19 2010)." *Id.*

22 34. The 2009 incidental take for CV steelhead is
23 3,000 fish based on "fairly old data." 3/31/10 Tr.
24 135:19-20.

25 35. CV steelhead critical habitat is severely
26 degraded. 3/31/10 Tr. 67:21-68:8.

1 36. Despite over five (5) years of active
2 controversy over relevant ESU designation and
3 preservation of CV steelhead, Federal Defendants have no
4 credible population figures, nor a reliable life cycle
5 model for this species.
6

7 d. Southern DPS of North American Green
8 Sturgeon.

9 37. The southern distinct population segment of the
10 North American green sturgeon ("green sturgeon")
11 (*Acipenser medirostris*) is listed as "threatened" under
12 the ESA. 71 Fed. Reg. 17757 (Apr. 7, 2006); 73 Fed.
13 Reg. 52,084 (critical habitat designated).
14

15 38. Green sturgeon are anadromous fish that spawn
16 and rear in freshwater rivers and estuaries but spend
17 most of their lives in the ocean. Gov't Salmon Ex. 4,
18 ¶58. Juvenile green sturgeon are present in the Delta
19 year round. *Id.* at ¶59. The green sturgeon "is at
20 substantial risk of future population declines" due to,
21 among other things, "loss of juvenile green sturgeon due
22 to entrainment at the project fish collection facilities
23 in the South Delta...." BiOp at 126.
24

25 39. There are no population counts or figures for
26 the Southern DPS green sturgeon. 3/31/10 Tr. 73:1. Mr.
27 Stuart was unable to provide an estimate of the actual
28 population of green sturgeon because relevant data is

1 sparse. 4/1/10 Tr. 177:7-8, 183:17-18. The BiOp
2 estimates salvage of green sturgeon to be highly
3 variable, with a 10-year historical average of 74 adults
4 and 106 juveniles per year. BiOp at 777. However, Mr.
5 Stuart noted that green sturgeon have not been detected
6 in salvage this year. 4/1/10 Tr. 177:10-11.
7

8 40. Green sturgeon are another species for which no
9 reliable population estimates and/or life cycle models
10 have been developed, preventing the formulation of more
11 precise protective measures.
12

13 e. Southern Resident Killer Whale.

14 41. The Southern Resident killer whale DPS ("Sothern
15 Residents") of *Orcinus orca* was listed as an "endangered"
16 species under the ESA on November 18, 2005. 70 Fed. Reg.
17 69,903 (Nov. 18, 2005).
18

19 42. Southern Residents are found throughout the
20 coastal waters off Washington, Oregon, and Vancouver Island
21 and are known to travel as far south as central California
22 and as far north as the Queen Charlotte Islands, British
23 Columbia. BiOp at 159. The Southern Residents were
24 formerly thought to range southward along the coast to
25 about Grays Harbor or the mouth of the Columbia River.
26 However, recent sightings of members of K and L pods in
27 Oregon (in 1999 and 2000) and California (in 2000, 2003,
28

1 2005, 2006 and 2008) have extended the southern limit of
2 the Southern Resident range. *Id.* at 160.

3 43. The Southern Residents have fewer than 90
4 members and loss of even a single individual, or the
5 decrease in reproductive capacity of a single individual,
6 is likely to reduce the likelihood of survival and
7 recovery of the DPS. BiOp at 573. NMFS concluded that
8 Southern Residents prefer Chinook salmon as prey. *Id.* at
9 163 (salmon constitute up to 96% of Southern Resident
10 prey, with Chinook salmon constituting 72% of that prey);
11 *id.* at 573. In addition, genetic and chemical evidence
12 indicate that Southern Residents consume Chinook salmon
13 from the Central Valley. *Id.* at 164. Orca sightings off
14 the Coast of California coincide with large runs of
15 Central Valley salmon. *Id.* at 159-62, 573.

16 44. NMFS concluded that extinction of winter-run and
17 spring-run Chinook salmon, as well as reductions in fall-
18 run Chinook salmon populations³, "would reduce prey
19 availability and increase the likelihood for local
20 depletions of prey in particular locations and times,"
21 which would, in turn increase the risk of extinction of
22 the Southern Residents. *Id.* at 573-74.

23 45. There is no direct evidence of orca mortality
24
25

26
27
28 ³ Fall-run Chinook salmon are not listed as threatened or
endangered under the ESA. 3/31/10 Tr. 126:19-21

1 attributable to the Projects.

2
3 (2) Effects of Ocean Conditions on Salmon Declines.

4 46. Mr. Cramer testified that poor fall-run Chinook
5 adult returns during 2007 and 2008 could be attributed to
6 a change in ocean conditions and very poor survival in
7 the ocean. 3/30/10 Tr. 111:10-112:2; 117:17-118:2.

8 47. The BiOp cites the Lindley (2009) analysis of
9 this fishery collapse for the proposition that "the rapid
10 and likely temporary deterioration in ocean conditions
11 acted on top of a long-term steady degradation of the
12 freshwater and estuarine environment." BiOp at 149. The
13 BiOp also concludes:
14

15 Because the potential for poor ocean conditions
16 exists in any given year, and there is no way
17 for salmon managers to control these factors,
18 any deleterious effects endured by salmonids in
19 the freshwater environment can only exacerbate
20 the problem of an inhospitable marine
21 environment. Therefore, in order to ensure
22 viable populations, it is important that any
23 impacts that can be avoided prior to the period
24 when salmonids enter the ocean must be carefully
25 considered and reduced to the greatest extent
26 possible.

27 *Id.* at 152-53

28 48. Mr. Cramer clarified that the fish of concern
were already at low abundance and that, over the course
of decades, there were other factors operating on their
population trajectories besides ocean conditions.

3/31/10 Tr. 2:18-3:2. Mr. Stuart testified that the

1 collapse of fall-run Chinook was not exclusively caused
2 by ocean conditions, but also was brought about by
3 freshwater environmental conditions, including reduced
4 flows, water temperatures, predators, and non-native
5 species. 3/31/10 Tr. 127:22-25; *id.* at 128:1-11.

6
7 49. Other causes of freshwater degradation,
8 including, but not limited to, toxics, increased
9 salinity, alien and invasive species, predators, riparian
10 pumping and in-Delta diversions are unaddressed by any
11 alternatives. These other causes have not been
12 systematically addressed by Federal Defendants or any
13 other potentially interested agency or entity.
14

15 (3) Action IV.2.1.

16 a. Operation and Purpose(s) of Action IV.2.1.

17 50. The stated objectives of Action IV.2.1 are to:
18 (a) reduce vulnerability of emigrating CV Steelhead in
19 the San Joaquin River (i.e., the SSNDG) to conditions in
20 the South Delta and at the pumps; and (b) enhance
21 likelihood of salmonids successfully exiting the Delta by
22 creating more suitable hydraulic conditions in the
23 mainstem of the San Joaquin. BiOp at 641; 3/31/10 Tr.
24 65:10-18.
25

26 51. NMFS's analysis of the scientific basis for
27 Action IV.2.1 is found in Appendix 5 to the BiOP. Gov't
28

1 Salmon Ex. 20 ("BiOp App. 5").

2 52. While spring flow increases and export
3 reductions have been provided as part of the Vernalis
4 Adaptive Management Plan ("VAMP") since 2000, the
5 proposed operation did not carry VAMP forward, as funding
6 for such flows was set to expire in 2009, and the San
7 Joaquin River Agreement, a key to implementing VAMP,
8 expires in 2012. *Id.* at 2. Based on uncertainty that
9 VAMP would continue, NMFS determined it necessary to
10 develop an RPA which ensured the flows necessary for
11 successful juvenile outmigration and maintenance of
12 critical habitat. *Id.* at 3.

14 53. Action IV.2.1 is in effect from April 1 through
15 May 31 and has two requirements. First, the Action
16 requires a minimum flow, as measured at Vernalis, based
17 on an index of storage at New Melones ("New Melones
18 Index"). *BiOp* at 642. Based on this Index, the minimum
19 flow required at Vernalis from April 1, 2010 to May 31,
20 2010 under Action IV.2.1 is the greater of 3,000 cubic
21 feet per second ("cfs") or the flow needed to meet the
22 requirements of State Water Resources Control Board
23 Decision 1641 ("D-1641"). *Gov't Salmon Ex. 5* (Third
24 Milligan Decl.), ¶5. The Vernalis flow requirement is
25 not challenged here.
26
27
28

1 54. The second requirement of Action IV.2.1
2 restricts combined CVP and SWP export pumping based on
3 the flows at Vernalis, with the permissible exports
4 rising in relation to increased flows at Vernalis. BiOp
5 at 642. The baseline export rate is set at 1,500 cfs, as
6 this has been deemed an operational minimum required to
7 address health and human safety needs. 3/31/10 Tr. 64:9-
8 11. As of a March 15, 2010 estimate provided by the day-
9 to-day manager of the CVP, Ronald Milligan, Vernalis
10 flows are likely to be less than 6,000 cfs, meaning that
11 Action IV.2.1 likely will limit export pumping to 1,500
12 cfs. BiOp at 642; Gov't Salmon Ex. 5, ¶5.
13
14

15 55. Action IV.2.1 will not control exports for the
16 entire 60-day period, as VAMP will limit combined exports
17 to 1,500 cfs for 30 days in April and May. Gov't Salmon
18 Ex.5, ¶23. This year, VAMP likely will be initiated
19 April 22, 2010. *Id.*
20

21 56. Action IV.2.1 is designed primarily to benefit
22 the SSNDG (i.e. steelhead that originate in the San
23 Joaquin basin from the Stanislaus, Tuolumne, and Merced
24 Rivers). 3/31/10 Tr. 65:10-13. Action IV.2.1 will also
25 benefit those salmonids that emigrate out of the
26 Calaveras and Mokelumne Rivers and those salmonids that
27 come from the Sacramento River basin but enter into the
28

1 central and southern Delta through Georgiana Slough or
2 the Delta Cross Channel ("DCC") and the Mokelumne River
3 system when the DCC gates are open. *Id.* at 65:13-18.

4 57. Increased flows from Action IV.2.1 will also
5 benefit designated critical habitat for the CV steelhead
6 within this region by enhancing riparian habitat, flow,
7 and decreasing ambient temperature, as well as increasing
8 turbidity and juvenile migration time, both of which
9 lessen the risk of predation. 3/31/10 Tr. 67:2-17.

10 However, habitat protection is not one of the rationales
11 for Action IV.2.1 articulated in the BiOp or Appendix 5.
12

13
14 b. Viabile Salmonid Population Methodology.

15 58. There is considerable dispute about whether NMFS
16 went far enough in its use of the Viabile Salmonid
17 Population ("VSP") concept to evaluate the effects of
18 Project operations on the Listed Species.

19 59. It is undisputed that VSP can serve as a
20 "conceptual framework" around which the analysis of a
21 project can be structured. BiOp at 51-53. The BiOp
22 describes VSP as follows:
23

24 The VSP concept provides specific guidance for
25 estimating the viability of populations and
26 larger-scale groups of Pacific salmonids such as
27 ESU or DPS. Four VSP parameters form the key to
28 evaluating population and ESU/DPS viability: (1)
abundance; (2) productivity (i.e., population
growth rate); (3) population spatial structure;
and (4) diversity.

1 *Id.*

2 60. Under the VSP concept, abundance is just one of
3 several criteria that must be met for a population to be
4 considered viable. BiOp at 84. ESU viability also
5 depends on the number of populations and subunits within
6 the ESU, their individual status, their spatial
7 arrangement with respect to each other and sources of
8 catastrophic disturbance, and diversity of the
9 populations and their habitat. *Id.*; see also NMFS AR
10 00123481 (Lindley (2007)).
11

12 61. The BiOp explains that under the VSP framework,
13 viability requires more than attaining a particular level
14 of population abundance. "Rather, for an ESU to persist,
15 populations within the ESU must be able to spread risk
16 and maximize future potential for adaptation." BiOp at
17 84. Lindley (2007) further found that an important risk
18 facing salmonid ESUs is "that much of the diversity
19 historically present in these ESUs has been lost." NMFS
20 AR 00123489. Lindley (2007) thus recommends that "every
21 extant population" of the listed salmonids "be viewed as
22 necessary for the recovery of the ESU," because all three
23 ESUs "are far short of being viable, and extant
24 populations, even if not presently viable, may be needed
25 for recovery." NMFS AR 00123494. Based on this
26
27
28

1 recommendation, the BiOp "assumed that if appreciable
2 reductions in any population's viability are expected to
3 result from implementation of the proposed action, then
4 this would be expected to appreciably reduce the
5 likelihood of both the survival and recovery of the
6 diversity group the population belongs to as well as the
7 listed ESU/DPS." BiOp at 50.

9 62. The BiOp used the VSP concept, extensively
10 discussed it, and addressed the various VSP factors in
11 considering the current status of and the impacts of
12 proposed Project operations on the Listed Species. See
13 BiOp at 105 at 43; see also, *id.* at 50-53, 68, 84-88, 93-
14 101, 108-111, 124, 173, 309, 443, 451, 472. However,
15 NMFS used VSP as a qualitative framework.
16

17 63. There is a dispute over whether NMFS should have
18 used the VSP as a starting point for a quantitative
19 analysis. Mr. Cramer opines that the VSP concept
20 described in Lindely (2006) ("NMFS Science Center
21 Evaluation of the Peer Reviews of the Long-Term Central
22 Valley Project and State Water Project Operations Section
23 7 Consultation"), identifies attributes of a population
24 that are useful in determining a population's ability to
25 persist, but is not a quantitative framework. 3/30/10
26 Tr. 105:5-13.
27
28

1 64. Lindley 2006 states that the VSP framework was
2 designed to be a conceptual framework. SLDMWA Ex. 379 at
3 5. However, Lindley 2006 also stated: "while VSP would
4 provide a conceptual framework, an analytical framework
5 will still need to be assembled to assess the impacts of
6 specific projects on VSP parameters." *Id.*
7

8 65. Mr. Cramer opines that there was data cited in
9 the 2009 Salmonid BiOp that would have permitted
10 quantitative analyses within the VSP framework. 3/30/10
11 Tr. 123:1-12.

12 66. However, the NMFS Science Center's 2006 peer
13 evaluation of the previous salmonid biological opinion,
14 for which Lindley was the lead author, disagrees: "While
15 new information or models," beyond the VSP criteria, "may
16 help make the analysis more transparent and rigorous, it
17 is not required and many times is not realistic given the
18 limitations on time and resources." SLDMWA Ex. 379 at 5.
19

20 67. Although the analysis in the BiOp could have
21 benefited from the application of quantitative
22 methodologies within the VSP framework, there is a
23 scientific dispute whether the failure to do so
24 represents a breach of accepted scientific practice.
25

26 c. Population Modeling/Life Cycle Analysis.
27

28 68. Mr. Cramer opines that the BiOp should have

1 performed population modeling and/or life cycle modeling.
2 See 3/30/10 Tr. 94:8 - 96:1. In the context of
3 anadromous salmonids, the application of such a
4 methodology involves evaluation of the life history of
5 the population, from adults spawning in fresh water, to
6 fry emergence from gravel, to downstream migration as
7 smolts rear, and then to the species' salt-water life
8 history. At each stage, population modeling would be
9 used to evaluate the factors that affect survival. *Id.*
10 at 94:8 - 96:1. Mr. Cramer opined that proper use of a
11 life cycle model involves testing of a hypothesis against
12 available data to determine whether predicted outcomes
13 match up with observed values. *Id.* at 97:13 - 98:8.

16 69. NMFS did not explicitly evaluate the impact of
17 project operations in a life cycle model. This failure
18 has been criticized as not complying with accepted
19 scientific principles for population analysis.
20 Plaintiffs presented no evidence regarding the existence
21 or availability of such a life cycle model for the
22 species in question. Plaintiffs did not present evidence
23 that they, or anyone else developed or made available to
24 NMFS an appropriate life cycle model or the results of an
25 appropriate life cycle analysis prior to the issuance of
26 the BiOp.
27
28

1 70. The primary purpose of Action IV.2.1 is to
2 protect outmigrating juvenile members of the SSNDG of CV
3 steelhead, for which no population indices (whether
4 absolute or relative) exist.

5 71. Despite years of controversy and litigation over
6 CV steelhead, the absence of reliable population data
7 complicates the analysis.

8
9 d. Lack of Statistically Significant
10 Correlation Between Exports and Effects on
11 Salmonid Survival.

12 72. The crux of Plaintiffs' critique of Action
13 IV.2.1 is that it is unsupported by the various studies
14 and analyses actually relied upon in the BiOp. The
15 rationale for Action IV.2.1, provided in Appendix 5 to
16 the BiOp, relies on a number of sources.

17
18 (1) Treatment of VAMP Data in the BiOp.

19 73. VAMP is a multi-agency collaborative effort
20 designed to test the hypothesis that exports and flow in
21 the San Joaquin River influence survival of smolts
22 emigrating down the San Joaquin River. 3/30/10 Tr.
23 126:21 - 127:4. Annual reports presenting the results of
24 the VAMP experiment have been produced since 2000. *Id.*
25 at 127:5-7.

26 74. Analyses of the evidence gathered during VAMP
27 have been equivocal regarding the impact of exports on
28

1 survival. The BiOp recognized that "recent papers
2 examining the effects of exports on salmon survival have
3 been unable to prove a statistically significant reduction
4 in survival related to exports (Newman 2008)." BiOp at
5 426.

6 75. Newman's 2008 statistical analyses of the VAMP
7 data concludes that environmental variables could obscure
8 any relationship between exports and survival. 3/31/10
9 Tr. 88:11-14. This caveat was recognized in the BiOp.
10 BiOp at 426.

11 76. The VAMP experimental design has not been
12 implemented in full, in that not all of the planned
13 relationships have been tested. 3/31/10 Tr. 83:11-15.
14 Over the ten years VAMP data was collected, there have
15 been six replications of conditions at 3,200 cfs Vernalis
16 flow and 1,500 cfs exports. *Id.* at 84:2-4. Newman noted
17 that the small number of variables tested in the existing
18 VAMP data did not provide the ability to discriminate
19 between survival effects. *Id.* at 88:19-22. Plaintiffs'
20 expert, Mr. Cramer, and DWR's expert, Mr. Cavallo,
21 recognize these limitations in the VAMP data. *Id.* at
22 191:6-12; 4/1/10 Tr. 100:4-11.

23 77. The BiOp also recognizes these limitations.
24 BiOp at 426. To build a more robust data set, NMFS is
25 implementing a six-year acoustic tag study prescribed by

1 RPA Action IV.2.2. 3/31/10 Tr. 87:11-15.

2 78. The BiOp considered the VAMP evidence and its
3 limitations and did not disregard any important
4 conclusions generated from the VAMP data.

5
6 (a) Figure 10.

