Endangered Species Law and Policy : Environmental and Natural Resources Attorneys from Nossaman

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued an order (pdf) denying a motion for preliminary relief filed by plaintiffs suing the City and County of San Francisco over the management of Sharp Park Golf Course, which San Francisco owns but which is located in the City of Pacifica in San Mateo County, California. At issue in the case is whether San Francisco’s management of the golf course violates the take prohibition of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Plaintiffs sought an injunction that would substantially restrict activities necessary to allow for continued operation of the golf course.

The Sharp Park golf course has been in continuous operation since 1930. For a substantial portion of that period, two listed species -- the endangered San Francisco garter snake (Thamnophis sirtalis tetrataenia) and threatened California red-legged frog (Rana draytonii) -- have been present at Sharp Park. Plaintiffs argued that pumping during the rainy season to control water levels in water bodies on site, mowing, and golf cart use are likely to cause take of listed species. They further argued that the standard for granting preliminary relief in an ESA case is whether take is likely to occur. The court rejected this argument, recognizing that preliminary relief is an extraordinary remedy and that plaintiffs must show a likelihood of irreparable harm.

The court determined that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of establishing irreparable harm. In sum, the court held:

The expansion of the Frog population, coupled with defendants’ careful attention to moving any vulnerable egg masses and their continuing interactions with [the Fish and Wildlife Service] seeking authorization to do so, make this a situation that does not warrant the temporary, immediate, and drastic relief afforded by a preliminary injunction.

Slip Op. at 14.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a decision (pdf) issued on November 22, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a lower court decision striking the decision of the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) to delist a distinct population segment of grizzly bears (ursus arctos horribilis) near Yellowstone National Park and retaining protected status for the species.  The court held that the Service failed to articulate a rational connection between data in the record and the Service's determination that whitebark pine declines were not a threat to the Yellowstone grizzly.  However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the Service's determination regarding the adequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms was not reasonable. 

The subject of the appeal was the Service's decision to remove the Yellowstone grizzly from the list of threatened and endangered species.  The Service first listed the grizzly as threatened in the lower 48 states in 1975.  At the time of listing, the Yellowstone area grizzly population was estimated to number between 136 and 312 bears.  The Service developed a grizzly bear recovery plan in 1982 and revised the plan in 1993.  By 2006, the Service determined that the recovery plan's demographic and habitat based recovery criteria were being met, and the total grizzly population in the greater Yellowstone area was estimated at more than 500 bears, which scientists concluded was approaching Yellowstone National Park's carrying capacity.  Pursuant to the recovery plan, the Service developed a Final Conservation Strategy for the Grizzly Bear in the Greater Yellowstone Area (Strategy), which the Service finalized in March 2007.  The Service published a final rule (pdf) removing Yellowstone grizzly from the threatened species list in March 2007. 

The Greater Yellowstone Coalition challenged the Service's final rule in district court in November 2007.  The district court found that the Service failed to rationally support its conclusions that adequate regulatory mechanisms were in place to protect the grizzly and that declines in whitebark pine did not threaten the grizzly.  The district court vacated and remanded the final rule. 

The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court and found that the Service failed to articulate a rational connection between the scientific data and its conclusion that changes in whitebark pine production are not likely to impact the Yellowstone grizzly to the point where it is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.  The court explained that the data in the final rule actually demonstrated a relationship between whitebark pine seed shortages, increased bear mortality, and decreased female reproductive success.  The increasing shortage of whitebark pine is due to stresses on the trees from mountain pine beetles and white pine blister rust, both of which may be exacerbated by climate change. As we previously reported here, environmental groups sued the Service to act on a petition to list the whitebark pine due to climate change, and the Service subsequently made a warranted but precluded finding for listing the whitebark pine, which we blogged about here. 

The court rejected the Service's notion that employing adaptive management justified the delisting, explaining that the future possibility of relisting is not a reasonable justification for delisting, and that "for adaptive management of a potential threat to suffice as a basis for a delisting determination, . . . more specific management responses, tied to more specific triggering criteria, are required." 

Finally, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the Service that there are adequate regulatory mechanisms in place to protect a recovered Yellowstone grizzly population.  The court explained that "delisting cannot require the imposition of legal protections commensurate with those provided by the [Endangered Species Act] itself."  Therefore, the court explained, "it is reasonable to conceive of 'adequate' regulatory mechanisms as offering a recovered species something less than the stalwart protections of the ESA, but considerably more than no special protection at all."

The effect of the court's decision is to continue Endangered Species Act protection for the Yellowstone grizzly.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On November 16, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a ruling (PDF) affirming a lower court’s decision (PDF) that two U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) biological opinions (BiOp) for a proposed 1500-acre mining project in the Cabinet Mountain Wilderness on the Kootenai National Forest met the legal standards set forth in the Endangered Species Act and Administrative Procedure Act. The Court upheld the BiOp’s conclusions that construction and operation of the mine would not adversely modify bull trout critical habitat or jeopardize the continued existence of grizzly bear population in the lower 48 states of the United States. 

