Endangered Species Law and Policy : Environmental and Natural Resources Attorneys from Nossaman

In a major victory for advocates of regulatory action to address climate change, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected challenges to the listing of the polar bear as a threatened species.  In Re:  Polar Bear Endangered Species Listing and Section 4(d) Rule Litigation (D.C. Cir. No. 11-5219, March 1, 2013).  The court held that the decision to list the polar bear based on predicted reductions in the sea ice habitat of the polar bear as a result of climate change is reasonable and adequately supported by the record.
The polar bear listing is the first and most high profile example of the use of the Endangered Species Act to force the federal government to adopt regulations addressing climate change.  Environmental organizations have sought to list several other species under the ESA based on potential climate change impacts on the species.  The petitioners for the listing of the polar bear have indicated their intention to use the regulatory protections provided by the ESA to challenge fossil fuel development and other activities with material greenhouse gas emissions.
 
Among several other arguments, the State of Alaska and other opponents of the listing argued that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) improperly used determinations by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the evaluation of the likelihood of survival of the polar bear.  The court concluded that while the Service relied on the IPCC climate forecasts, the Service did not bind itself to the IPCC determinations to evaluate the survival of the polar bear.

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The California Legislature has sent to the Governor legislation authorizing the Department of Fish and Game to permit the incidental take of 36 fully protected species pursuant to a natural community conservation plan approved by the Department. (Senate Bill 618 (Wolk).) The legislation, in effect, gives fully protected species the same level of protection as is provided under the Natural Community Conservation Planning Act (“NCCP Act”) for endangered and threatened species. (Cal. Fish & Game Code § 2835.)  The legislation removes a significant regulatory barrier to the development of regional conservation plans under the NCCP Act.  The NCCP Act, enacted in the 1990s, authorizes the incidental take of species “whose conservation and management” is provided for in a conservation plan approved by the Department of Fish and Game.

Existing state law prohibits the take of any of the 36 identified “fully protected species.”  The fully protected species laws were enacted prior to the California Endangered Species Act and the federal Endangered Species Act and were intended to prohibit hunting, catching, or harvesting of specific species.  The fully protected species laws were interpreted, however, to also prohibit “take” of the species from land development, farming, ranching and other activities – even when the activities had received take permits under the state and federal endangered species laws.

The 36 fully protected species are found in many areas of California and include such species as the salt marsh harvest mouse (Reithrodontomys raviventris), brown pelican (Pelecanus occidentalis), California least tern (Sterna albifrons browni), California clapper rail (Rallus longirostris levipes), peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus anatum), bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis), blunt-nosed leopard lizard (Crotaphytus wislizenii silus), and the San Francisco garter snake (Thamnophis sirtalis tetrataenia). Several of the fully protected species are also protected by the federal and state endangered species laws.
 

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In a decision that underscores the regulatory importance of recovery plans, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia invalidated the delisting of the Virginia northern flying squirrel on the grounds that the delisting rule modified delisting criteria in the recovery plan for the squirrel. Friends of Blackwater v. Salazar No. 09-2122 (D.D.C. March 25, 2011). The Court concluded that the Service violated section 4(f) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) (requiring notice and comment on recovery plans) by relying on criteria to support delisting that varied from the criteria in the adopted recovery plan.

The court rejected the Service’s argument that the recovery plan merely provided guidance and that the Service could delist a species based on the factors for listing and delisting in section 4(a) of the ESA without first amending the recovery plan. Recovery plans are often ignored by the regulated community. This decision is a reminder that recovery plans have real world consequences.

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regulation of water deliveries from the State Water Project and Central Valley Project to protect the threatened delta smelt did not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar, No. 10-19152 (9th Cir. March 25, 2011). 

The decision is the latest in a series of decisions by the federal appellate courts rejecting Commerce Clause challenges to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The court concluded that the protection of endangered and threatened species (including wholly intrastate species such as the delta smelt) bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has, to date, declined to review any of the ESA Commerce Clause decisions.

The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the argument of the Fish and Wildlife Service (and the conclusion of the district court below) that the farming company plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the lawsuit. The court concluded that the companies were not required to show a threat of imminent enforcement under the ESA. The coercive ability of the Fish and Wildlife Service to enforce the ESA is sufficient to satisfy the causation element of standing. The court’s decision provides additional support for the standing of economic interests in other pending Delta lawsuits brought under the ESA.

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The United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a decision by the Fish and Wildlife Service to exclude an area from the designation of critical habitat for the endangered Cape Sable seaside sparrow in Florida.  Center For Biological Diversity v. Salazar (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2011) (PDF).  While conceding that the excluded area was “essential” to the sparrow’s conservation, the Service decided not to designate the area as critical habitat, in part, because of the conflict between critical habitat and the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project. 

The court concluded that the “balance between designating a crucial swath of critical habitat for the Sparrow, a single species, and greater flexibility for restoration of the Everglades to benefit the entire ecosystem and its many inhabiting species, is left to the Secretary’s discretion.”  Slip Op. at 32.  The decision is important because it affirms the Service’s broad discretion under the ESA to weigh and balance economic and environmental costs and benefits in the designation of critical habitat.  The Service’s decision here to balance the protection of individual species with a broader ecosystem plan stands in sharp contrast to other recent decisions by the Service to designate critical habitat in areas with approved habitat conservation plans.  These other recent critical habitat decisions create a disincentive for landowners to participate in habitat conservation plans.