7 79. Notwithstanding the lack of statistical
8 significance, evidence contained in the VAMP reports
9 demonstrates that, during times when the Head of Old
10 River Barrier ("HORB")⁴ was in place, as the ratio
11 between Vernalis flow and exports increased, survival
12 increased. 3/31/10 Tr. 86:6-9; BiOp App. 5 at 20.⁵
13 Figure 10 in Appendix 5 of the BiOp demonstrates a
14 positive relationship between the Vernalis flow/export
15 ratio and survival. BiOp App. 5 at 20. The relationship
16 was not statistically significant, but the BiOp states
17 that this may have been due to the narrow range of export
18 rates tested. *Id.*

19
20
21 80. RPA Action IV.2.1 assumes a physical or non-
22 physical barrier will be installed at the head of Old

23
24 ⁴ HORB is a removable rock barrier that "when installed, directs
25 flows on the San Joaquin River away from the Old River into the
26 Central Delta." Finding of Fact #47 Re: Interim Remedies Re: Delta
27 Smelt ESA Remand and Reconsultation, *NRDC v. Kempthorne*, 2007 WL
28 4462395 (Dec. 14, 2007).

⁵ It is undisputed that when HORB is in place, there is a
statistically significant relationship between Vernalis flows and
survival. See BiOp App. 5 at 20; Tr. 3/30/10 128:3 - 130:11
(Cramer); SLDMWA Ex. 128. This is not equivalent to a statistically
significant effect of exports or the Vernalis flow/export ratio on
survival.

1 River in order to prevent the fish from following the
2 flow split at the juncture of the mainstem San Joaquin
3 and Old Rivers. 3/31/10 Tr. 92:4-8. However, because
4 the HORB negatively impacts the Delta smelt, NMFS worked
5 with Reclamation, DWR, and other parties to develop
6 alternative engineering solutions, which resulted in an
7 additional RPA Action to study ways to separate fish from
8 the flow. *Id.* at 95:22-96:3.

10 81. A non-physical barrier, or "bubble barrier,"
11 which uses bubbles, LED strobe lights, and acoustic noise
12 to deter the fish from entering Old River is planned to
13 be installed this year. *Id.* at 96:10-14. Based on a
14 2009 study, the bubble barrier was 83% successful in
15 blocking fish from moving through the barrier. *Id.* at
16 96:19-21. NMFS has determined that the bubble barrier
17 will serve as an effective substitute for the physical
18 barrier at the head of Old River required by RPA Action
19 IV.2.1. *Id.* at 96:22-25. As of March 31, the
20 installation of the bubble barrier was scheduled to
21 commence on April 6, 2010. *Id.* at 180:19.

24 82. Mr. Cramer opined that without HORB in place,
25 studies of survival with HORB in place should not be
26 used. *See id.* at 132:13-24; SLDMWA Ex. 129. Mr. Cramer
27 did not address whether the alternative bubble barrier
28

1 will produce conditions similar enough to those present
2 with HORB in place to permit the reliance on survival
3 data from when HORB was in place.

4 83. The record suggests that an effective barrier
5 will be in place at the head of Old River. It was not
6 unreasonable for NMFS to consider data with HORB in
7 place.
8

9 (2) Escapement Data.

10 84. In Figure 11 of Appendix 5, the BiOp relied on
11 an analysis presented in the 2006 VAMP annual report that
12 showed a positive relationship between the spring
13 Vernalis flow/export ratio and adult escapement (i.e.
14 return from the ocean to freshwater) two and a half years
15 later, based on data from 1951 through 2003. 3/31/10 Tr.
16 70:12-14, 74:7-20; BiOp App. 5 at 21.
17

18 85. The analysis in Figure 11 did not attempt to
19 account for variable ocean conditions or commercial
20 harvest of salmonids. See generally 3/31/10 Tr. 142-43
21 (Cramer). Elsewhere in the BiOp, NMFS acknowledges that
22 escapement survival may be significantly impacted by
23 ocean conditions. See, e.g., BiOp 96, 144-45, 148-53,
24 166-68, 218. There is a conceptual model in the
25 administrative record that suggests even though ocean
26 conditions and harvest may vary from year to year, the
27
28

1 species' long-term declines may be attributed to other
2 factors affecting survival during the freshwater life
3 stages of the species in question. DI 1002 (Lawson
4 conceptual model).

5 86. Although Figure 11 did not account for variable
6 ocean conditions and/or commercial harvest, Plaintiffs'
7 expert, Mr. Cramer, testified that a reasonable biologist
8 would use this data. 3/30/10 Tr. 192:21-193:3. This
9 suggests that it was not unreasonable for NMFS to
10 consider the analysis depicted in Figure 11.
11

12
13 e. Delta Action 8 Studies.

14 87. The BiOp also considered data from the so-called
15 "Delta Action 8 studies," which compared the relative
16 survival rates of coded-wire tagged salmon released at
17 (a) Ryde on the Sacramento River and (b) Georgiana
18 Slough, a channel that splits off of the Sacramento River
19 at Walnut Grove and leads to the interior Delta, joining
20 the South Fork of the Mokelumne River just before it
21 meets the San Joaquin River.
22

23 88. Evaluating the data from the Delta Action 8
24 studies, Newman (2008) first explained that there was a
25 high level of environmental variation in the data. *Id.*
26 at 78:18-23. Dr. Newman performed further analysis to
27 reduce the amount of environmental variation and
28

1 subsequently found a 98% probability that a negative
2 relationship between exports and survival is present.
3 *Id.* at 79:5-7. Mr. Stuart stated the significance of
4 Newman's finding is that as exports increased, survival
5 decreases for those salmonid smolts that are moving down
6 into the San Joaquin River, where they would be exposed
7 to the influences of the export pumps. 4/2/10 Tr. 32:8-
8 34:12. For those fish released into Georgiana Slough,
9 survival was better when exports were lower.
10

11 89. This study is relevant to assessing the impacts
12 of export pumping on fish migrating through the San
13 Joaquin River, because fish released into Georgiana
14 Slough must exit into the San Joaquin River, where they
15 are subject to the influence of the pumps. 3/31/10 Tr.
16 76:20-23. The Georgiana Slough fish share a common
17 migratory pathway with fish that exit the San Joaquin
18 River basin. *Id.* at 76:24-77:6. Regardless of their
19 origin, once the fish are in this common migratory
20 pathway, they are subject to the same hydraulic
21 conditions. *Id.* at 78:1-17.
22

23 90. Mr. Cavallo stated that his interpretation of
24 the Newman (2008) study is that there is a weak
25 relationship between exports and survival in the interior
26 Delta, but conceded that there was some relationship.
27
28

1 4/1/10 Tr. 98:24-99:4. Mr. Stuart testified that
2 Newman's studies are the best available and the fact that
3 Newman could find a relationship given the considerable
4 amount of "environmental noise" and the very low signal
5 to noise ratio "shows that the relationship is probably
6 very real." *Id.* at 159:6-10. Whether this opinion is
7 entitled to weight is disputed by Plaintiffs.
8

9 91. A September 26, 2008 paper prepared by Dr.
10 Newman with Patricia L. Brandes entitled "Hierarchical
11 Modeling of Juvenile Chinook Salmon Survival as A
12 Function of Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Water Exports"
13 ("Newman and Brandes 2008") examined the Delta Action 8
14 data concerning the relative survival rates for Ryde and
15 Georgiana Slough releases and declared: what "we cannot
16 conclude is that exports are the cause of this lower
17 relative survival." 4/1/10 Tr. 67:20-23 (emphasis
18 added); DWR Ex. 507 at 22. Newman and Brandes 2008
19 reached this conclusion because "the evidence for an
20 association between exports and survival is somewhat
21 weak" and because of the study's inability to randomize
22 export levels within a given outmigration season. 4/1/10
23 Tr. 68:1-12; DWR Ex. 507 at 22-23. A later version of
24 this study, dated 2009, omitted this language from the
25
26
27
28

1 conclusion. 4/2/10 Tr. 28:2-13.⁶

2 92. The Delta Action 8 studies seek to relate to
3 exports survival of juvenile salmonids and steelhead
4 passing through the interior Delta from the San Joaquin
5 River basin. These studies show a negative relationship,
6 although admittedly weak, between export levels and
7 survival for fish passing through this area of the Delta.
8

9 f. Limited Amount of Water Available in Storage
10 to Increase Flows at Vernalis.

11 93. Figure 11 and other studies cited in Appendix 5
12 suggest that maximizing the difference between Vernalis
13 flows and export levels (or maximizing the Vernalis
14 flow/export ratio) improves survival. BiOp App. 5 at 8,
15 20-21.
16

17 94. NMFS determined that, because there was a
18 limited amount of water available to increase flows at
19 Vernalis, capping export levels would provide the
20 greatest differential between flows at Vernalis and
21 export levels. 3/31/10 Tr. 71:12-17; 97:14-21.
22

23 95. This reason for controlling exports is unrelated
24 to any direct scientific evidence connecting export
25 levels to fish survival, making the reason arbitrary,
26

27 ⁶ Mr. Stuart explained that although the BiOp cited the 2008
28 version of the Newman and Brandes study, he actually used the 2009
version to prepare the BiOp and the 2009 paper was in his reference
list. He does not know why the BiOp used the 2008 citation. 4/2/10
Tr. 28:2-13.

1 capricious, unsupported by reasonable explanation, and
2 not based on best available science.

3
4 g. Justification for Ratios Used in Action
5 IV.2.1.

6 96. Although not the subject of extensive testimony
7 during the evidentiary hearing, there is little to no
8 justification in the record for the exact flow ratios
9 chosen for RPA Action IV.2.1.

10 97. NMFS looked at the VAMP data to develop the
11 ratio.

12 Current VAMP studies have ratios of flow to
13 exports clustered around 2:1, which have
14 provided low survival indices for upstream
15 releases compared to downstream releases,
16 particularly in recent years. Studies which
17 would have had higher flows (i.e., 7,000 cfs) to
18 export (1,500 cfs) ratios were not conducted,
19 since the necessary environmental conditions to
20 implement this part of the study protocol never
21 occurred. Recent conditions in which high flows
22 did occur in the San Joaquin River basin and
23 which would have given flow to export ratios
24 greater than 3:1 in 2005 and 10:1 in 2006 were
25 confounded by poor ocean conditions during the
smolts entry into the marine environment, and
returning adult fall-run Chinook salmon
escapement numbers from these brood years were
very low (brood years 2004, 2005 which returned
in 2007 and 2008). From the available data,
including the information contained in figures
10⁷ and 11⁸, flow to export ratios should be at
least 2:1 and preferably higher to increase
survival and abundance. In light of these

26 ⁷ Figure 10 suggests there is a positive relationship between
the ratio of Vernalis flow to exports and survival of salmonids in
the interior Delta.

27 ⁸ Figure 11 relied on an analysis presented in the 2006 VAMP
annual report that showed a positive relationship between the spring
28 Vernalis flow/export ratio and adult escapement.

1 factors, NMFS initially developed flow to export
2 ratios of 4:1 for wet, above normal, below
3 normal, and dry years, based on the minimum
4 export level of 1,500 cfs and a targeted minimum
5 Vernalis flow of 6,000 cfs. Flows in critically
6 dry years were targeted to be a minimum 3,000
7 cfs, which gives a flow to export ratio of 2:1
8 when exports are targeted to be 1,500 cfs.

6 BiOp App. 5 at 22-23 (emphasis added). The feasibility
7 and water supply implications of implementing such flow
8 versus export ratios were then examined through computer
9 modeling. *Id.* at 24-68. The BiOp reasoned that a 2:1
10 ratio was insufficient because the VAMP studies
11 demonstrated low survival rates at that ratio, and that
12 higher ratios would be "prefera[ble]" to increase
13 survival and abundance. Yet, without any biological
14 explanation, the BiOp chose to impose a 1,500 cfs limit
15 when flows at Vernalis are lower than 6,000 cfs,⁹ and a
16 ratio of 4:1 (as opposed to 2.5:1, or 3:1, or even 5:1 or
17 higher) when Vernalis flows are between 6,000 cfs and
18 21,750 cfs. *Id.* at 71-72.

21 98. The absence of explanation and analysis for
22 adoption of these limits uses no science, let alone the
23 best available and is simply indefensible.

24
25
26
27 ⁹ This 1,500 cfs limit is the minimum export level that would
28 maintain health and safety criteria. BiOp App. 5 at 22. At flows
of 5,000 cfs, for example, the ratio would therefore be 5,000/1,500
or approximately 3.33:1.

1 h. Will Enjoining Action IV.2.1 Appreciably
2 Diminish The Likelihood Of Survival Or
3 Recovery Of The Listed Species Or Adversely
4 Modify Their Critical Habitat?

5 99. The evidence supports NMFS's general finding
6 that some form of restriction on the Vernalis flow/export
7 ratio is needed to prevent jeopardy to the SSNDG of CV
8 Steelhead. Enjoining any flow/export ratio restriction
9 will appreciably diminish the likelihood of the SSNDG's
10 survival or recovery and/or adversely modify its critical
11 habitat.

12 a. Mr. Stuart testified that enjoining Action
13 IV.2.1 would "jeopardize" the SSNDG of CV steelhead,
14 3/31/10 Tr. 122:9, 121:3-5, which in turn would "further
15 decrease the viability of the Central Valley" steelhead
16 DPS, *id.* at 104:2-3. Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Cramer, did
17 not provide an opinion on the impact of enjoining Action
18 IV.2.1 on the SSNDG of CV steelhead. *Id.* at 24:23-25:1.

19 b. For critical habitat, Mr. Stuart opined that
20 Action IV.2.1 provides benefits by enhancing migratory
21 corridors, increasing riparian zones and rearing areas
22 which can be used by migrating juveniles, and shortening
23 migration time and increasing turbidity, both of which
24 can decrease vulnerability to predation. *Id.* at 110:24-
25 111:14. Mr. Stuart testified that enjoining Action
26 IV.2.1 would remove these beneficial effects. *Id.* at
27
28

1 111:1-2, 121:13-19; see also Gov't Salmon Ex., ¶4
2 (enjoining Action IV.2.1 would "negate" the benefits
3 provided by Action IV.2.1). Mr. Cramer did not opine
4 what effect enjoining Action IV.2.1 would have on CV
5 steelhead critical habitat. 3/31/10 Tr. 25:7-11, 110:24-
6 25, 111:1-2 (Stuart testimony that Mr. Cramer "didn't
7 look at the effects of the flow on enhancing critical
8 habitat in migratory corridors in the Delta").
9

10 100. The low levels of incidental take of steelhead
11 in this water year do not undermine this conclusion.

12 a. Mr. Cramer opined that the current estimated
13 take of salmon and steelhead is below the incidental take
14 limits in the BiOp. See SLMWA Ex. 122, Doc. 244, Cramer
15 Decl., ¶¶ 41-43.¹⁰
16

17 b. The purpose of the incidental take limit is
18 to identify a point at which reinitiation of consultation
19 should occur. 3/31/10 Tr. 113:20-22. It is not the
20 default level at which the facilities should be operated.
21 If the RPA works as designed, the incidental take limit
22 should never be reached. *Id.* at 113:25-114:7, 133:15-24.
23

24 ¹⁰ Mr. Cramer also suggests in his declaration that "once fish
25 have entered the south Delta, their best chance for survival is to
26 be salvaged at the fish facilities." SLDMWA Ex. 122, ¶26. However,
27 Mr. Stuart disagreed with this position and pointed out that, in
28 addition to the mortality at the salvage facility, there is a high
chance of predation for the fish released back into the western
Delta after salvage. 3/31/10 Tr. 132:16-24. The best option is to
keep the fish out of Old River. *Id.* at 132:24-133:1. This is a
matter of scientific dispute among experts.

1 Mr. Stuart opines that the take limits alone are not
2 sufficiently protective without implementation of the RPA
3 Actions. See, e.g., *id.* at 148:20-149:1; BiOp 105 at 729
4 ("If less take occurs from the proposed action than is
5 anticipated, this does not indicate that the actions
6 compromising the RPA are not necessary to avoid
7 jeopardizing listed species.").

8
9 b. Take of salmon and steelhead at the pumps is
10 only a "small fraction" of their overall mortality,
11 3/31/10 Tr. 126:5-7, and does not account for indirect
12 impacts of export pumping. 3/31/10 Tr. 114:10-15. Mr.
13 Cramer, expressed no opinion whether enjoining Action
14 IV.2.1 would increase indirect mortality. 3/31/10 Tr.
15 36:22-37:25.
16

17 101. Action IV.2.1 also helps spring-run Chinook
18 salmon, because "the reduced export rates [caused by
19 Action IV.2.1] create a more positive OMR flow within the
20 southern central Delta," resulting in less fish entrained
21 when entering the San Joaquin River at Mokelumne.
22 3/31/10 Tr. 124:9-15.
23

24 102. However, the record does not support a finding
25 that the specific Vernalis flow to export ratios imposed
26 by Action IV.2.1 (as opposed to lesser or greater ratios)
27 are necessary to avoid jeopardy and/or adverse
28

1 modification to any of the Listed Species. The total
2 absence of explanation for the exact flow limits chosen
3 makes Action IV.2.1 arbitrary and capricious.
4

5 (4) Action IV.2.3.

6 103. Action IV.2.3 operates from January 1 through
7 June 15 or until the average daily water temperature at
8 Mossdale is greater than 72° F, and limits OMR flows to
9 no more negative than -2,500 to -5,000 cfs, depending on
10 juvenile entrainment levels. BiOp at 648-52. At the
11 first level of increased juvenile loss, exports must be
12 reduced to achieve an average net flow of -3,500 cfs for
13 a minimum of five days, and at the second level, a more
14 positive OMR average of -2,500 cfs must be achieved for
15 at least five days. *Id.* For each trigger, OMR averages
16 can return to
17
18 -5,000 cfs only after three consecutive days of not
19 meeting the higher-density juvenile loss trigger. *Id.*
20

21 104. Action IV.2.3 is meant to:

22 [r]educe the vulnerability of emigrating
23 juvenile winter-run, yearling spring-run, and CV
24 steelhead within the lower Sacramento and San
25 Joaquin rivers to entrainment into the channels
26 of the South Delta and at the pumps due to the
27 diversion of water by the export facilities in
28 the South Delta. Enhance the likelihood of
salmonids successfully exiting the Delta at
Chippis Island by creating more suitable
hydraulic conditions in the mainstem of the San
Joaquin River for emigrating fish, including
greater net downstream flows.

1 BiOp at 648. RPA Action IV.2.3 is intended to benefit
2 fish coming from both the Sacramento and San Joaquin
3 River basins. 4/1/10 Tr. 101:18-102:2.

4 105. NMFS utilized several sources of data to
5 determine that export flow limitations would achieve the
6 objectives of RPA Action IV.2.3, including the
7 relationship between OMR flows and salvage, particle
8 tracking model simulations, and other studies evaluating
9 survival of fish within the central and southern Delta.
10 4/1/10 Tr. 134:5-17.

11 a. Reliance on Particle Tracking Model
12 Simulations.

13 106. Plaintiffs' seminal challenge to Action IV.2.3
14 is that NMFS improperly based its rationale for the
15 Action on outputs from computer model runs utilizing the
16 so-called Particle Tracking Model ("PTM"), which models
17 the flow of inert particles as they move within a flowing
18 body of water.
19

20 107. PTM is a hydrodynamic simulation used to assess
21 the fate of particles, as a function of flow, tides,
22 exports, and other factors. 4/1/10 Tr. 18:12-15; see
23 also *id.* at 143:9-25. NMFS used PTM to assess the
24 effects of different OMR flows on the movement of
25 neutrally buoyant particles injected at nine different
26 locations in the Delta. Gov't Salmon Ex. 23 at 2; BiOp
27
28

1 at 364-66. The 2009 Salmonid BiOp states that "NMFS uses
2 the findings of PTM simulations to look at the eventual
3 fate of objects in the river over a defined period of
4 time from a given point of origin in the system." BiOp
5 at 366. According to the BiOp, "PTM data can be useful
6 to indicate the magnitude of the net movement of water
7 through the channel after the junction split (and the
8 route selected by the fish), and thus can be used to
9 infer the probable fate of salmonids that are advected
10 into these channels during their migration." *Id.* at 367.

12 108. Mr. Cavallo opined that PTM data are not useful
13 to infer the probable fate of salmonids because, in
14 contrast to PTM particles, which have no behavior
15 characteristics, fish have behavior, swim quickly, and
16 have a destination in mind. 4/1/10 Tr. 20:14 - 21:5.
18 Mr. Cramer explained that "[j]uvenile salmonids are
19 strong swimmers whose movements are determined by a wide
20 variety of factors varying with species, size,
21 developmental state, season, time of day, and water
22 temperature, as well as relative hydraulic conditions in
23 a channel. Unlike passive particles, juveniles can and
24 do swim against significant currents." SLDMWA Ex. 120 at
26 ¶6. To illustrate the problems with PTM, Mr. Stuart
27 compared PTM simulations to actual data from mark-
28

1 recapture studies of Chinook salmon. This comparison
2 demonstrated that salmon move approximately 3.5 times
3 faster through the water than neutrally buoyant particles
4 and would arrive at Chipps Island in a considerably
5 shorter time frame. 4/1/10 Tr. 37:13 - 38:4.
6

7 109. This was a concern expressed in other studies by
8 other experts. For example, the BiOp relied upon Wim J.
9 Kimmerer and Matthew Nobriga's report entitled
10 "Investigating Particle Transport and Fate in the
11 Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Using a Particle Tracking
12 Model" ("Kimmerer and Nobriga 2008"). BiOp 105 at 380-
13 381; Gov't Salmon Ex. 1 at ¶4; Gov't Salmon Ex. 4 at ¶8.
14 Kimmerer and Nobriga 2008 disclaims: "[w]e do not claim
15 that the specific results presented here represent actual
16 movements of salmon; rather, these results indicate what
17 factors may or may not be important in determining how
18 salmon smolts may move through the Delta." DWR Ex. 501
19 at 18.
20

21 110. DWR expressed similar concerns in an email to
22 NMFS dated April 20, 2009 regarding the draft 2009
23 Salmonid BiOp, asserting that NMFS improperly applied the
24 PTM results in determining the eventual fate of
25 salmonids. Attachment 1 to DWR's comments is a
26 comparison of the results of an experimental release of
27
28

1 coded wire tagged salmon in the San Joaquin River under
2 known hydrodynamic conditions with a PTM simulation under
3 identical conditions. 4/1/10 Tr. 32:19-33:8. These
4 results indicate that under low flow conditions, the
5 coded wire tag salmon reached the end location of Chipps
6 Island long before the arrival of most of the PTM
7 particles. The PTM results only partially corresponded
8 with the coded wire tag results under high flow
9 conditions. *Id.* at 34:3-35:18; DWR Ex. 502 at AR
10 00086765, AR 00086767.
11

12 111. NMFS recognized the limitations of applying the
13 PTM model simulation to salmonids. 4/1/10 Tr. 144:2-8.
14 There were discussions with DWR concerning this issue
15 during the consultation process. *Id.* at 144:9-11. In
16 discussions between DWR and NMFS, NMFS indicated it was
17 using the PTM to evaluate water movement and the
18 potential vulnerability to particle entrainment from
19 various locations in the Delta. *Id.* at 144:13-19. NMFS
20 was explicit that it was not using PTM to predict exactly
21 how fish were moving within these same channels, but that
22 the information gleaned from PTM about water movement
23 through the Delta could provide information on
24 vulnerability to entrainment. *Id.* at 144:19-25.
25
26

27 112. DWR's expert, Mr. Cavallo, agrees with the BiOp
28

1 that PTM data can be useful to indicate the magnitude of
2 the net movement of water through a channel after a
3 junction split. *Id.* at 20:21-23; BiOp at 367.

4 113. Mr. Cavallo also agrees that PTM results may be
5 informative with regard to salmon movement. 4/1/10 Tr.
6 28:21-25. Mr. Cavallo stated that under the appropriate
7 conditions, PTM simulations would be an appropriate tool
8 to describe fish movement in discharge-driven portions of
9 the Delta watershed. *Id.* at 86:8-10. Mr. Cavallo stated
10 that the Kimmerer and Nobriga PTM study shows that "flow
11 has a big effect on the path that water takes through the
12 Delta," and that fish in a riverine system will tend to
13 go with the flow. *Id.* at 30:11-15.

14
15
16 114. Mr. Cavallo's time-step critique of the PTM
17 simulations used in the BiOp is unsupported.

18 a. Mr. Cavallo opines that the correct approach
19 to PTM simulations is be to ensure that the time horizon
20 used in the model was consistent with the time horizon of
21 the fish being studied. *Id.* at 25:6-11. Mr. Cavallo
22 interpreted particular graphs in the biological opinion
23 to indicate that NMFS used a 31-day time horizon in its
24 PTM simulations, *id.* at 26:6-16, and opined that this
25 time horizon was too long and would skew the results of
26 the simulation, *id.* at 27:7-11.

1 b. The PTM simulations NMFS used were run by
2 DWR. *Id.* at 86:14-15; 146:9-10. These simulations
3 included four model runs for the months of February
4 through June, using both wet year, a dry year, and varied
5 whether HORB was installed during the April/May period.
6 *Id.* at 146:14-24, 147:4-6. Three different OMR flows
7 were examined: -3,000 cfs, -2,500 cfs, and -1,250 cfs.
8 *Id.* at 147:15-18. During that simulation, the particles
9 actually were tracked every five days for the first 30
10 days. *Id.* at 147:1-4; Gov't Salmon Ex. 23 at 2. Mr.
11 Cavallo was unsure that the particles were tracked every
12 five days, nor did he review Mr. Stuart's memorandum
13 explaining the PTM simulation results. 4/1/10 Tr. 87:11-
14 13.

15
16
17 115. Mr. Cavallo's critique of the choice of
18 injection sites is weakened by his agreement that at
19 least two of the particle injection sites modeled by DWR,
20 at NMFS' request, were useful in evaluating the movement
21 of water particles at channel junctions. *Id.* at 90:17-
22 91:16. NMFS selected the particular injection sites in
23 order to model the vulnerability of particles within the
24 waterways of the south Delta. *Id.* at 147:22-149:13.

25
26 116. NMFS' PTM simulation also showed that, as export
27 levels increase, OMR levels became more negative. 4/1/10
28

1 Tr. 150:21-21. Mr. Cavallo stated that exports are
2 highly correlated with OMR flows. 4/1/10 Tr. 40:25-41:2.

3 117. NMFS' PTM simulation showed that, as exports
4 increased, the percentage of particles entrained at the
5 export facilities increased, particularly from the
6 Mossdale and Union Island sites and stations 912, 815,
7 902, and 915. 4/1/10 Tr. 150:22-25; see Gov't Salmon Ex.
8 18 (map of injection sites). The proximity of the
9 injection point to the export facilities led to a much
10 higher level of particle entrainment. 4/1/10 Tr. 151:1-
11 3. As exports increased, the rate at which the particles
12 arrived at the export facilities increased. *Id.* at
13 151:3-5; see also BiOp at 365-66; 4/1/10 Tr. 151:21-153:9
14 (explaining graphs in biological opinion).
15
16

17 118. Despite the statement in the Kimmerer and
18 Nobriga study that they could not establish a "zone of
19 influence" of exports, Mr. Stuart testified that the
20 shorter time horizon used in NMFS' PTM simulations
21 distinguished it from the Kimmerer and Nobriga
22 simulations, which utilized a 90-day period. 4/2/10 Tr.
23 23:21-24:2.
24

25 119. Mr. Stuart testified that there is no precisely
26 defined boundary for the influence of the exports, and
27 that the boundary of influence depends on river flow,
28

1 tides, and the magnitude of the exports. *Id.* at 29:4-9.
2 If there are extremely low-flow conditions and high
3 exports, the extent of the exports could travel
4 considerably farther downstream, even towards the
5 junction of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers. *Id.*
6 at 29:9-13. Typically, according to Mr. Stuart, the
7 boundary would be close to station 815 at the confluence
8 of Georgiana Slough and the Mokelumne River or slightly
9 farther downstream. *Id.* at 29:13-15. As the BiOp
10 explains:
11

12 The data output for the PTM simulation of
13 particles injected at the confluence of the
14 Mokelumne River and the San Joaquin River
15 (Station 815) indicate that as net OMR flow
16 increases southwards from -2,500 to -3,500 cfs,
17 the risk of particle entrainment nearly doubles
18 from 10 percent to 20 percent, and quadruples to
19 40 percent at -5,000 cfs. At flows more negative
20 than -5,000 cfs, the risk of entrainment
21 increases at an even greater rate, reaching
22 approximately 90 percent at -7,000 cfs. Even if
23 salmonids do not behave exactly as neutrally
24 buoyant particles, the risk of entrainment
25 escalates considerably with increasing exports,
as represented by the net OMR flows. The logical
conclusion is that as OMR reverse flows
increase, risk of entrainment into the channels
of the South Delta is increased. Conversely, the
risk of entrainment into the channels of the
South delta is reduced when exports are lower
and the net flow in the OMR channels is more
positive -- that is, in the direction of the
natural flow toward the ocean.

26 BiOp at 652.

27 120. This is a dispute among scientists. While DWR
28

1 criticizes PTM modeling, Stuart and NMFS recognized its
2 limitations and found PTM studies helpful to support its
3 conclusions that: (a) as exports increase, negative OMR
4 flows also increase; and (b) that at Station 815 (the
5 confluence of the Mokelumne River and the San Joaquin
6 River), particle entrainment increases from 10% at -2,500
7 cfs, to 20% at -3,500 cfs, to 40% at -5,000 cfs, and 90%
8 at -7,000 cfs. NMFS, through Mr. Stuart, took into
9 account inherent differences in the movement of neutrally
10 buoyant particles and their speed and direction of
11 travel. Administrative law requires deference to the
12 Agency. Additional record analysis is necessary to
13 determine the extent of support for NMFS's additional
14 opinion that exports affect salmonid survival.
15
16

17 b. Additional Data Relied Upon by NMFS.

18 (1) Salvage Data.

19 121. NMFS also relied on salvage data provided by
20 Plaintiff-Intervenor DWR. 4/1/10 Tr. 134:21; see Gov't
21 Salmon Ex. 1 at (internal) Exhibit 3. This data
22 collected monthly average OMR flows for the months of
23 December to April 1995-2007 and the monthly older
24 juvenile loss numbers for both the state and the federal
25 facilities. *Id.* at 135:18-136:8.
26

27 122. This data was presented in Figures 6-65 and 6-66
28

1 of the BiOp:

2

3

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
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
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BiOp at 361-62.

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123. Based on this data, NMFS determined that there was a threshold level of pumping, as reflected by OMR flows, below which entrainment was low, but above which entrainment at the Project facilities markedly increases. 4/1/10 Tr. 139:11-16. The threshold level identified by NMFS is -5,000 cfs. *Id.* at 139:18-21.

1 124. There is evidentiary support for the conclusions
2 that: (1) entrainment data show that as exports increase,
3 so does juvenile salvage; and (2) that at flows more
4 negative than -5,000 cfs, OMR salvage increases more
5 rapidly than at lower flow levels.
6

7 125. However, The comparisons of salvage to negative
8 OMR flows relied upon in the BiOp utilize raw salvage
9 numbers, rather than scaling salvage to population size.
10 See Doc. 179, Declaration of Richard B. Deriso at ¶¶ 3-5.
11 Scaling salvage to population size is standard fisheries
12 science practice and could have been accomplished for
13 several of the Listed Species based on existing
14 population data. See *id.* at ¶¶ 5-6. This failure is a
15 fundamental and inexplicable error. Salvage may have
16 been higher in some years simply because the population
17 was higher, not because of any differences in negative
18 OMR flows. Salvage may have been lower in other years
19 because the population was lower. Dr. Deriso
20 demonstrated the potential significance of this failure
21 by plotting the population adjusted Juvenile Chinook
22 Incidental take rate against OMR flow. Based upon this
23 revised analysis for spring-run and winter-run, Dr.
24 Deriso concluded that there is no statistically
25 significant relationship between the take index and OMR
26
27
28

1 flows. *Id.* at ¶6.

2 126. The BiOp's conclusions reached about the spring-
3 run and winter-run Chinook failed to utilize the best
4 available scientific methodology, because population data
5 was available at the time the BiOp was issued that would
6 have permitted NMFS to perform the straightforward
7 population adjustment required to conform to standard,
8 generally accepted practices for fisheries population
9 measurements utilized in their field of expertise. If,
10 in those years when salvage was greatest, population
11 sizes overall were 10 or 100 times larger than other
12 years, the effects might not be jeopardizing. Without
13 adjustment for population size, NMFS's reliance on that
14 figure was arbitrary and capricious.
15
16

17 127. As to the CV steelhead, for which no population
18 numbers are available, it is less clear whether the use
19 of raw salvage numbers is always inappropriate. Figures
20 6-65 and 6-66 ambiguously reference monthly CVP and SWP
21 "Older Juvenile Loss" on the y axis. Were most of the
22 salvaged fish represented on these charts Chinook salmon?
23 No reason is offered why NMFS did not segregate the
24 steelhead figures from those of Chinook salmon. If the
25 species had been evaluated separately, would it have been
26 reasonable for NMFS to fail to adjust the steelhead
27
28

1 figures for population size? Separate analysis was not
2 done.

3
4 (2) Delta Action 8 Studies.

5 128. NMFS relied upon Newman's 2008 analysis of the
6 Delta Action 8 studies discussed above. See also BiOp at
7 373 (General Discussion of Relationship of Exports to
8 Salvage). These results demonstrate that as exports
9 increase there is decreased survival for salmonids
10 passing through the south and central Delta. Georgianna
11 Slough enters the Delta at Station 815.

12
13 129. Newman's and Brandes' (2009) Delta Action 8
14 studies found that determining the proportion of all
15 Sacramento River smolts volitionally migrating through
16 Georgiana Slough is essential to evaluating the
17 population level or biological significance of any export
18 effects, at least on those populations that spawn in the
19 upper Sacramento basin (e.g., winter-run Chinook salmon).
20 DWR Ex. 507 at 24. NMFS did not address relative
21 population impacts in developing or explaining RPA Action
22 IV.2.3.¹¹

23
24 130. Even assuming all smolts traveled through
25 Georgiana Slough, Mr. Cavallo testified that under

26
27 ¹¹ Although the same failure applies to NMFS's use of the Delta
28 Action 8 data in IV.2.1, that Action was designed to help the SSNDG
of CV Steelhead, all of whom must pass through the central Delta on
their way to the ocean.

1 Newman's weak export-mortality relationship, a 2,000 cfs
2 increase (from 4,000 to 6,000 cfs) in exports would
3 increase total mortality by five percent. 4/1/10 Tr.
4 63:8-25. However, based on his review of available data,
5 Mr. Cavallo estimated that no more than 22% of smolts
6 originating in the Sacramento River would pass through
7 Georgiana Slough, lowering the impact on these
8 populations of a 2,000 cfs increase to one percent. *Id.*

9
10 131. NMFS's failure to evaluate the population level
11 impacts of exports is inexplicable. A population level
12 evaluation would shed light on the relative impact of
13 exports on the winter-run, for which no population spawns
14 in the San Joaquin basin. This failure is less critical
15 to the analysis of impacts on spring-run and CV
16 steelhead, as both species have important populations
17 that spawn in tributaries of the San Joaquin and
18 necessarily must pass through the interior Delta on their
19 way to the ocean.
20

21
22 c. Perry & Skalsi.

23 132. The BiOp utilized the Perry and Skalski (2008)
24 study that concluded survival of fish moving into
25 Georgiana Slough and nearby channels was reduced compared
26 to those in the mainstem of the Sacramento River. 4/1/10
27 Tr. 161:20-162:1. These fish enter a portion of the San
28

1 Joaquin River that NMFS found to be impacted by exports
2 in its PTM simulation. *Id.* at 162:5-17; 4/2/10 Tr.
3 18:12-20, 19:22-20:11.

4 133. However, Perry and Skalski 2008 noted that
5 "there is limited understanding of how water management
6 actions in the Delta affect population distribution and
7 route-specific survival of juvenile salmon." SDLMWA Ex.
8 227 at 3. Mr. Cavallo testified that Perry and Skalski
9 2008 does not provide scientific support for the view
10 that salmonids are lost due to water project-induced
11 alterations to Delta hydrologic conditions. 4/1/10 Tr.
12 66:5-9.

13
14 134. Mr. Stuart admitted that Perry and Skalski 2008
15 did not address water project impacts on Delta hydrology,
16 fish behavior, or the indirect mortality of fish in the
17 central and southern channels of the Delta. Mr. Stuart
18 further admitted that he reached his conclusions
19 regarding water project impacts on Delta hydrology, fish
20 behavior, and indirect salmonid mortality based upon his
21 personal extrapolation from the data contained in Perry
22 and Skalski 2008, and not from any conclusions reached by
23 Perry and Skalski. 4/2/10 Tr. 19:2 - 21:24. However,
24 these personal extrapolations are not documented or
25 otherwise explained in the BiOp or elsewhere in the
26
27
28

1 record.

2
3 d. Vogel.

4 135. The BiOp also relied upon Vogel (2004), which
5 reviewed telemetry-tagging data to investigate fish route
6 selection in the channels leading to the south Delta.
7 See BiOp at 380-81. Based on Vogel's work, the BiOp
8 found that when export levels were reduced and San
9 Joaquin River flows were increased, more fish stayed in
10 the main channel of the San Joaquin River, heading
11 downstream toward the San Francisco Bay. *Id.*

12
13 136. Mr. Cavallo maintains that Vogel (2004) does not
14 support the conclusion that a reduction in export pumping
15 resulted in the reduction of salmon leaving the mainstem
16 of the San Joaquin River and entering the southern Delta.
17 4/1/10 Tr. 47:20-24, 49:8-13, 49:25 - 50:4, 50:17-23; DWR
18 Ex. 505. The Vogel (2004) study concluded that the
19 experiments it conducted "could not explain why some fish
20 move off the mainstem of the San Joaquin River into the
21 south Delta channels," noting that "[d]ue to the wide
22 variation in hydrologic conditions" during the course of
23 the experiments, "it was difficult to determine the
24 principal factors affecting fish migration. Based on
25 the limited data from these studies, it may be that a
26 combination of a neap tide, reduced exports, and
27
28

1 increased San Joaquin River flows is beneficial for
2 outmigrating smolts, but more research is necessary."
3 DWR Ex. 505 at 37.