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The U.S. Supreme Court has denied (pdf) two petitions that sought to have the Court resolve a Circuit split regarding the evaluation of economic impacts of critical habitat designations under the federal Endangered Species Act.  The Court’s action leaves in place two recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upholding the use of the so-called “baseline” methodology by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service").  Under the “baseline” methodology, the Service restricts the evaluation of economic impacts of a potential critical habitat designation to the impacts of the designation alone and does not consider the cumulative impact of the critical habitat designation and the listing of the endangered species.  Arizona Cattle Growers' Assn. v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (pdf); Home Builders Assn. of Northern California v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (pdf). 

In sharp contrast to the above cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invalidated the Service’s use of the “baseline” methodology.  New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (pdf).  The Tenth Circuit held that the Service’s use of the “baseline” methodology rendered an economic analysis relying on the baseline approach "virtually meaningless" because it allowed the agency, in all cases, to find no economic impact to the critical habitat designation.  As a result, in states within the Tenth Circuit, the Service evaluates the “co-extensive” economic impacts of listing and the critical habitat designation.  Use of the “co-extensive” methodology typically results in much higher estimates of economic impacts.

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The Ninth Circuit issued a decision (PDF) recently in which it held that the removal of an endangered plant from privately-owned “waters of the United States” is not a violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Section 9(a)(2)(B) of the ESA makes it unlawful to “remove and reduce to possession any [endangered species of plant] from areas under federal jurisdiction.” The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the term “areas under federal jurisdiction” includes areas that qualify as wetlands and other “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act. The decision is important because it is the first circuit court decision to interpret the jurisdictional scope of the plant protection provisions of section 9 of the ESA.

Employees of the California Department of Fish and Game identified the endangered Sebastopol meadowfoam on private land within an area determined to be an “adjacent wetland” under the federal Clean Water Act. Suspecting that the plants had been unlawfully transplanted, a Fish and Game employee removed the plants to a Fish and Game evidence locker. Plaintiffs sued the Fish and Game employees and the landowner for violating the ESA. The plaintiffs argued that the term “areas under federal jurisdiction” in section 9(a)(2) of the ESA included areas within the regulatory jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It concluded that the term “areas under federal jurisdiction” was ambiguous, and interpreted the term “as not including all of the ‘waters of the United States’ as defined by the [Clean Water Act] and its regulations. The court acknowledged that the decision did not foreclose the possibility that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service might adopt some other statutory construction. In this case, the Service sided with the defendants and argued that ESA prohibition on “removing” endangered plants applies to endangered plants on federal land and on federal property interests such as conservation easements, leasehold estates, and special management areas.

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For the second time in two months, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected an industry challenge to a designation of critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  In Home Builders Association of Northern California v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service (PDF), the court upheld the designation of 858,000 acres of land in California as critical habitat for fifteen vernal pool species.

The ESA prohibits federal agencies from approving actions that “adversely modify” critical habitat.  The court rejected Home Builders’ claim that the ESA limited the designation of critical habitat to those areas that contain all (rather than some) of the physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the vernal pool species. The court also rejected the claim that, in designating critical habitat, the Fish and Wildlife Service is required to determine when the protected species are required to be conserved.  Following its recent decision in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Assn. v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.  2010), the court upheld the Service’s analysis of the economic impacts of the critical habitat designation.  The court concluded that, unlike the National Environmental Policy Act, the ESA does not require the Fish and Wildlife Service to evaluate cumulative impacts of the critical habitat designation.

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The regulatory requirements of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") are imposing limitations on the development of renewable energy projects in the California desert. State and federal regulatory agencies are attempting to expedite ESA and other environmental reviews of proposed renewable energy projects. But the jury is out on whether these efforts will succeed. The ability of California to implement its precedent-setting climate change legislation hangs in the balance. As Governor Schwarzenegger stated "If we cannot put solar power in the Mojave Desert, I don't know where the hell we can put them."

Click here for the ESA and Renewable Energy Power Point presentation that was given at the April 8-9 ESA conference

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In the latest round of litigation over endangered species impacts of water management in Southern Florida, a district court invalidated an incidental take statement applicable to actions of the Corps of Engineers to restore the Everglades.  The decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States (PDF), is the latest in a line of decisions concluding that the Fish and Wildlife Service failed to provide a sufficient justification for the use habitat conditions in lieu of a numerical cap on incidental take.  The decision is an example of the willingness of the federal courts to undertake detailed review of biological opinions issued by the federal wildlife agencies.

In this case, the Miccosukee Tribe challenged the 2002 biological opinion and subsequent 2006 biological opinion (PDF) issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding management actions by the Corps of Engineers to restore wildlife in the Everglades. The Tribe challenged the Amended Incidental Take Statement (PDF) to the 2006 biological opinion, specifically the Service’s use of ecological and habitat surrogates for a numerical limit on the incidental take of three listed species, the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, Everglade snail kite, and wood stork.  Federal courts have held that the Service has the burden of demonstrating that it is impractical to identify a numerical limit on incidental as the trigger for reconsultation under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.

 Here the Service argued that natural fluctuations in the population of the Cape Sable seaside sparrow made the identification of a numerical take limit impractical.  The District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected the Service’s argument stating the “fact that sparrow populations may decrease due in part to low nest success rates does not unequivocally support the conclusion that the variability of nest success rates makes it impractical to establish a numerical trigger for incidental take.” 

The court found the Amended Incidental Take Statement was valid as to the Everglade snail kite and the wood stork. 

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