4 137. When asked about Vogel's inconclusive results,
5 not discussed in the BiOp, Mr. Stuart admitted that the
6 BiOp's failure to disclose the conclusion was "an
7 oversight on my part," for which he had no explanation.
8 4/2/10 Tr. 15:4-9.

9 138. It was not rational nor scientifically
10 justified for the BiOp to rely on Vogel (2004) for
11 findings the authors themselves refused to make.
12

13
14 e. Justification for Specific Flow Levels.

15 139. The only discernable and scientifically
16 justifiable support provided in the BiOp for the negative
17 5,000 cfs ceiling on OMR flows under Action IV.2.3 is the
18 salvage data, represented in Figures 6-65 and 6-66 of the
19 BiOp. See Gov't Salmon Ex. 1 at (internal) Exhibit 3.
20 Based on this data, NMFS concluded that
21 -5,000 cfs represented a "threshold level" of pumping,
22 reflected by OMR flows, below which species entrainment
23 was low, but above which entrainment at the Project
24 facilities markedly increases. 4/1/10 Tr. 139:11-16.
25 The BiOp discusses Figures 6-65 and 6-66:

26
27 Loss of older juveniles at the CVP and SWP fish
28 collection facilities increase sharply at Old

1 and Middle River flows of approximately -5,000
2 cfs and depart from the initial slope at flows
below this.

3 The record does not explain whether NMFS utilized a
4 statistical analysis to choose -5,000 cfs as the break
5 point, or whether that figure was based on a visual
6 inspection of Figures 6-65 and 6-66.
7

8 140. NMFS considered setting more positive OMR flow
9 requirements, which would have been more beneficial for
10 the listed salmonids, but would place more restrictions
11 on exports. 4/1/10 Tr. 178:17-22. Mr. Stuart testified
12 that he "tried to find a point that would be equitable"
13 to balance species protection and burdens on the exports.
14 *Id.* at 178:24-179:6 (emphasis added).
15

16 141. Mr. Stuart testified that:

17 [T]he minus 5,000 was sufficiently []
18 restrictive to protect the fish from
19 entrainment. To go more positive than that
20 would have been better, but I don't think that I
21 would have gained that much. And, you know, I
22 did, you know, consider that to go more positive
23 you'd have to put more restrictions on the
24 exports. And I tried to balance that
25 relationship. You know, more negative would
26 have taken more [] fish, which was less
27 protective of our species. To go more positive
28 would have been more protective, but it would
have been a very onerous burden on the exports.
[¶] So, you know, I tried to find a point that
would be equitable. I didn't run a full
detailed hydraulic analysis and water analysis
on that, but, you know, to balance those two was
in my mind as I was looking at the minus 5,000
as the trigger point.

1 4/1/10 Tr. 178:17 - 179:6. This effort to choose a
2 "balance point," is not supported by any scientific
3 analysis.

4 142. Mr. Stuart testified that he "looked at ... the
5 level where we saw increasing take and use[d]
6 precautionary ... principles to protect the fish." Yet,
7 nowhere in the BiOp (or any other document in the
8 administrative record cited by the parties) does NMFS
9 disclose its intent to use a "precautionary principle" to
10 design the RPA Actions, nor is that "level" specifically
11 defined or justified.
12

13 143. The -5,000 cfs OMR ceiling is based,
14 predominantly on speculation.
15

16 144. Moreover, Figures 6-65 and 6-66, do not scale
17 salvage to population size. This further undermines
18 NMFS's extrapolation of the -5,000 cfs "break point," and
19 affects the credibility of Mr. Stuart's testimony.
20

21 f. Will Enjoining Action IV.2.3 Appreciably
22 Diminish The Likelihood Of Survival Or
23 Recovery Of The Listed Species Or Adversely
24 Modify Their Critical Habitat?

25 145. Although the moving papers seek an unlimited
26 injunction of Action IV.2.3, at the evidentiary hearing,
27 Plaintiff-Intervenor DWR clarified that an injunction was
28 sought only against the so-called "calendar-based
triggers" of Action IV.2.3, and that it does not oppose

1 the salvage-based triggers of Action IV.2.3. 4/1/10 Tr.
2 9:7-10:17. DWR accepts the underlying scientific
3 principle that when significant salvage occurs at project
4 pumps, the projects operations must be altered. *Id.* at
5 10:11-13. In prior remedial proceedings, some Plaintiffs
6 have acknowledged that at flows more negative than -7,000
7 cfs, Delta smelt and the continued existence of two
8 Chinook salmon species are jeopardized. See, e.g., *PCFFA*
9 *v. Gutierrez*, 2008 WL 4657785, *6 (Oct. 21, 2008). The
10 proposed injunction applies only to the "calendar-based
11 triggers" of RPA Action IV.2.3.
12

13 146. There are serious questions whether there is
14 support in the record for the general proposition that
15 exports reduce survival of salmonids in the interior
16 Delta.
17

18 a. The PTM studies do stand for the proposition
19 that neutrally buoyant particles injected at Station 815
20 have a higher chance of entrainment as negative OMR flows
21 increase. But, particles are not a reasonably accurate
22 prototype for the behavior of strong-swimming Chinook
23 salmon, steelhead, and sturgeon.
24

25 b. The salvage data was not scaled for
26 population size, which any prudent and competent fish
27 biologist and statistician would have done, making NMFS'
28

1 reliance on the salvage data scientifically erroneous for
2 those species for which abundance data are available.
3 The effect of this error on NMFS's evaluation of export
4 impacts on CV steelhead is less clear.

5 c. NMFS's reliance on the Perry & Skalski and
6 Vogel studies is unjustified and unreasonable, given that
7 NMFS relied upon those studies to support conclusions the
8 authors refused to reach without explanation.

9 d. The Delta Action 8 studies, at the very
10 least, support the proposition that, for those salmonid
11 populations spawning entirely within the San Joaquin
12 basin, increasing exports can negatively impact salmonid
13 smolt survival. This data, coupled with the highly
14 criticized PTM studies, are the questionable foundation
15 underlying NMFS's rationale for Action IV.2.

16 e. Mr. Stuart testified that if the calendar-
17 based portion of the Action were enjoined, jeopardy to
18 the species would not be avoided because it would "affect
19 a large proportion of the spring-run population, a
20 portion of the steelhead population, and that portion of
21 the green sturgeon population that's currently within the
22 Delta." *Id.* and 186:2-5. (Although, not one sturgeon
23 has been taken as of April 4, 2010.) As further
24 explained in Mr. Stuart's declaration:
25
26
27
28

1 Without the protection of RPA action IV.2.3, OMR
2 flows will increase in relation to the increase
3 in exports, and more fish will be lost to the
4 export actions over current conditions. In
5 addition to the loss [of] salmonids during the
6 salvage process, it is expected that a greater
7 number of listed fish will be exposed to
8 stressors in the delta as they are advected into
9 the channels of the central and southern delta
10 by the altered hydraulic conditions. Loss to
11 predation, as well as other stressors such as
12 contaminants, is expected to occur as a result
13 of this increased exposure.

8 Gov't Salmon Ex. 4, ¶62. Action IV.2.3 is designed to
9 protect the fish from being pulled south towards the
10 facilities; a purely salvage-based operation is
11 reactionary and reflects the pre-biological opinion
12 status quo, which NMFS determined was not sufficiently
13 protective. 4/1/10 Tr. 170:9-171:7.

15 147. Plaintiffs' offer to use the species' incidental
16 take limits to avoid jeopardy is not sufficiently
17 protective. The ITL is not meant to be a ceiling on
18 mortality, in part because it "doesn't address all of the
19 different forms of take that can occur throughout the
20 whole Central Valley." 4/1/10 Tr. 172:21-73:1.

22 148. NMFS's choice of -5,000 cfs as the calendar
23 based ceiling for Action IV.2.1 is not scientifically
24 justified and is not based on best available science.

25 (5) Indirect Mortality.

26 149. Indirect mortality is that mortality that does
27 not occur directly as a result of the entrainment process
28

1 at the Project pumps. 3/31/10 Tr. 104:22-24. Stated
2 another way, it is the sum of mortality that occurs to
3 fish that are under the influence of the changed
4 hydraulic field within the Delta. *Id.* at 105:1-3.

5 150. Indirect mortality is observed within the
6 channels and waterways of the northern, central, and
7 southern Dela. *Id.* at 109:23-24.

8 151. DWR's expert, Mr. Cavallo, does not contend that
9 there is no indirect loss, 4/1/10 Tr. 94:10-12, nor that
10 indirect mortality is not a stressor on fish as they move
11 through the system, *id.* at 94:13-15. Mr. Cavallo agrees
12 that a reasonable biologist addressing the impacts of the
13 Projects should not have ignored indirect mortality. *Id.*
14 at 94:16-19.

15 152. This belies DWR's present contention that
16 indirect mortality is not related to Project operations,
17 as does information submitted by DWR in the prior
18 litigation estimating indirect mortality attributable to
19 exports. 4/1/10 Tr. 190:7-191:10; see D-I Ex. 1003 at
20 (internal) Exhibit 2. NMFS relied on this information in
21 preparation of the current biological opinion. 4/1/10
22 Tr. 191:13-18; see D-I 1011. The information provided by
23 DWR suggests that, based on certain water year types and
24 export to inflow ("E/I") ratios, there could be
25
26
27
28

1 substantial export-related mortality in the interior
2 Delta. 4/1/10 Tr. 192:9-14. Such mortality may be
3 substantially greater than direct take at the CVP and
4 SWP. See *id.* at 190:17-190:10; see also D-I Ex. 1011.

5 153. Plaintiffs' expert, Mr. Cramer, did not deny the
6 existence of indirect mortality, but stated that it had
7 not been adequately tested. 3/31/10 Tr. 19:2-15.

8 154. Acoustic tag studies are beginning to provide
9 estimates of indirect mortality in the Delta. *Id.* at
10 105:9-10. The Perry and Skalski (2008) paper showed a
11 survival rate of about 30 to 35% for interior Delta
12 waters. *Id.* at 105:15-17, 108:15-18; see SLDMWA Ex. 227
13 (Perry & Skalski (2008)). Perry and Skalski did not
14 attribute any particular portion of this to the projects.
15

16
17 (6) Other Stressors.

18 155. It is undisputed that there are numerous
19 stressors unrelated to project operations that adversely
20 affect and jeopardize the viability of the Listed Species
21 and the quality of their critical habitat. The BiOp
22 dedicates a lengthy section to "Factors Responsible for
23 the Current Status of Winter-Run, Spring-Run, CV
24 Steelhead, and the Southern DPS of Green Sturgeon." BiOp
25 at 134-157. Among other causes, this section discusses
26 the following factors adverse to survival and habitat
27
28

1 quality:

- 2 • Habitat blockage by dams of the CVP SWP and other
- 3 municipal and private entities;
- 4 • Water diversion and storage;
- 5 • Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation District ("ACID")
- 6 Dam and Red Bluff Diversion Dam ("RBDD");
- 7 • Water conveyance and flood control facilities;
- 8 • Land use activities throughout the Central Valley;
- 9 • Water quality degradation;
- 10 • Hatchery operations and practices;
- 11 • Over utilization through commercial and/or sport
- 12 harvest;
- 13 • Disease and predation;
- 14 • Environmental variation (including natural
- 15 environmental cycles, ocean productivity, and
- 16 global climate change); and
- 17 • Non-Native Invasive Species.

18 156. Whether and to what extent these factors are

19 exacerbated by project operations has been the subject of

20 continuing debate in this and the Consolidated Smelt

21 Cases. It was not the subject of briefing in the PI

22 motion in this case.

23 157. Plaintiffs have argued that Federal Defendants

24 have wrongfully ignored these other causes and have put

25 the burden of remediation wholly on the water supply and

26 Project operations. Plaintiffs contend that the

27 overwhelming causes of jeopardy to the species and their

28 habitats are these other stressors.

1 158. Federal Defendants have not quantified relative
2 harms, nor has any party suggested what remedies will
3 effectively address these other causes.
4

5 D. Irreparable Harm.

6 159. The evidence has established a variety of
7 adverse impacts to humans and the human environment from
8 reduced CVP and SWP deliveries, including "irretrievable
9 resource losses (permanent crops, fallowed lands,
10 destruction of family and entity farming businesses);
11 social disruption and dislocation; as well as
12 environmental harms caused by, among other things,
13 increased groundwater consumption and overdraft, and
14 possible air quality reduction." Doc. 202, 2/5/10 TRO
15 Decision, at 15:24-24 - 16:1-4.
16

17 160. At the same time, the declining health of the
18 salmonid population is harming other interests, including
19 those of commercial fishermen and Native Americans with
20 cultural and spiritual interests in salmon.
21

22 (1) Water Supply Impacts.

23 161. It has previously been recognized that "any lost
24 pumping capacity directly attributable to the 2009
25 Salmonid BiOp will contribute to and exacerbate the
26 currently catastrophic situation faced by Plaintiffs,
27 whose farms, businesses, water service areas, and
28

1 impacted cities and counties, are dependent, some
2 exclusively, upon CVP and/or SWP water deliveries." Doc
3 202, TRO Decision, at 15:17-24.

4 162. Every acre-foot of pumping foregone during
5 critical time periods is an acre-foot that does not reach
6 the San Luis Reservoir where it can be stored for future
7 delivery to users during times of peak demand in the
8 water year.

9
10 163. It is undisputed that, in the three water years
11 prior to the 2009-2010 water year, California has
12 experienced three consecutive years of drought
13 conditions. Gov't Salmon Exh. 5 at (internal) Exhibit 1
14 at 18. This influences the amount of run-off forecasted
15 for 2010 and is indicative of why reservoir storages were
16 at a low state entering the 2009-2010 water year. 4/1/10
17 Tr. 208:7-15. Hydrologic conditions are not within the
18 control of the parties and have materially contributed to
19 water service reductions to contractors.

20
21 164. It is also undisputed that other, non-project
22 factors, such as tides, wind events, storm surges, San
23 Joaquin River flows, Contra Costa Water District
24 operations, and diversions by in-Delta water users impose
25 limitations on how Reclamation must operate the project
26 to meet flow targets. See *id.* at 202:12-204:1.

1 165. The projects are subject to export reductions
2 required to protect species listed under the California
3 Endangered Species Act, including longfin smelt, delta
4 smelt, winter-run Chinook salmon, and spring-run Chinook
5 salmon, which subject the water project operators to
6 controls under state law that are similar, and, in some
7 cases, identical to those contained in the 2009 Salmonid
8 BiOp and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's
9 ("FWS") December 15, 2008 Biological Opinion ("2008 Delta
10 Smelt BiOp"). See *id.* at Tr. 212:4-213:8; 4//10 Tr.
11 20:18-21:20. In the absence of the BiOps' RPAs, those
12 protections are argued to have likely limited export
13 pumping to levels below those allowable under D-1641,
14 which also limits Project pumping at certain times of the
15 year. See, e.g., SWC Ex. 938 (DWR's 3/30/10 allocation
16 announcement considered several "SWP operational
17 constraints" including "the incidental take permit for
18 longfin smelt").

19
20
21 166. Plaintiffs' estimates of water losses do not
22 account for or otherwise offset losses attributable to
23 proposed remedies in the consolidated Delta Smelt and
24 Salmon cases. See 4/7/10 Tr. 17:10-20:14.

25
26 a. Water Supply Impacts of Action IV.2.1.

27 167. Action IV.2.1 lasts from April 1, 2010 through
28

1 May 31, 2010. SLDMWA Ex. 105 at 641-643. The flow
2 requirements in Action IV.2.1 vary depending on the
3 February New Melones Index. SLDMWA Ex. 105 at 642.
4 Based on the February 2010 New Melones Index of 1,779
5 thousand acre-feet ("TAF") under the 50% exceedance
6 forecast,¹² the minimum flows at Vernalis under Action
7 IV.2.1 will be those required to meet the D-1641
8 requirements or 3,000 cfs, whichever is greatest. Gov't
9 Salmon Ex. 55 at ¶5. Additionally, flows at Vernalis are
10 anticipated to be less than 6,000 cfs in April and May
11 2010, which means that combined exports will likely be
12 limited to 1,500 cfs in April and May when Action IV.2.1
13 controls. Gov't Salmon Ex. 55 at ¶5; SLDMWA Ex. 105 at
14 642.
15
16

17 168. Action IV.2.1 began affecting pumping and water
18 supply allocations beginning April 1. 4/6/10 Tr. 188:11-
19 14. Terry Erlewine, General Manager of the State Water
20 Contractors, estimated that from April 1 through April 5,
21 2010 SWP and CVP experienced a loss of exports of
22 approximately 50,000 acre feet. 4/6/10 Tr. 188:18-19.
23 He also estimated that the two Projects would incur
24

25 ¹² Reclamation only can estimate what will be controlling CVP
26 operations in the future. 4/1/10 Tr. 204:5-7. The degree of
27 certainty in predicting what will control Project operations,
28 particularly in the winter and spring, declines rapidly past two or
three days. *Id.* at 204:7-9. Reclamation uses DWR's monthly run-off
forecasts to develop monthly 50% and 90% exceedance forecasts of CVP
operations. *Id.* at 206:13-207:15.

1 additional losses of approximately 50,000 acre feet, or
2 more, during the months of April and May 2010, as a
3 result of the 2009 Salmonid and 2008 Delta Smelt BiOps.
4 4/6/10 Tr. 196:19-21; 199:10-16, 23; SWC Ex. 939.

5
6 169. The 2009 Salmonid BiOp estimates that, on
7 average, Action IV.2.1 could reduce monthly exports by 73
8 percent in April and 67 percent in May. SLDMWA Ex. 105,
9 App. 5 at 44. NMFS has acknowledged that these
10 reductions are in addition to the reductions mandated
11 under the 2008 Delta Smelt BiOp. *Id.* at 60. If Action
12 IV.2.1, Action IV.2.3, or the 2008 Delta Smelt BiOp RPA
13 are enjoined, Reclamation expects to increase CVP water
14 supply allocations in May and June. 4/1/10 Tr. 213:14-
15 20.
16

17 b. Water Supply Impacts of Action IV.2.3.

18 170. Action IV.2.3 began controlling Reclamation's
19 and DWR's operation of the CVP and SWP, respectively, on
20 January 20, 2010. 4/1/10 Tr. 199:8-9; Gov't Salmon Ex. 5
21 at ¶6. This restriction lasted until January 27, 2010.
22 *Id.* at 199:11-13; Gov't Salmon Ex. 5 at ¶6. From January
23 27, 2010 through February 5, 2010, Action IV.2.3 required
24 OMR flow reductions which, in turn, required Reclamation
25 to restrict its pumping at the CVP's Jones Pumping Plant
26 to approximately 3,300 cfs. Gov't Salmon Ex. 5 at ¶6.
27
28

1 On February 6, 2010, Reclamation increased pumping at the
2 Jones Pumping Plant to approximately 4,200 cfs in order
3 to comply with the temporary restraining order granted on
4 February 5, 2010. Gov't Salmon Ex. 5 at ¶6. On February
5 10, 2010, the OMR requirement for the 2008 Smelt BiOp
6 began controlling operation of the pumping facilities.
7
8 4/1/10 Tr. 200:6-10.

9 171. From February 19 through March 15, 2010, NMFS
10 and FWS independently made flow recommendations of -5,000
11 cfs for OMR flow targets, in order to comply with Action
12 IV.2.3 and the 2008 Delta Smelt BiOp, respectively.
13
14 4/1/10 Tr. 200:5-7; Gov't Salmon Ex. 5 at ¶8.

15 172. San Luis Plaintiffs estimate that for every day
16 that Action IV.2.3 controls under a -5,000 cfs limit,
17 Reclamation's pumping output is reduced by 500 cfs per
18 day. TRO Decision at 14:8-15. Mr. Erlewine estimates
19 that losses to the combined projects between January 20
20 and January 26, 2010 exceeded 90,000 acre-feet ("AF"),
21 and combined losses from January 27 through February 5,
22 2010 were approximately another 100,000 AF. TRO Decision
23 at 14:19-22; TR 4/6/10 183:14-15; SWC Ex. 903. It has
24 been reocognized that even if estimates of loss by Thomas
25 Boardman and Erlewine "are so excessive that they double
26 actual loss, the figures are still significant." TRO
27
28

1 Decision at 15:1-4.

2
3 c. Other Facts Relevant to Water Supply
4 Impacts.

5 173. It is undisputed that even in the absence of the
6 RPAs, the quantity of exportable water is still subject
7 to regulation, e.g. under Decision 1641. 4/6/10 Tr. 184-
8 185. However, the quantity of exportable water has been
9 reduced by the implementation of the salmonid and smelt
10 RPAs. *Id.* From January 20 through March 24, 2010, Mr.
11 Erlewine testified that potential and actual exports were
12 diminished by 522,561 acre feet, of which a 433,000 AF
13 loss was attributable to the SWP and a 89,000 AF loss was
14 attributable to the CVP. 4/6/10 Tr. 185:16-19; SWC
15 Demonstrative Ex. 903.

16
17 174. DWR made its initial water supply allocation
18 announcement on November 30, 2009, allocating five
19 percent of Table A contracted amounts for SWP water
20 contractors. 4/6/10 Tr. 240:16-22; SWC Ex. 923, Ex. B.
21 As of March 30, 2010, DWR increased the SWP allocation
22 for 2010 to a 20% allocation. 4/6/10 Tr. 189:15-17; SWC
23 Ex. 938; 4/1/10 Tr. 249:22-25.

24
25 175. Reclamation announced its initial allocation of
26 CVP water on February 26, 2010. Fed. Salmon Ex. 55 at
27 ¶1. Under the 90% exceedance forecast, Reclamation
28 allocated CVP agricultural users 5% of their contract

1 amounts, and CVP municipal and industrial ("M&I")
2 contractors 55% of their contract amounts. Fed. Salmon
3 Ex. 55 at ¶12. Under the 50% exceedance forecast, north-
4 of-Delta agricultural and M&I contractors would receive
5 100% of their contract amounts, while south-of-Delta
6 agricultural contractors would receive 30% and M&I
7 contractors 75%. *Id.*

9 176. CVP water users faced similar reductions to
10 their individual allocations. Farmers on the west side of
11 the San Joaquin Valley have received reduced CVP water
12 supply allocations in the 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009-
13 2010 water years, and face similar reductions in 2010-
14 2011. SLDMWA Ex. 153 at ¶3; SLDMWA Ex. 154 at ¶4; SLDMWA
15 Ex. 156 at ¶4. In 2007-2008, Reclamation allocated to
16 Westlands 40% of its contract supply. In 2008-2009, that
17 allocation was 10%. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶8. For the 2009-
18 2010 water year, Westlands was advised the initial
19 allocation was zero percent. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶9.

21 177. On March 16, 2010, Reclamation announced an
22 increase in allocations, raising the allocation for
23 south-of-Delta agricultural users to 25% under a 90%
24 forecast and 30% under a 50% forecast. 4/1/10 Tr.
25 210:14-22; Gov't Salmon Exh. 13.

27 178. Judicial notice is taken of the fact that as of
28

1 April 1, 2010, CVP water supply allocations to south-of
2 Delta agricultural contractors were increased from 25% to
3 30%. See Doc. 318-2 (U.S. Department of the Interior
4 Press Release). On April 23, 2010, DWR increased its
5 allocation of SWP deliveries to 30%. See Doc. 323-2 (DWR
6 Press Release). This does not alter the fact that water
7 deliveries will likely increase if the two RPAs are
8 enjoined. 4/1/10 Tr. 213:14-20 (acknowledging that
9 deliveries would increase by 5% - 10% if the RPAs were
10 enjoined).
11

12 179. The quantity of water lost through pumping
13 reductions translates directly into water losses for
14 urban and agricultural water users. In the SWP service
15 area, one acre-foot of water serves about five to seven
16 people for one year. 4/6/10 Tr. 186:25 - 187:1-3. The
17 SWP loss of 433,000 AF, if available to urban users,
18 would have supplied approximately 2.6 million people for
19 one year. 4/6/10 Tr. 187:8-11. Seventy-five to eighty-
20 five percent of SWP supply is provided for urban uses,
21 with the remainder provided to agricultural users.
22
23 4/6/10 Tr. 187:15-17. The Metropolitan Water District of
24 Southern California alone serves approximately 20 million
25 urban users.
26

27 180. Water loss for agricultural users results in
28

1 reduction in the number of acres that may be sustained
2 with actual water supply. Water duty is the amount of
3 water that a crop needs per acre for a growing season.
4 4/6/10 Tr. 187:21-22. DWR information indicates that for
5 the SWP service area, the water duty is approximately
6 three AF per acre. 4/6/10 Tr. 187:22-25. If the 433,000
7 AF were withheld from almond crops, for example, almond
8 production would be reduced by approximately 140,000
9 acres. 4/6/10 Tr. 188:1-4.

11 181. Reduced CVP and SWP water supply allocations
12 have increased the cost of supplemental water. Farmers
13 have been forced to purchase supplemental water at
14 drastically increased cost. SLDMWA Ex. 154 at ¶7, SLDMWA
15 Ex. 155 at ¶17, SLDMWA Ex. 156 at ¶6. Since 2007, the
16 cost of securing supplemental water has more than
17 tripled. SLDMWA Ex. 156 at ¶6; SLDMWA Ex. 154 at ¶7. As
18 of January 2010, the cost for buying replacement water
19 for transfer in a dry year is at least \$300 per acre
20 foot, plus transportation costs. SLDMWA Ex. 157 at ¶12.

22 182. Increased water allocations may lessen this
23 increased cost, and will mitigate anticipated harms from
24 reduced water allocations. Farmers anticipate that
25 increased water allocations would mitigate anticipated
26 damage to crops in proportion to the amount of water
27

1 received and prevent further layoffs of farm employees.
2 SLDMWA Ex. 156 at ¶10.

3 183. In 2009, the Department of the Interior
4 accounted for actions taken under the Delta smelt
5 biological opinion, including federal export reductions,
6 as (b)(2) actions, pursuant to section 3406(b)(2) of the
7 CVPIA. 4/1/10 Tr. 213:24-214:2. In 2010, the Department
8 of the Interior intends to follow the same accounting
9 allocation for federal export reductions related to both
10 biological opinions, to the extent that (b)(2) assets are
11 available at the time the action is taken. *Id.* at
12 214:3-7.
13
14

15 (2) Other Resource Impacts Caused or Exacerbated by
16 the 2009 Salmonid BiOp RPA Actions.

17 184. Plaintiffs attribute a number of other human
18 impacts to reductions in the water supply. There is
19 considerable dispute among the parties regarding the
20 extent to which the 2009 Salmonid BiOp RPA Actions are
21 responsible for a number of other impacts. It is
22 undisputed that these RPA Actions are, at the very least,
23 exacerbating the following impacts.
24

25 (1) Permanent Crops.

26 185. Reductions in the quantity of water supply
27 deliveries have resulted in changes to farming practices,
28

1 including an increased reliance on permanent crops.

2 SLDMWA Ex. 154 at ¶6; SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶¶ 18, 22; SLDMWA
3 Ex. 157 at ¶11.

4 186. Permanent crops place farmers at greater risk
5 than row crops, as farmers cannot cut back on the water
6 to permanent crops without destroying them. SLDMWA Ex.
7 154 at ¶6; SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶¶ 18, 22; SLDMWA Ex. 157 at
8 ¶11.
9

10 (2) Fallowed Lands.

11 187. Because of reduced water forecasts and
12 uncertainty regarding future water supply, farmers have
13 fallowed hundreds and thousands of acres of fields.
14 SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶10; SLDMWA Ex. 153 at ¶3; SLDMWA Ex.
15 156 at ¶5.
16

17 188. Fallowed lands and reduced water supply has
18 caused the loss of thousands of acres of crops. Todd
19 Allen, a third-generation farmer in Fresno County, was
20 able to salvage and harvest only 40 acres of a wheat crop
21 out of a total arable 616 acres on his farm in 2009.
22 SLDMWA Ex. 153 at ¶3.
23

24 189. For every 1,000 AF of water lost by the San Luis
25 Plaintiffs' member agencies, approximately 400 acres of
26 land may remain out of production. SLDMWA Ex. 157 at
27 ¶13.
28

1 190. Fallowing fields also negatively impacts the air
2 quality of the San Joaquin Valley by increasing dust and
3 particulate matter. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶20. Reduced air
4 quality in turn impairs major transportation routes
5 through the valley. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶20.
6

7 191. The commander of Lemoore Naval Air Station
8 described increased bird-on-aircraft strikes attributable
9 to land fallowing. 4/7/10 Tr. 213:20 - 214:6.
10 Reclamation responded by allocating an emergency water
11 supply to farms adjacent to Lemoore. See *id.* at 213.
12

13 (3) Lack of Access to Credit.

14 192. The more unreliable the water supply, the more
15 difficult it is for farmers to secure necessary financing
16 for their farming operations. SLDMWA Ex. 153 at ¶4;
17 SLDMWA Ex. 154 at ¶13, SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶26, SLDMWA Ex.
18 156 at ¶7, SLDMWA Ex. 157 at ¶15. In some cases, lenders
19 deny loan applications because of a lack of reliable
20 water supply. SLDMWA Ex. 153 at ¶4; SLDMWA Ex. 154 at
21 ¶13, SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶26, SLDMWA Ex. 156 at ¶7, SLDMWA
22 Ex. 157 at ¶15. In others, lenders' concerns about
23 availability to lands irrigated by federally-supplied
24 water has required farmers to make a 50 percent down
25 payment to secure any loans. SLDMWA Ex. 156 at ¶7.
26
27
28

1 (4) Social Disruption and Dislocation.

2 193. It is undisputed that farm employees and their
3 families have faced devastating losses due to reductions
4 in the available water supply. The impact on the farm
5 economy from the combination of a three-year drought and
6 diversion limitations relating to the delta smelt has
7 already been severe. SLDMWA Ex. 157 at ¶14.
8

9 194. Lost water supply has decreased the number of
10 productive agricultural acres, which has resulted in
11 reductions in employee hours, salaries, and positions,
12 devastating farm employees and their families. SLDMWA
13 Ex. 154 at ¶11, SLDMWA Ex. 156 at ¶8.
14

15 195. The removal of 250,000 acres from production
16 translates to a loss of approximately 4,200 permanent
17 agricultural worker positions. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶19.
18 Water shortages also cause jobs to be lost in
19 agriculture-related businesses, such as packing sheds,
20 processing plants, and other related services. *Id.* The
21 projected agriculture-related wage loss for the San
22 Joaquin Valley stands at \$1.6 billion. *Id.*
23

24 196. Dr. Michael, Defendant Intervenors' economist
25 with expertise in regional and environmental economics,
26 counters that "[a]lthough water impacts have affected
27 parts of the west side, there is no evidence that reduced
28

1 water deliveries have had a severe effect on farm or non-
2 farm employment in the Central Valley as a whole." D-I
3 Exh. 1006 (Michael Decl.) ¶10. Instead, it is a
4 combination of factors, including the three-year drought,
5 the global economic recession, the foreclosure crisis,
6 and the collapse of the real estate market and
7 construction industry, that are mainly driving crop and
8 job losses, food bank needs, and credit problems in the
9 Central Valley—not RPA Action IV.2.1. *Id.* at ¶¶ 6-10.
10 Dr. Michael estimates that ESA-related pumping
11 restrictions have resulted in the loss of less than 2,000
12 jobs. *See id.* at ¶4.
13

14
15 197. Unemployment has led to hunger on the west side
16 of the San Joaquin Valley. SLDMWA Ex. 158 at ¶8. The
17 Community Food Bank, serving Fresno, Madera and Kings
18 Counties, estimates 435,000 people in the area it serves
19 do not have a reliable source of food. SLDMWA Ex. 158 at
20 ¶4. The Chief Executive Officer of the Community Food
21 Bank, Dana Wilkie, believes that hunger in the
22 communities served by the Food Bank in the western San
23 Joaquin Valley will continue to increase in 2010 because
24 of ongoing water shortages. SLDMWA Ex. 158 at ¶5. Ms.
25 Wilkie understands that at least 42,000 people served by
26 the Food Bank in October 2009 were employed by farm-
27
28

1 related businesses before losing their jobs. SLDMWA Ex.
2 158 at ¶8.

3
4 (5) Groundwater Consumption and Overdraft.

5 198. Reductions in the available water supply have
6 caused water users to increase groundwater pumping in
7 attempts to make up the difference between irrigation
8 need and allocated water supplies. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶¶
9 4, 7; SLDMWA Ex. 157 at ¶10; 4/6/10 Tr. 216:6-7.

10 199. However, groundwater pumping is not always
11 available, and cannot be used in all areas or for all
12 crops. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶11. Increased groundwater
13 pumping reduces the quality of water applied to the soil
14 by increasing soil salinity. SLDMWA *Id.* at ¶15. Not all
15 fields and crops can be irrigated with groundwater. *Id.*
16 at ¶¶ 11, 15.

17
18 200. Increased reliance on and overuse of groundwater
19 has caused groundwater overdraft, which occurs when
20 pumping exceeds the safe yield of an aquifer. *Id.* at
21 ¶12. Overdraft causes increased land subsidence and
22 potential damage to CVP conveyance facilities, *id.* at ¶¶
23 12-13, although it is not clear that any subsidence of
24 CVP facilities has occurred as a result of the
25 implementation of the 2009 Salmonid BiOp RPA Actions, as
26 the only reported incident of subsidence at a SWP
27
28

1 conveyance facility predates current implementation,
2 4/7/10 Tr. 16:1-13.

3 201. Increased groundwater pumping also increases
4 demand for energy. SLDMWA Ex. 155 at ¶16. Due to the
5 falling water table, wells require increased amounts of
6 energy. *Id.* Westlands estimates that pumping of
7 groundwater in 2009 required approximately 425,000,000
8 kWh. *Id.* Adverse environmental impacts are associated
9 with such increased demand for and use of energy. *Id.*

10
11 202. Increased groundwater pumping has depleted
12 groundwater reserves. Groundwater reserves that were at
13 2 million acre feet in the beginning of 2007 are now less
14 than 900,000 AF. 4/6/10 Tr. 216:21-24. Within MWD's
15 service area, storage levels are at 1.3 million AF, about
16 half of normal storage levels. 4/6/10 Tr. 217:4-8.

17
18 b. Impacts of Decreased Salmonid Populations.

19 203. It is undisputed that declines in salmon
20 populations have caused harm to other residents of
21 California, predominantly the salmon fishing industry,
22 although the extent to which the Projects should be
23 assigned the blame for such harms and the extent to which
24 the RPA Actions will alleviate these harms is a matter of
25 considerable dispute.
26
27
28

1 (1) Impacts on the Commercial and
2 Recreational Salmon Fishing Industries

3 204. Mr. Zeke Grader, Executive Director of
4 Defendant-Intervenor Pacific Coast Federation of
5 Fishermen's Associations ("PCFFA"), testified that the
6 commercial fishing industry has suffered tremendous
7 losses as a result of the near total collapse of
8 California's salmon fishery, which precipitated a
9 shutdown of the salmon fishing seasons in 2008 and 2009
10 and threatens another shutdown in the future. D-I Ex.
11 1007 (Supp. Declaration of William F. "Zeke" Grader) ¶¶
12 5, 8. The fall-run (a non-listed species) collapse is
13 believed to have been brought about by a combination of
14 environmental stressors in the Delta, including reduced
15 flows, water temperature, predation, and non-native
16 species, as well as declining ocean conditions. *Id.* at
17 ¶5; see also 3/31/10 Tr. 127:22-128:10.

18
19 205. The evidence establishes that the costs of these
20 closures are substantial: the 2008-2009 closures cost
21 the states of California, Oregon, and Washington
22 approximately 4,200 jobs and well over \$500 million. See
23 *id.* ¶7, Att. 3; see also D-I Ex. 1006 at ¶14.

24
25 206. According to Mr. Stuart, fall-run Chinook
26 emigrate through the Delta during the same time period as
27 Central Valley steelhead (April and May). 3/31/10 Tr.
28

1 128:17-18. The BiOp notes, "[m]any RPA actions intended
2 to avoid jeopardy to listed winter-run and spring-run, or
3 adverse modification of their critical habitat, are also
4 expected to reduce adverse effects of the action on the
5 short- and long-term abundance and the long-term
6 viability of non-listed fall-run and late-fall run."
7
8 BiOp at 715. RPA Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3 are also
9 designed to "reduce exposure of fall-run and late fall-
10 run juveniles to export facilities and increase survival
11 for fall-run leaving the San Joaquin River." *Id.* at 716,
12 717.

13
14 207. Reduced fall-run populations could lead to
15 further closures in future seasons, which, according to
16 Mr. Grader, "would have devastating effects on the
17 commercial fishermen of PCFFA and likely would lead to
18 additional job and income losses. Continued fishery
19 closures threaten the long term viability of the salmon
20 fishery, as the infrastructure and expertise that
21 sustains the fishery is lost." D-I Ex. 1007 (Supp.
22 Grader Decl.) ¶8.

23
24 208. Dr. Michael compared the economic impacts to the
25 agricultural and salmon fishing industries and concluded
26 that the "short-run economic impacts of the endangered
27 species pumping restrictions and salmon fishery closure
28

1 are of a similar scale." D-I Exh. 1006 at ¶16.

2
3 c. Impacts On the Winnemem Wintu Tribe's
4 Cultural Interests in Salmon

5 209. The Winnemem Wintu, a Native American tribe,
6 also have significant interests in Sacramento River
7 Chinook salmon that could be affected by injunctive
8 relief against Actions IV.2.1 or IV.2.3. See D-I Ex.
9 1008 (Declaration of Gary Hayward Slaughter Mulcahy
10 ("Mulcahy Decl.)) ¶¶ 2-3. The declaration of Gary
11 Mulcahy demonstrates that, for centuries, salmon have
12 sustained the Winnemem Wintu and have formed the
13 foundation of the Tribe's cultural and spiritual
14 ceremonies and beliefs. *Id.* at ¶3. However, like the
15 salmon, the Tribe is "struggling to survive," in part due
16 to the decline of native wild salmon and the dietary and
17 health effects this has had on Tribal members. *Id.* at
18 ¶5. In addition, the loss of native salmon runs has
19 transformed the Winnemem Wintu's way of life, which once
20 involved community celebrations, salmon bakes, and
21 festivals, all centered around the salmon. *Id.* at ¶¶ 3,
22 6. The Winnemem Tribe's connection to salmon is so
23 strong that they believe "that if the salmon go, the
24 Winnemem Wintu will also disappear." *Id.* at ¶3.

25
26
27 210. To the extent that an injunction of either
28 Action IV.2.1 or Action IV.2.3 would harm Sacramento

1 River Chinook salmon, as discussed above, it will
2 threaten the significant cultural and spiritual interests
3 of the Winnemem Wintu.
4

5 (3) Harm to Species.

6 211. The potential harms to the species of enjoining
7 Action IV.2.1 and/or IV.2.3 are discussed above.

8 212. The NMFS's and related fish agencies continuing
9 failure, after more than ten (10) years of disputes, to
10 acquire credible and reliable species population figures,
11 perform impact analyses in light of population levels,
12 and develop appropriate population life-cycle models,
13 with explicit knowledge that such data and modeling are
14 generally accepted scientific methods in the field, is
15 still unexplained, except that it is difficult to
16 accomplish.
17

18
19 VI. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

20 A. Jurisdiction.

21 1. Jurisdiction over claims brought under NEPA
22 exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal Question) and the
23 Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 702 et
24 seq. Jurisdiction over the ESA claims exists under the
25 ESA citizen-suit provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
26 Personal jurisdiction over all the parties exists by
27 virtue of their participation in the lawsuit as
28

1 Plaintiffs, Defendants, and Intervenors.

2
3 B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits: NEPA Claim.

4 2. Plaintiffs have already succeeded on their NEPA
5 claim. See Memorandum Decision Re Cross-Motions for
6 Summary Judgment on NEPA Issues. Doc. 266.

7 3. NEPA insures that federal agencies "make
8 informed decisions and 'contemplate the environmental
9 impacts of [their] actions.'" *Ocean Mammal Inst. v.*
10 *Gates*, 546 F. Supp. 2d 960, 971 (D. Hi. 2008) (quoting
11 *Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas*, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th
12 Cir. 1998).

13
14 4. "NEPA emphasizes the importance of coherent and
15 comprehensive up-front environmental analysis to insure
16 informed decision-making to the end that the agency will
17 not act on incomplete information, only to regret its
18 decision after it is too late to correct." *Ctr. for*
19 *Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 349 F.3d 1157,
20 1166 (9th Cir. 2003).

21
22 5. The agencies' violations of NEPA prevented the
23 required reasonable evaluation, analysis, "hard look at,"
24 and disclosure of the harms and damage of implementing
25 the 2009 Salmonid BiOp RPA Actions to human health and
26 safety, the human environment and other environments not
27 inhabited by the Listed Species.

1 6. Harms that have been caused by RPA water supply
2 reductions include but are not limited to: destruction of
3 permanent crops; fallowed lands; increased groundwater
4 consumption; land subsidence; reduction of air quality;
5 destruction of family and entity farming businesses; and
6 social disruption and dislocation, such as increased
7 property crimes and intra-family crimes of violence,
8 adverse effects on schools, and increased unemployment
9 leading to hunger and homelessness.
10

11 7. Where a federal agency takes action in violation
12 of NEPA, "that action will be set aside." *High Sierra*
13 *Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell*, 390 F.3d 630, 640 (9th Cir.
14 2004).

15 8. However, a court may not issue an injunction
16 under NEPA that would cause a violation of other
17 statutory requirements, such as those found in section 7
18 of the ESA. See *United States v. Oakland Cannabis*
19 *Buyers' Coop.*, 532 U.S. 483, 497 (2001) ("A district
20 court cannot, for example, override Congress' policy
21 choice, articulated in a statute, as to what behavior
22 should be prohibited"). Nor should an injunction issue
23 under NEPA when enjoining government action would result
24 in more harm to the environment than denying injunctive
25 relief. *Save Our Ecosystems v. Clarke*, 747 F.2d 1240,
26
27
28

1 1250 (9th Cir. 1984); *Am. Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt*, 714
2 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding public interest
3 does not favor granting an injunction where "government
4 action allegedly in violation of NEPA might actually
5 jeopardize natural resources"); *Alpine Lakes Prot. Soc'y*
6 *v. Schlapfer*, 518 F.2d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 1975)
7 (denying injunctive relief in NEPA case where more harm
8 could occur to forest from disease if injunction was
9 granted).

10
11
12 C. Likelihood of Success on ESA Claims.

13 (1) Legal Standards.

14 9. The Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
15 requires Plaintiffs to show that NMFS's action was
16 "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
17 otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. §
18 706(2)(A).

19
20 a. Record Review.

21 10. A court reviews a biological opinion "based upon
22 the evidence contained in the administrative record."
23 *Arizona Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. FWS*, 273 F.3d 1229, 1245
24 (9th Cir. 2001). Judicial review under the APA must
25 focus on the administrative record already in existence,
26 not some new record made initially in a reviewing court.
27 Parties may not use "post-decision information as a new
28

1 rationalization either for sustaining or attacking the
2 agency's decision." *Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA*, 615
3 F.2d 794, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980).

4 11. Exceptions to administrative record review for
5 technical information or expert explanation make such
6 evidence admissible only for limited purposes, and those
7 exceptions are narrowly construed and applied. *Lands*
8 *Council v. Powell*, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005).

9 12. Here, the Court has considered expert testimony
10 only for explanation of technical terms and complex
11 subject matter beyond the Court's knowledge; to
12 understand the agency's explanations, or lack thereof,
13 underlying the RPA Actions; and to determine if any bad
14 faith existed.
15
16

17 b. Deference to Agency Expertise.

18 13. The Court must defer to the agency on matters
19 within the agency's expertise, unless the agency
20 completely failed to address some factor, consideration
21 of which was essential to making an informed decision.
22 *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. NMFS*, 422 F.3d 782, 798 (9th Cir.
23 2005). The court "may not substitute its judgment for
24 that of the agency concerning the wisdom or prudence of
25 the agency's action." *River Runners for Wilderness v.*
26 *Martin*, 539 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009).
27
28

1 In conducting an APA review, the court must
2 determine whether the agency's decision is
3 "founded on a rational connection between the
4 facts found and the choices made ... and whether
5 [the agency] has committed a clear error of
6 judgment." *Ariz. Cattle Growers' Ass'n v. U.S.*
Fish & Wildlife, 273 F.3d 1229, 1243 (9th Cir.
2001). "The [agency's] action ... need be only
a reasonable, not the best or most reasonable,
decision." *Nat'l Wildlife Fed. v. Burford*, 871
F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 1989).

7 *Id.*

8 14. Although deferential, judicial review under the
9 APA "is designed to ensure that the agency considered all
10 of the relevant factors and that its decision contained
11 no clear error of judgment." *Arizona v. Thomas*, 824 F.2d
12 745, 748 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted).

13 "The deference accorded an agency's scientific or
14 technical expertise is not unlimited." *Brower v. Evans*,
15 257 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations
16 omitted). Deference is not owed when "the agency has
17 completely failed to address some factor consideration of
18 which was essential to making an informed decision." *Id.*
19 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
20
21

22 [An agency's decision is] arbitrary and
23 capricious if it has relied on factors which
24 Congress has not intended it to consider,
25 entirely failed to consider an important aspect
26 of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or
the product of agency expertise.

27 *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut.*

28 *Auto. Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); see also *Citizens*

1 to *Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe*, 401 U.S. 402,
2 416 (1971) ("A reviewing court may overturn an agency's
3 action as arbitrary and capricious if the agency failed
4 to consider relevant factors, failed to base its decision
5 on those factors, and/or made a clear error of
6 judgment.").

7
8 c. General Obligations Under the ESA.

9 15. ESA Section 7(a)(2) prohibits agency action that
10 is "likely to jeopardize the continued existence" of any
11 endangered or threatened species or "result in the
12 destruction or adverse modification" of its critical
13 habitat. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).

14
15 16. To "jeopardize the continued existence of" means
16 "to engage in an action that reasonably would be
17 expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably
18 the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a
19 listed species in the wild by reducing the reproduction,
20 numbers, or distribution of that species." 50 C.F.R. §
21 402.02; see also *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. NMFS*, 524 F.3d
22 917 (9th Cir. 2008) ("*NWF v. NMFS II*") (rejecting agency
23 interpretation of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 that in effect
24 limited jeopardy analysis to survival and did not
25 realistically evaluate recovery, thereby avoiding an
26 interpretation that reads the provision "and recovery"
27
28

1 entirely out of the text). An action is "jeopardizing"
2 if it keeps recovery "far out of reach," even if the
3 species is able to cling to survival. *Id.* at 931.

4 17. "[A]n agency may not take action that will tip
5 a species from a state of precarious survival into a
6 state of likely extinction. Likewise, even where
7 baseline conditions already jeopardize a species, an
8 agency may not take action that deepens the jeopardy by
9 causing additional harm." *Id.* at 930.

10 18. To satisfy this obligation, the federal agency
11 undertaking the action (the "action agency") must prepare
12 a "biological assessment" that evaluates the action's
13 potential impacts on species and species' habitat. 16
14 U.S.C. § 1536(c); 50 C.F.R. § 402.12(a).

15 19. If the proposed action "is likely to adversely
16 affect" a threatened or endangered species or adversely
17 modify its designated critical habitat, the action agency
18 must engage in "formal consultation" with NMFS to obtain
19 its biological opinion as to the impacts of the proposed
20 action on the Listed Species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2),
21 (b)(3); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a), (g). Once the
22 consultation process has been completed, NMFS must give
23 the action agency a written biological opinion "setting
24 forth [NMFS's] opinion, and a summary of the information
25
26
27
28

1 on which the opinion is based, detailing how the agency
2 action affects the species or its critical habitat." 16
3 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(h).

4 20. If NMFS determines that jeopardy or destruction
5 or adverse modification of critical habitat is likely,
6 NMFS "shall suggest those reasonable and prudent
7 alternatives which [it] believes would not violate
8 subsection (a)(2) of this section and can be taken by the
9 Federal agency or applicant in implementing the agency
10 action." 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). "Following the
11 issuance of a 'jeopardy' opinion, the agency must either
12 terminate the action, implement the proposed alternative,
13 or seek an exemption from the Cabinet-level Endangered
14 Species Committee pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)."
15 *National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*,
16 551 U.S. 644, 652 (2008).
17
18

19
20 d. Best Available Science.

21 21. Under the ESA, an agency's actions must be based
22 on "the best scientific and commercial data available."
23 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(8) ("In
24 formulating its Biological Opinion, any reasonable and
25 prudent alternatives, and any reasonable and prudent
26 measures, the Service will use the best scientific and
27 commercial data available."). "The obvious purpose of
28

1 the [best available science requirement] is to ensure
2 that the ESA not be implemented haphazardly, on the basis
3 of speculation or surmise." *Bennett v. Spear*, 520 U.S.
4 154, 176 (1997). A failure by the agency to utilize the
5 best available science is arbitrary and capricious. See
6 *Gutierrez II*, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 1144.
7

8 22. A decision about jeopardy must be made based on
9 the best science available at the time of the decision;
10 the agency cannot wait for or promise future studies.
11 See *Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Rumsfeld*, 198 F.
12 Supp. 2d 1139, 1156 (D. Ariz. 2002).
13

14 23. The "best available science" mandate of the ESA
15 sets a basic standard that "prohibits the [agency] from
16 disregarding available scientific evidence that is in
17 some way better than the evidence [it] relies on." *Am.*
18 *Wildlands v. Kempthorne*, 530 F.3d 991, 998 (D.C. Cir.
19 2008) (citation omitted).
20

21 24. What constitutes the "best" available science
22 implicates core agency judgment and expertise to which
23 Congress requires the courts to defer; a court should be
24 especially wary of overturning such a determination on
25 review. *Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res.*
26 *Defense Council*, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983) (a court must be
27 "at its most deferential" when an agency is "making
28

1 predictions within its area of special expertise, at the
2 frontiers of science"). As explained by the en banc
3 panel of the Ninth Circuit in *Lands Council*, 537 F.3d at
4 993, courts may not "impose on the agency their own
5 notion of which procedures are best or most likely to
6 further some vague, undefined public good." *Id.* In
7 particular, an agency's "scientific methodology is owed
8 substantial deference." *Gifford Pinchot Task Force v.*
9 *U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv.*, 378 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir.
10 2004).

11
12 25. This deference extends to the use and
13 interpretation of statistical methodologies. As
14 explained by the D.C. Circuit in *Appalachian Power Co. v.*
15 *EPA*, 135 F.3d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1998), in reviewing a
16 challenge to a decision of the Environmental Protection
17 Agency ("EPA") under the "arbitrary and capricious"
18 standard of review:
19

20 Statistical analysis is perhaps the prime
21 example of those areas of technical wilderness
22 into which judicial expeditions are best limited
23 to ascertaining the lay of the land. Although
24 computer models are "a useful and often
25 essential tool for performing the Herculean
26 labors Congress imposed on EPA in the Clean Air
27 Act," [citation] their scientific nature does
28 not easily lend itself to judicial review. Our
consideration of EPA's use of a regression
analysis in this case must therefore comport
with the deference traditionally given to an
agency when reviewing a scientific analysis
within its area of expertise without abdicating
our duty to ensure that the application of this
model was not arbitrary.

1 *Id.* at 802.

2
3 26. More generally, "[w]hen specialists express
4 conflicting views, an agency must have discretion to rely
5 on the reasonable opinions of its own qualified experts
6 even if, as an original matter, a court might find
7 contrary views more persuasive." *Lands Council*, 537 F.3d
8 at 1000 (quoting *Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council*,
9 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989)).

10
11 27. Mere uncertainty, or the fact that evidence may
12 be "weak," is not fatal to an agency decision.
13 *Greenpeace Action v. Franklin*, 14 F.3d 1324, 1337 (9th
14 Cir. 1992) (upholding biological opinion, despite
15 uncertainty about the effectiveness of management
16 measures, because decision was based on a reasonable
17 evaluation of all available data); *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n*
18 *v. Babbitt*, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1300 (E.D. Cal. 2000)
19 (holding that the "most reasonable" reading of the best
20 scientific data available standard is that it "permits
21 the [FWS] to take action based on imperfect data, so long
22 as the data is the best available").

23
24 28. The deference afforded under the best available
25 science standard is not unlimited. For example, *Tucson*
26 *Herpetological Society v. Salazar*, 566 F.3d 870, 879 (9th
27 Cir. 2009), held that an agency may not rely on
28

1 "ambiguous studies as evidence" to support findings made
2 under the ESA. Because the studies did not lead to the
3 conclusion reached by FWS, the Ninth Circuit held that
4 these studies provided inadequate support in the
5 administrative record for the determination made by FWS.
6 *Id.*; see also *Rock Creek Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife*
7 *Service*, 390 F. Supp. 2d 993 (D. Mont. 2005) (rejecting
8 FWS's reliance on a disputed scientific report, which
9 explicitly stated its analysis was not applicable to the
10 small populations addressed in the challenged opinion);
11 *Greenpeace v. NMFS*, 80 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1149-50 (W.D.
12 Wash. 2000) (where agency totally failed to develop any
13 projections regarding population viability, it could not
14 use as an excuse the fact that relevant data had not been
15 analyzed).

18 29. The presumption of agency expertise may be
19 rebutted if the agency's decisions, although based on
20 scientific expertise, are not reasoned. *Greenpeace*, 80
21 F. Supp. 2d at 1147. Agencies cannot disregard available
22 scientific evidence better than the evidence on which it
23 relies. *Kern County Farm Bureau v. Allen*, 450 F.3d 1072,
24 1080 (9th Cir. 2006); *S.W. Ctr. for Biological Diversity*
25 *v. Babbitt*, 215 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

27 30. Courts routinely perform substantive reviews of
28

1 record evidence to evaluate the agency's treatment of
2 best available science. The judicial review process is
3 not one of blind acceptance. See, e.g., *Kern County*, 450
4 F.3d 1072 (thoroughly reviewing three post-comment
5 studies and FWS's treatment of those studies to determine
6 whether they "provide[d] the sole, essential support for"
7 or "merely supplemented" the data used to support a
8 listing decision); *Home Builders Ass'n of N. Cal. v. U.S.*
9 *Fish and Wildlife Serv.*, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1120 (N.D.
10 Cal. 2007) (examining substance of challenge to FWS's
11 determination that certain data should be disregarded);
12 *Trout Unlimited v. Lohn*, 645 F. Supp. 2d 929 (D. Or.
13 2007) (finding best available science standard had been
14 violated after thorough examination of rationale for
15 NMFS's decision to withdraw its proposal to list Oregon
16 Coast Coho salmon); *Oceana, Inc. v. Evans*, 384 F. Supp.
17 2d 203, 217-18 (D.D.C. 2005) (carefully considering
18 scientific underpinnings of challenge to Service's use of
19 a particular model, including post decision evidence
20 presented by an expert, to help the court understand a
21 complex model, applying one of several record review
22 exceptions articulated in *Esch v. Yeutter*, 876 F.2d 976,
23 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989), which are similar to those
24 articulated by the Ninth Circuit).

1 31. Courts are not required to defer to an agency
2 conclusion that runs counter to that of other agencies or
3 individuals with specialized expertise in a particular
4 technical area. See, e.g., *Am. Turnboat Ass'n v.*
5 *Baldrige*, 738 F.2d 1013, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 1984) (NMFS's
6 decision under the Marine Mammal Protection Act was not
7 supported by substantial evidence because agency ignored
8 data that was product of "many years' effort by trained
9 research personnel"); *Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of*
10 *Eng'rs*, 701 F.2d 1011, 1030 (2d Cir. 1983) ("court may
11 properly be skeptical as to whether an EIS's conclusions
12 have a substantial basis in fact if the responsible
13 agency has apparently ignored the conflicting views of
14 other agencies having pertinent experience[]") (internal
15 citations omitted). Here, DWR has a scientifically-
16 based, contrary view of the science, has considered the
17 economic consequences of the RPA Actions, and has
18 intervened to protect humans and the human environment.
19 A court should "reject conclusory assertions of agency
20 'expertise' where the agency spurns un rebutted expert
21 opinions without itself offering a credible alternative
22 explanation." *N. Spotted Owl v. Hodel*, 716 F. Supp. 479,
23 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (citing *Am. Turnboat Ass'n*, 738
24 F.2d at 1016).

1 32. In *Conner v. Burford*, 848 F.2d 1441, 1453-54
2 (9th Cir. 1988), the agency attempted to defend its
3 biological opinions by arguing that there was a lack of
4 sufficient information. In rejecting this defense, the
5 court held that "incomplete information about post-
6 leasing activities does not excuse the failure to comply
7 with the statutory requirement of a comprehensive
8 biological opinion using the best information available,"
9 and it noted that FWS could have completed more analysis
10 with the information that was available. *Id.* at 1454
11 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit stated:

12 In light of the ESA requirement that the
13 agencies use the best scientific and commercial
14 data available ... the FWS cannot ignore
15 available biological info or fail to develop
16 projections of oil and gas activities which may
17 indicate potential conflicts between development
18 and the preservation of protected species. We
19 hold that the FWS violated the ESA by failing to
20 use the best information available to prepare
21 comprehensive biological opinions.

22 848 F.2d at 1454 (emphasis added).

23 (2) Environmental Baseline.

24 33. Plaintiffs argue that the BiOp is flawed because
25 NMFS improperly attributed negative effects to the
26 Project that should have been included in the
27 environmental baseline. Doc. 164 at 10-16.

28 34. The relevant regulatory definition of the
 "environmental baseline" is provided within the

1 definition of the "effects of the action":

2 the direct and indirect effects of an action on
3 the species or critical habitat, together with
4 the effects of other activities that are
5 interrelated or interdependent with that action,
6 that will be added to the environmental
7 baseline. The environmental baseline includes
8 the past and present impacts of all Federal,
9 State, or private actions and other human
activities in the action area, the anticipated
impacts of all proposed Federal projects in the
action area that have already undergone formal
or early section 7 consultation, and the impact
of State or private actions which are
contemporaneous with the consultation in
process.

10 50 C.F.R. § 402.02.

11 35. When determining the "effects of the action,"
12 the agency first must evaluate the status of the species
13 or critical habitat, which will involve "consideration of
14 the present environment" in which the species or habitat
15 exists as well as "the environment that will exist when
16 the action is completed, in terms of the totality of
17 factors affecting the species or critical habitat." 51
18 Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,932 (June 3, 1986). This evaluation
19 is to serve as the "baseline" for determining the effects
20 of the action on the species or critical habitat. *Id.*
21 However, it is all evaluated together as the "effects of
22 the action."
23

24 36. If additional data would provide a better
25 information base from which to formulate a biological
26 opinion, the Director may request an extension of formal
27
28

1 consultation and that the action agency obtain additional
2 data to determine how or to what extent the action may
3 affect listed species or critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. §
4 402.14(f); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and National
5 Marine Fisheries Service, *Endangered Species Consultation*
6 *Handbook* (March 1998) at 4-6.¹³
7

8 37. The Ninth Circuit directed NMFS to consider the
9 effects of its actions "within the context of other
10 existing human activities that impact the listed
11 species." *NWF v. NMFS II*, 524 F.3d at 930. "[T]he
12 proper baseline analysis is not the proportional share of
13 responsibility the federal agency bears for the decline
14 in the species, but what jeopardy might result from the
15 agency's proposed actions in the present and future human
16 and natural contexts." *Id.* The relevant jeopardy
17 analysis is whether this Project will tip a species into
18 a state of "likely extinction." 524 F.3d at 930.
19

20 Even under the so-called aggregation approach
21 NMFS challenges, then, an agency only
22 "jeopardize[s]" a species if it causes some new
23 jeopardy. An agency may still take action that
24 removes a species from jeopardy entirely, or
25 that lessens the degree of jeopardy. However, an
26 agency may not take action that will tip a
species from a state of precarious survival into
a state of likely extinction. Likewise, even
where baseline conditions already jeopardize a
species, an agency may not take action that
deepens the jeopardy by causing additional harm.

27 ¹³ Judicial notice may be taken of this Handbook, which is
28 available at:
<http://www.fws.gov/endangered/consultations/s7hndbk/s7hndbk.htm>.

1
2 Our approach does not require NMFS to include
3 the entire environmental baseline in the "agency
4 action" subject to review. It simply requires
5 that NMFS appropriately consider the effects of
6 its actions "within the context of other
7 existing human activities that impact the listed
8 species." [citation]. This approach is
9 consistent with our instruction (which NMFS does
10 not challenge) that "[t]he proper baseline
11 analysis is not the proportional share of
12 responsibility the federal agency bears for the
13 decline in the species, but what jeopardy might
14 result from the agency's proposed actions in the
15 present and future human and natural contexts."
16 [citation].

17 *Id.* (footnote omitted).

18
19 38. The agency is not required to quantify and/or
20 parcel out the "proportional share" of harms among the
21 baseline and the proposed action. See *Pacific Coast
22 Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. U.S. Bureau of
23 Reclamation*, 426 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005); see
24 also *Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. U.S.
25 Bureau of Reclamation*, 226 Fed. Appx. 715, 718 (9th Cir.
26 2007) (rejecting water users' argument that agency action
27 must be the "historical cause" of the jeopardy to
28 salmon). However, the record must reasonably demonstrate
that the agency's proposed actions, when viewed in the
present and future human and natural contexts, will cause
jeopardy or adverse modification.¹⁴

¹⁴ Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction specifically addresses the treatment of hatcheries and gravel loss below Whiskeytown Dam. Doc. 164 at 11-12. However, this issue was not presented or discussed at the evidentiary hearing or in Plaintiffs' proposed findings. It appears that these specific arguments have

1 39. Here, Plaintiffs identify only two potential
2 flaws in the environmental baseline in their Proposed
3 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, namely NMFS's
4 general failure to segregate discretionary from non-
5 discretionary actions, Doc. 316, Pltf's Proposed Findings
6 of Fact ## 65-66, 80, and, more specifically, NMFS's
7 failure to treat certain obligations arising under the
8 Coordinated Operations Agreement ("COA") as "mandatory,"
9 *id.* at Proposed Findings of Fact ## 67-80.¹⁵

11
12 a. Treatment of Discretionary v. Non-
13 Discretionary Operations.

14 40. Plaintiffs complain that the BiOp does not
15 distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary
16 actions. *Home Builders*, 551 U.S. 644, held that ESA §
17 7's consultation requirements do not apply to non-
18 discretionary actions. Where an agency is required by
19 law to perform an action, it lacks the power to insure
20 that the action will not jeopardize the species. *Id.* at
21 667.

22 41. However, *Home Builders* says nothing about
23 whether, once section 7 consultation is triggered, the
24 jeopardy analysis should segregate discretionary and non-
25

26 been abandoned.

27 ¹⁵ It is unclear whether Plaintiffs contend that all other
28 stressors now jeopardizing the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers and
the Delta are part of the Baseline and must not be considered
cumulatively with the effects of coordinated Project operations.

1 discretionary actions, relegating the non-discretionary
2 actions to the environmental baseline. *Home Builders*
3 fundamentally concerns whether the section 7 consultation
4 obligation attaches to a particular agency action at all.
5 See *Home Builders*, 551 U.S. at 679-80 ("duty does not
6 attach to actions... that an agency is required by
7 statute to undertake....") (emphasis added).
8

9
10 b. Reclamation's Treatment of the Coordinated
Operations Agreement.

11 The same reasoning applies to Plaintiffs' related
12 argument that Federal Defendants acted unlawfully by
13 attributing to the project the effects of "mandatory"
14 compliance with the Coordinated Operations Agreement
15 ("COA"). Even assuming, *arguendo*, that any mandatory
16 obligation exists under the COA, a proposition that is
17 questionable given the open-ended wording of the COA and
18 language in the CVPIA subjecting project operations to
19 the ESA, *Home Builders* does not require the agency to
20 segregate discretionary from non-discretionary activities
21 during an ESA § 7 consultation.¹⁶ Moreover, this argument
22 was not presented in Plaintiffs' opening brief. See
23 *Alaska Ctr. for Env't. v. U.S. Forest Serv.*, 189 F.3d 851,
24 858 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Arguments not raised in
25
26

27
28 ¹⁶ To the extent that Plaintiffs suggest that section 7 does not apply to the projects at all under *Home Builders*, this paradigm-shifting argument has not properly been raised or briefed.

1 opening brief are waived").

2
3 (3) Southern Resident Indirect Effects Analysis.

4 42. Plaintiffs raise another argument based on an
5 alleged error in the effects analysis pertaining to the
6 impacts of the projects on Southern Resident Killer
7 whales. Doc. 164 at 16-19. While the parties briefed
8 the issue, engaging in considerable debate over both the
9 appropriate standard to be applied to indirect effects
10 analyses and the sufficiency of the evidence cited in the
11 record to support NMFS's conclusions, this issue was not
12 a focus of the evidentiary hearing.

13
14 43. It is unnecessary to reach this issue because,
15 even if, *arguendo*, Plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood
16 of success on this claim, the alleged deficiencies in the
17 BiOp's analysis of impacts to orcas do not justify
18 enjoining either RPA Action IV.2.1 or IV.2.3. An
19 injunction must be "narrowly tailored" to give only the
20 relief to which plaintiffs are entitled. *See Orantes-*
21 *Hernandez v. Thornburgh*, 919 F.2d 549, 558 (9th Cir.
22 1990). Here, NMFS adopted Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3
23 primarily for the benefit of salmon, steelhead, and green
24 sturgeon that migrate through the Delta and are harmed by
25 export pumping that interferes with their migrations, not
26 orcas which reside in the ocean. *See* 4/1/10 Tr. 184:4-17
27
28

1 (Action IV.2.3 was not designed with the objective to
2 protect orcas or fall-run Chinook salmon). The indirect
3 effect of alleged reductions of orca prey is not
4 mentioned as a direct justification for either challenged
5 RPA.
6

7 (4) Challenges to Action IV.2.1.

8 a. Viable Salmonid Population Methodology/
9 Population Modeling/ Life Cycle Analysis.

10 44. Plaintiffs' argument that NMFS failed to apply
11 the VSP methodology in a sufficiently rigorous manner is
12 unpersuasive. The BiOp did not ignore the VSP
13 methodology. Rather, it chose to use VSP in a
14 qualitative manner as a conceptual framework, as
15 recommended by Lindley (2006). Although the analysis in
16 the BiOp may have benefited from the application of
17 quantitative VSP methodologies, it is disputed whether
18 the failure to do so represents a breach of accepted
19 scientific practice. A court must defer to the agency in
20 such scientific disputes.
21

22 45. The agency is not required to generate new
23 studies. For example, in *Southwest Center for Biological
24 Diversity v. Babbitt*, 215 F.3d 58, 60-61 (D.C. Cir.
25 2000), the district court found the available evidence
26 regarding FWS's decision not to list the Queen Charlotte
27 goshawks "inconclusive" and held that the agency was
28

1 obligated to find better data on the species' abundance.
2 The D.C. Circuit reversed, emphasizing that, although
3 "the district court's view has a superficial appeal ...
4 this superficial appeal cannot circumvent the statute's
5 clear wording: The secretary must make his decision as
6 to whether to list a species as threatened or endangered
7 'solely on the basis of the best scientific and
8 commercial data available to him....' 16 U.S.C. §
9 1533(b)(1)(A)." *Id.* at 61. Requiring NMFS to adapt the
10 VSP methodology to operate as a quantitative model would
11 be the equivalent of requiring NMFS to generate data.
12 The court has no authority to do so.

13
14
15 46. The same conclusion is required for Plaintiffs'
16 contention that NMFS should have engaged in population
17 modeling and/or life cycle analysis. Although such
18 modeling is scientifically preferred, Plaintiffs
19 presented no evidence that they, or anyone else,
20 presented NMFS with then-existing best available science
21 representing appropriate population or life cycle models
22 for the species of concern prior to the issuance of the
23 BiOp. Moreover, the primary purpose of Action IV.2.1 is
24 to protect outmigrating juvenile members of the SSNDG of
25 CV steelhead, for whom no population indices (whether
26 absolute or relative) are available.
27
28

1 b. Correlation Between Exports and Effects on
2 Salmonid Survival.

3 47. NFMS relied on a number of circumstances to
4 support its general conclusion that salmonid survival in
5 the interior Delta was adversely affected by export
6 pumping.

7 a. The VAMP data demonstrated some observable
8 negative impacts, but no statistically significant
9 connection, albeit the lack of statistical significance
10 was likely due to limitations in the data.

11 b. Figure 10 of Appendix 5 supports the
12 conclusion that, at least when HORB is in place, there is
13 an observable (but not statistically significant)
14 negative relationship between survival and exports.
15 Questions exist whether it is appropriate to rely on data
16 collected when HORB was in place, given that HORB cannot
17 be used under the Smelt BiOp. However, NMFS presented
18 evidence that a workable substitute (the bubble barrier)
19 for HORB will be utilized. Plaintiffs have not suggested
20 the barrier would be inadequate.

21 c. Highly questionable support for the BiOp's
22 conclusion that exports negatively influence survival
23 derives from a comparison of exports and adult escapement
24 two and a half years later, from 1951 through 2003. See
25 BiOp App. 5 at Figure 11. All parties agreed that adult
26 27 28

1 escapement can be significantly influenced by factors
2 such as ocean conditions and harvest. It is undisputed
3 that Figure 11 did not adjust for these factors.

4 However, NMFS relied on a conceptual model that suggests
5 because ocean conditions and harvest were likely to
6 fluctuate over time, long-term downward trends in
7 population could be caused by declining freshwater
8 conditions.
9

10 d. NMFS also relied extensively on Newman's
11 2008 analysis of the Delta Action 8 studies, which
12 released coded-wire tagged salmon into Georgiana Slough
13 and compared their survival to coded-wire tagged salmon
14 released into the mainstem Sacramento River. Newman
15 found a statistically significant, although weak,
16 negative relationship between exports and salmonid
17 survival.
18

19 e. There is no question that the remaining data
20 connecting exports to reduced salmonid survival is not
21 what NMFS represents it to be. Recognizing that "[w]hen
22 specialists express conflicting views, an agency must
23 have discretion to rely on the reasonable opinions of its
24 own qualified experts even if, as an original matter, a
25 court might find contrary views more persuasive," *Lands*
26 *Council*, 537 F.3d at 1000 (quoting *Marsh*, 490 U.S. 360)
27
28

1 (emphasis added), deference is not required "where the
2 agency offers an explanation for an action that runs
3 counter to the evidence before the agency, *Tuscon*
4 *Herpetological Society*, 566 F.3d at 878. NMFS did not
5 just rely on "ambiguous studies." Rather, it
6 uncritically examined the body of evidence, sometimes
7 disregarding the express qualifications and reservations
8 of independent studies, to reach the conclusion that the
9 exports negatively impact salmonid survival. This
10 conclusion, although not scientifically unassailable, has
11 marginal support in the record.
12

13 48. NMFS's opinion that low Vernalis flow to export
14 ratios threaten to appreciably increase the likelihood
15 that the SSNDG of CV steelhead will become extinct is
16 also based on incomplete and conflicting evidence.
17 Although no absolute or relative population numbers are
18 available for either the SSNDG or the entire ESU, it is
19 undisputed that both are small and imperiled. It is also
20 undisputed that, pursuant to the VSP approach, every
21 extant population of the CV steelhead must be protected.
22 All members of the SSNDG must pass through the interior
23 Delta on their way to the ocean. As exports increase,
24 their chances of survival decrease. On the whole, the
25 record corroborates NMFS's conclusion that planned
26
27
28

1 project operations will jeopardize the CV steelhead.¹⁷

2 49. Other adverse impacts from toxics, invasive
3 species, predators, in-Delta pumping, and other non-
4 operational hazards were not compared with Project
5 operations to determine the extent these other stressors
6 contribute to the jeopardy to the species and their
7 habitat.
8

9 c. Did NMFS Adequately Justify the Ratios
10 Imposed?

11 50. The fundamental flaw in NMFS's justification of
12 Action IV.2.1 is its selection of the specific ratios
13 imposed under the Action. As discussed in the Findings
14 of Fact, the record reveals no biological explanation why
15 NMFS chose to impose a 1,500 cfs limit on exports when
16 flows at Vernalis are lower than 6,000 cfs,¹⁸ and a ratio
17 of 4:1, as opposed to any other ratio, when Vernalis
18 flows are between 6,000 cfs and 21,750 cfs. *Id.* at 71-
19 72.
20

21 51. This is a quintessential example of arbitrary
22 action. There is no way to know whether these levels are
23 sufficiently protective, not protective enough, or far
24

25 ¹⁷ It is not necessary to now examine whether NMFS was justified
26 in concluding that planned project operations during this time
27 period will jeopardize any of the other Listed Species. Action
28 IV.2.1 is designed primarily to aid CV steelhead.

¹⁸ This 1,500 cfs limit is the minimum export level NMFS found
necessary to maintain health and safety criteria. BiOp App. 5 at
22. At flows of 5,000 cfs, for example, the ratio would be
5,000/1,500 or approximately 3.33:1.

1 more protective than necessary.¹⁹ Particularly in light
2 of the enormous human impacts caused by even small
3 changes in the flow regime reducing exports, the agency
4 must provide a reasoned and scientifically justified
5 basis for selecting the specific remedial measures
6 chosen. They have failed to do so.
7

8 52. This conclusion is particularly justified in
9 light of the concurrent NEPA violation. Had either NMFS
10 or Reclamation performed a proper NEPA evaluation of the
11 human and environmental impacts of the RPA Actions before
12 implementing them, or if both NMFS and Reclamation had
13 worked together to do so, this would have at least forced
14 the agencies to fully consider and rationally balance the
15 biological need for certain flow levels against the
16 adverse water supply and resulting human impacts those
17 restrictions effectuate.
18

19 53. There is insufficient record evidence to
20 conclude what alternative flow/export ratio would be
21 sufficiently protective of the SSNDG of CV steelhead, the
22 population Action IV.2.1 was designed to protect. NMFS's
23 scientifically justified conclusion that a low Vernalis
24 flow to export ratio during the spring threatens to
25 jeopardize CV steelhead makes it inappropriate to
26

27 ¹⁹ It may be scientifically justifiable to build a margin of
28 error (i.e. to take a precautionary approach) when designing an RPA,
but this must be properly justified and disclosed by the record.

1 completely remove any Vernalis flow to export ratio
2 restriction. Plaintiffs offered no scientifically
3 justifiable alternative except the unjustified argument
4 there is no jeopardy caused by project operations and no
5 evidence of peril to the species.
6

7 (5) Challenges to Action IV.2.3.

8 54. Action IV.2.3 operates from January 1 through
9 June 15 or until the average daily water temperature at
10 Mossdale is greater than 72° F, whichever is earlier. It
11 limits OMR flows to no more negative than -2,500 to -
12 5,000 cfs, depending on juvenile entrainment levels.
13 BiOp at 648-52.
14

15 55. Plaintiffs and DWR only seek an injunction
16 against the -5,000 cfs "calendar-based" ceiling.
17

18 a. Use of PTM for salmonids.

19 56. Although the PTM model, a hydrodynamic
20 simulation used to assess the fate of particles as a
21 function of flow, tides, project operations, and other
22 factors, has shortcomings, it is an indicator of
23 directions of river flows that salmonids follow,
24 recognizing their strong swimming ability. NMFS relied
25 on the PTM studies to support its conclusions that: (a)
26 as exports increase, negative OMR flows also increase;
27 and (b) that at Station 815 (the confluence of the
28

1 Mokelumne River and the San Joaquin River), particle
2 entrainment increases as negative OMR flows increase.
3 Above -5,000 cfs, 40% of particles injected at that
4 station are entrained, while 90% are entrained at -7,000
5 cfs.

6
7 57. Although particles decidedly do not mirror the
8 behavior of salmonid smolts, which move approximately 3.5
9 times faster, they provide a very rough approximation of
10 salmonid behavior, one ground supporting NMFS's
11 utilization of the PTM as part of its overall rationale
12 for Action IV.2.1.

13
14 b. Salvage Data.

15 58. NMFS also relied on salvage data, which
16 demonstrated that, as negative OMR flows increases,
17 salvage increases, and that at some point more negative
18 than -5,000 cfs, salvage increases much more rapidly than
19 at lower levels.

20
21 59. The data utilized does not scale salvage to
22 population size, an undisputed failure to use the best
23 available scientific methods, at least with respect to
24 the winter-run and spring-run, for which population data
25 is available. Dr. Deriso opined that scaling salvage to
26 population size is standard accepted practice in the
27 field of fisheries science. Even from a lay perspective,
28

1 it is obvious that absolute salvage numbers vary
2 depending on the size of the extant population. NMFS's
3 reliance on comparisons of raw salvage numbers to
4 negative OMR flow was clear scientific error and not the
5 best available science.

6
7 60. Action IV.2.3 is also designed to protect CV
8 steelhead, for which no population data is available. It
9 is less certain whether NMFS could legitimately apply
10 comparisons of raw salvage data to OMR flows to assess
11 the impact of negative OMR flows on CV steelhead.

12
13 c. Delta Action 8 Studies.

14 61. As with Action IV.2.1, NMFS also relied
15 extensively on Newman's 2008 analysis of the Delta Action
16 8 studies, which released coded-wire tagged salmon into
17 Georgiana Slough. Newman found a statistically
18 significant, although "weak," negative relationship
19 between exports and salmonid survival.

20
21 62. There are additional concerns that, as to upper
22 Sacramento River populations, NMFS failed to consider the
23 relative number of fish that are exposed to conditions in
24 the interior Delta, compared to those that remain in the
25 mainstem of the Sacramento River. This critique is not
26 relevant to NMFS's application of the Delta Action 8
27 Studies to those populations of CV steelhead and spring-
28

1 run that originate in the San Joaquin basin. For those
2 populations, the Delta Action 8 studies support the
3 conclusion that the higher the export levels, the lower
4 the chance a salmonid smolt may survive to reach the
5 ocean.

6
7 d. Perry & Skalski and Vogel.

8 63. Perry and Skalski (2008) concluded that survival
9 of fish moving into Georgiana Slough and nearby channels
10 was reduced compared to those in the mainstem of the
11 Sacramento River. 4/1/10 Tr. 161:20-162:1. However,
12 Perry and Skalski observed that "there is limited
13 understanding of how water management actions in the
14 Delta affect population distribution and route-specific
15 survival of juvenile salmon." SDLMWA Ex. 227 at 3. Mr.
16 Stuart admitted that Perry and Skalski 2008 did not
17 address water project impacts on Delta hydrology, fish
18 behavior, or the indirect mortality of fish in the
19 central and southern channels of the Delta. Mr. Stuart
20 further admitted that he reached his conclusions
21 regarding water project impacts on Delta hydrology, fish
22 behavior, and indirect salmonid mortality based upon his
23 personal extrapolation from the data contained in Perry
24 and Skalski 2008, and not from any conclusions reached by
25 the study. 4/2/10 Tr. 19:2 - 21:24. The BiOp and Stuart
26
27
28

1 used Perry and Skalski (2008) to support a proposition
2 that Perry and Skalski themselves disclaimed. The BiOp
3 provides no explanation to justify this use of Perry and
4 Skalski for this purpose, which is arbitrary and
5 capricious.

6
7 64. A similar problem exists with the BiOp's
8 reliance on the Vogel (2004) review of telemetry-tagging
9 data to investigate fish route selection in the channels
10 leading to the south Delta. See BiOp at 380-81. The
11 BiOp used Vogel's work to find that when export levels
12 were reduced and San Joaquin River flows were increased,
13 more fish stayed in the main channel of the San Joaquin
14 River, heading downstream toward the San Francisco Bay.
15 *Id.* However, the Vogel study concluded its experiments
16 "could not explain why some fish move off the mainstem of
17 the San Joaquin River into the south Delta channels,"
18 noting that "[d]ue to the wide variation in hydrologic
19 conditions" during the course of the experiments, "it was
20 difficult to determine the principal factors affecting
21 fish migration. Based on the limited data from these
22 studies, it may be that a combination of a neap tide,
23 reduced exports, and increased San Joaquin River flows is
24 beneficial for outmigrating smolts, but more research is
25 necessary." DWR Ex. 505 at 37 (emphasis added).
26
27
28

1 65. The BiOp's reliance on the Perry and Skalski and
2 Vogel studies presents the same infirmities as in *Tucson*
3 *Herpetological Society*, 566 F.3d at 879, where the FWS
4 wrongfully "affirmatively relie[d] on ambiguous studies."
5

6 e. Does the Record Support NMFS's General
7 Conclusion that Negative OMR Flows
8 Appreciably Reduce Salmonid Smolts' Chances
9 of Survival?

10 66. There are undeniable problems with NMFS's basis
11 for Action IV.2.3. However, the Delta Action 8 studies
12 support the proposition that, for those populations
13 spawning entirely within the San Joaquin basin,
14 increasing exports negatively impact salmonid smolt
15 survival. The highly disputed PTM studies constitute the
16 other colorable support for Action IV.2.3. In such a
17 scientific dispute, deference is owed unless the Agency
18 is unreasonably wrong.

19 f. Did NMFS Adequately Justify the Calendar-
20 based -5,000 cfs Ceiling of Action IV.2.3?

21 67. The -5,000 cfs OMR ceiling is based, in large
22 measure, on speculation. It is also based upon BiOp
23 Figures that do not scale salvage to population size.
24 This is not the best available science and is arbitrary
25 and capricious.

26
27 (6) Reclamation's ESA Responsibility.

28 68. The ESA regulations require the action agency to

1 "determine whether and in what manner to proceed with the
2 action in light of its section 7 obligations and the
3 Service's biological opinion." 50 C.F.R. § 402.15(a).
4 Prior to accepting and implementing the 2009 Salmonid
5 BiOp RPA, Reclamation had an independent obligation under
6 ESA section 7(a)(2) to ensure that it "use[d] the best
7 scientific and commercial data available."
8

9 69. Reclamation, as the federal action agency, "may
10 not rely solely on a FWS biological opinion to establish
11 conclusively its compliance with its substantive
12 obligations under section 7(a)(2)." *Pyramid Lake Paiute*
13 *Tribe of Indians v. U.S. Dept. of the Navy*, 898 F.2d
14 1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1990). "[T]he action agency must
15 not blindly adopt the conclusions of the consultant
16 agency." *City of Tacoma v. Fed. Energy Regulatory*
17 *Comm'n*, 460 F.3d 53, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
18

19 70. Reclamation did not ensure that the RPA utilized
20 the best available science, nor did it independently
21 identify and analyze alternative RPA Actions that
22 minimized jeopardy to humans and the human environment
23 while protecting threatened species.
24

25 D. Balancing of the Harms.

26 (1) Balancing of the Harms in ESA Cases.

27 71. The Supreme Court held in *TVA v. Hill*, 437 U.S.
28

1 153, 194 (1978), that Congress struck the balance in
2 favor of affording endangered species the highest of
3 priorities. In adopting the ESA, Congress intended to
4 "halt and reverse the trend toward species' extinction,
5 whatever the cost." *Id.* at 184 (emphasis added). *TVA v.*
6 *Hill* continues to be viable. See *Home Builders*, 551 U.S.
7 at 669-71; see also *Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Co-op.*, 532
8 U.S. 496-97; *Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell*, 480
9 U.S. 531, 543 n.9 (1987).

11 72. *Winter* does not modify or discuss the *TVA v.*
12 *Hill* standard.²⁰ Although *Winter* altered the Ninth
13 Circuit's general preliminary injunctive relief standard
14 by making that standard more rigorous, *Winter* did not
15 address, nor change, the approach to the balancing of
16 economic hardships where endangered species and their
17 critical habitat are jeopardized. See *Biodiversity Legal*
18 *Found. v. Badgley*, 309 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002)
19 (Congress removed the courts' traditional equitable
20 discretion to balance parties' competing interests in ESA
21 injunction proceedings); *Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v.*
22 *Burlington N. R.R., Inc.*, 23 F.3d 1508, 1510-11 (9th Cir.
23 1994) (same).

26 73. Prior decisions involving the coordinated

27
28 ²⁰ Although *Winter* involved ESA-listed species, the *Winter*
decision did not address any ESA claims.

1 projects' operations found that *TVA v. Hill* and related
2 Ninth Circuit authorities foreclose the district court's
3 traditional discretion to balance equities under the ESA.
4 There is no such bar in NEPA injunction proceedings.

5
6 74. Plaintiffs have advanced a human health and
7 safety exception and contend that unlike any of the prior
8 cases, this case juxtaposes species' survival against
9 human welfare, requiring a balancing of the BiOp's
10 threats of harm to humans, health, safety and protection
11 of affected communities. No case, including *TVA v. Hill*,
12 which concerned the competing economic interest in the
13 operation of a hydro-electric project, expressly
14 addresses whether the ESA precludes balancing of harms to
15 humans and the human environment under the circumstances
16 presented here.

17
18 75. Even if it is permissible to balance harm to
19 humans and the human environment against Congress' stated
20 desire to protect the Listed Species, doing so in
21 practice is complicated by the harm caused to other human
22 communities by the reduced abundance of salmonids, such
23 as to the salmon fishing industry and the Winnemem Wintu
24 Tribe.

25
26 76. This case is at the intersection of harm to
27 threatened species and humans and their environment.

1 Congress has not nor does *TVA v. Hill* elevate species
2 protection over the health and safety of humans.

3
4 (2) Balancing the Harms under NEPA.

5 77. Although it is undisputed that all harms may be
6 considered in evaluating a claim for injunctive relief
7 under NEPA, an injunction should not issue if enjoining
8 such government action would result in more harm to the
9 environment than denying injunctive relief. *Save Our*
10 *Ecosystems*, 747 F.2d at 1250.

11 78. Here, it appears that interim relief is
12 justified, if deepening of the species' jeopardy can be
13 avoided.
14

15 E. The Public Interest.

16 79. In adopting the ESA, Congress explicitly found
17 that all threatened and endangered species "are of
18 esthetic, ecological, educational, historical,
19 recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and its
20 people." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3). The ESA advances a
21 Congressional policy to "halt and reverse the trend
22 toward species extinction, whatever the cost." *TVA v.*
23 *Hill*, 437 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
24

25 80. The public policy underlying NEPA favors
26 protecting the balance between humans and the
27 environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (declaring a national
28

1 policy to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony
2 between man and his environment; to promote efforts which
3 will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and
4 biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man;
5 [and] to enrich the understanding of the ecological
6 systems and natural resources important to the
7 Nation....").

8
9 81. If both these objectives can all be realized by
10 astute management, it is the government's obligation to
11 do so.

12 82. It is in the public interest that relief be
13 granted to Plaintiffs, who represent a substantial
14 population of water users in California, to enhance the
15 water supply to reduce the adverse harms of destruction
16 of permanent crops; fallowed lands; increased groundwater
17 consumption; land subsidence; reduction of air quality;
18 destruction of family and entity farming businesses; and
19 social disruption and dislocation, such as increased
20 property crimes and intra-family crimes of violence,
21 adverse effects on schools, and increased unemployment
22 leading to hunger and homelessness. This must be done
23 without jeopardizing the species and their critical
24 habitat.
25
26
27
28

VII. CONCLUSION

1
2 1. Plaintiffs have succeeded on the merits of their
3 NEPA claim.

4 a. NEPA requires that the responsible agency
5 take a hard look at the environmental consequences of its
6 actions, *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen's Counsel*,
7 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989), obligating federal agencies to
8 prepare an environmental impact statement ("EIS") for all
9 "major federal actions significantly affecting the
10 quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. §
11 4332(2)(C).
12

13 b. Federal Defendants are required to evaluate
14 the impact of the coordinated operations of the CVP and
15 SWP, which constitutes major federal action. The
16 evidence overwhelmingly establishes significant
17 detrimental effects visited on the quality of the human
18 environment by implementation of the BiOp's RPA Actions,
19 which impose virtually year-round substantial
20 restrictions on the water supply to California to protect
21 the Listed Species.
22

23 c. Where required, an EIS discloses
24 environmental affects of a proposed action and considers
25 alternative courses of action. *Id.* Here, Federal
26 Defendants completely abdicated their responsibility to
27
28

1 consider alternative remedies in formulating RPA Actions
2 that would not only protect the species, but would also
3 minimize the adverse impact on humans and the human
4 environment.

5 d. In considering RPA alternatives, the record
6 shows the burden of other causes is allocated to the
7 water supply, without the required analysis whether
8 alternatives, less harmful to humans and the human
9 environment, exist.
10

11 2. Plaintiffs have also shown a likelihood of
12 success on the merits of their ESA claim. Although the
13 premise underlying the RPA Actions -- that the species
14 may be jeopardized by increased negative flows occasioned
15 by export pumping -- has some record support, NMFS has
16 failed to adequately justify by generally recognized
17 scientific principles the precise flow prescriptions
18 imposed by RPA Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3. The exact
19 restrictions imposed, which are inflicting material harm
20 to humans and the human environment, are not supported by
21 the record. Rather, they are product of guesstimations
22 and attempts to try to achieve "equity," rendering it
23 impossible to determine whether the RPA Actions are
24 adequately protective, too protective, or not protective
25 enough. Judicial deference is not owed to such
26
27
28

1 arbitrary, capricious, and scientifically unreasonable
2 agency action.

3 3. It is highly significant that the co-operator of
4 the Projects, DWR, with access to scientific competence
5 in the fields of fish biology and ecology, and project
6 operations, strongly criticizes some of the science NMFS
7 used to justify RPA Action IV.2.3, seeks to enjoin Action
8 IV.2.3, and does not oppose enjoining Action IV.2.1
9

10 4. Under the balance of hardships analysis,
11 Defendants' contention that the ESA, under *TVA v. Hill*,
12 precludes equitable weighing of Plaintiffs' interests is
13 not supported by that case, as evidence of harm to the
14 human environment in the form of social dislocation,
15 unemployment, and other threats to human welfare were not
16 present in *Hill*. They are in this case.
17

18 5. Defendants argue that jeopardy to the species
19 cannot be avoided without continuing substantial
20 reduction of pumping, with resultant reduction of water
21 supply to Plaintiffs, representing over 20,000,000
22 persons, affected communities, and the agricultural
23 industry in Northern, Central, and Southern California.
24 Harm to the species has had equally detrimental effects
25 on the Pacific Coast salmon fishing industry and impairs
26 the interests of Native Americans. These additional
27
28

1 harms are deserving of equal protection.

2 6. Congress created public expectations in the
3 Amended Reclamation Act by instructing Reclamation to
4 contract for water service to hundreds of public-entity
5 water service providers that supply water to millions of
6 people and thousands of acres of productive agricultural
7 land. The agencies have not fully discharged their
8 responsibility to effectively allocate Project water
9 resources. Federal Defendants have acted arbitrarily and
10 capriciously in formulating RPA Actions to protect
11 threatened species under the ESA that lack factual and
12 scientific justification, while effectively ignoring the
13 irreparable harm those RPA Actions have inflicted on
14 humans and the human environment.
15
16

17 7. The species and their critical habitats are
18 entitled to protection under the ESA. The species have
19 been and will be protected. That is the law.
20 Nonetheless, NMFS and Reclamation, as the consulting and
21 action agencies, must take the hard look under NEPA at
22 the draconian consequences visited upon Plaintiffs, the
23 water supply of California, the agricultural industry,
24 and the residents and communities devastated by the water
25 supply limitations imposed by the RPA Actions. Federal
26 Defendants have failed to comprehensively and competently
27
28

1 evaluate whether RPA alternatives can be prescribed that
2 will be mutually protective of all the statutory purposes
3 of the Projects.

4 8. This is a case of first impression. The stakes
5 are high, the harms to the affected human communities
6 great, and the injuries unacceptable if they can be
7 mitigated. NMFS and Reclamation have not complied with
8 NEPA. This prevented in-depth analysis of the potential
9 RPA Actions through a properly focused study to identify
10 and select alternative remedial measures that minimize
11 jeopardy to affected humans and their communities, as
12 well as protecting the threatened species. No party has
13 suggested that humans and their environment are less
14 deserving of protection than the species. Until
15 Defendant Agencies have complied with the law, some
16 injunctive relief pending NEPA compliance is appropriate,
17 so long as it will not further jeopardize the species or
18 their habitat.

19 9. Injunctive relief is also warranted under the
20 ESA, because, although the general premises underlying
21 Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3 find marginal support in the
22 record, the precise flow prescriptions imposed on
23 coordinated project operations as part of Action IV.2.1's
24 Vernalis flow/export ratio and Action IV.2.3's -5,000 cfs
25

1 "calendar based" ceiling are not supported by the best
2 available science and are not explained as the law
3 requires.

4 10. Injunctive relief cannot be imposed without up-
5 to-date evidence of the status of the species to assure
6 that altered operations will not deepen jeopardy to the
7 affected species or otherwise violate other laws. The
8 evidence has not sufficiently focused on remedies to
9 provide a confidence level that completely removing the
10 Vernalis flow to export ratio prescriptions of Action
11 IV.2.1 or permitting negative flows in excess of the
12 -5,000 cfs OMR flow ceiling imposed by Action IV.2.3 to
13 increase water supply will not jeopardize the continued
14 existence of the species and/or adversely modify their
15 critical habitats.

16 11. Legal and equitable grounds for injunctive
17 relief have otherwise been established by a preponderance
18 of the evidence.

19 12. A hearing to address the proposed injunction and
20 any imminence of harm to species shall be held May 19,
21 2010 in Courtroom 3 at 10:00 a.m.

22 SO ORDERED
23 Dated: May 18, 2010

24
25 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger
26 Oliver W. Wanger
27 United States District Judge
28