FWS determined that construction and operation of the mine would not adversely modify bull trout critical habitat based primarily on the relatively small footprint of project impacts to critical habitat-- less than three stream miles-- as compared to the much larger 135-stream mile critical habitat “core area.” The Court agreed that such “large-scale critical habitat analysis” is appropriate provided localized impacts are not masked or ignored. The BiOp included a complete evaluation of the physical and biological characteristics necessary for the bull trout’s survival and concluded that all essential elements would remain functional throughout the project’s lifetime.  For this and other reasons, the Court affirmed FWS’s no adverse modification conclusion. 

The Court also upheld the BiOp’s no jeopardy conclusion for grizzly bears based on the project’s comprehensive mitigation plan for the affected Cabinet-Yaak population, which was expected to promote grizzly recovery over the long-term.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As we previously reported, on October 17, 2011, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that the Fish & Wildlife Service (Service) violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by issuing a rule under section 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) regarding take of the threatened Polar bear (Ursus maritimus) (Special Rule) without conducting an environmental assessment.  As we discussed here, the Special Rule sets forth those measures and prohibitions the Secretary of Interior deems necessary and advisable for the conservation the polar bear, but it has the effect of specifically prohibiting the federal government from using the polar bear's threatened status to regulate GHG emissions of activities that occur outside the polar bear’s range.

On November 18, 2011, the court remanded (PDF) the Special Rule to the Service for the preparation of an environmental assessment (EA) and new rulemaking determination.  The court set a deadline of April 13, 2012 for the Service complete a draft EA and to submit a notice of availability of the draft EA and proposed special rule to the office of the Federal Register for publication.  The Service has until December 6, 2012 to complete a final EA and final rulemaking determination and to submit a notice to the Federal Register for publication regarding the availability of those documents. 

The Interim Final Special Rule (PDF) is reinstated and effective until the new special rule for the polar bear becomes effective. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Maryland recently decided (pdf) cross motions for summary judgment in a challenge to a biological opinion (BiOp) and reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA) in favor of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).  In the BiOp and RPA, which NMFS developed at the request of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and after consultation with that agency, NMFS evaluated the effects of chlorpyrifos, diazinon, and malathion on 27 species of Pacific salmonids.  Plaintiffs argued that the BiOp and RPA were unlawful – in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA) – in a number of respects.  But the court rejected each claim and consistently deferred to NMFS as the expert agency charged with implementation of the ESA.

Plaintiffs claimed that NMFS improperly employed and relied on two models.  NMFS utilized results from application of the models to predict pesticide levels in streams that support the listed salmonids.  With respect to the use of one of the models by NMFS, the court opined that there seems to be a reasonable difference of opinion regarding whether the model accurately predicts pesticide concentrations.  But the court stated that “it is not within the purview of this Court to weigh the evidence supporting [ ] extremely divergent scientific opinions and decide which of them is correct.”  It appears though that, when the court held for NMFS on this issue, it may have been influenced by its view that the ultimate outcome would not differ across a range of predicted pesticide levels.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Today, on October 31, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States denied (pdf) review of a constitutional challenge to water delivery regulations regarding the Central Valley Project and California State Water Project intended to protect the threatened delta smelt. The petition for writ of certiorari was filed by the Pacific Legal Foundation on behalf of Stewart & Jasper Orchards, and asserted that application of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to the delta smelt, a noncommercial fish that is only found in California, is an unconstitutional exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. The government opposed (pdf) the petition by asserting, among other things, that the ESA is a comprehensive regulatory statute bearing a substantial relation to interstate commerce.

Some found it unsurprising that the Supreme Court did not take the case because there is no split in the federal courts of appeal on the issue. To date, the Supreme Court has declined to review constitutional challenges to the ESA on six different occasions.

In late March, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the water delivery regulations did not violate the commerce clause. The court concluded that the protection of endangered and threatened species (including wholly intrastate species such as the delta smelt) bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce. The petition for writ of certiorari was filed on June 22, 2011.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied (PDF) an emergency motion (PDF) for an injunction pending appeal to the extent the moving parties sought an injunction prior to the court hearing oral arguments, currently scheduled for November 8, 2011.  At issue in the underlying appeal is the constitutionality of a law (Public Law 112-10 section 1713 (Section 1713)) passed by Congress that directs the Secretary of the Interior to reissue a 2009 final rule which removed Endangered Species Act (ESA) protections for all wolves living in the Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wold Distinct Population Segment outside of Wyoming (2009 Rule).  Section 1713 directs that this reissuance shall not be subject to judicial review. 

Without the ESA protection, the wolves can be legally hunted, and wolf-hunting season has commenced in both Idaho and Montana. 

As we previously discussed, the 2009 Rule delisted (thereby removing ESA protection) the distinct population segment of the gray wolf in the Northern Rocky Mountains, except in Wyoming.  In August 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Montana set aside the 2009 Rule holding that the ESA does not allow the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) to divide a DPS into a smaller taxonomy.  The Service, Idaho, and Montana appealed.  Pending the outcome of those appeals, in April 2011, Congress passed the law ordering reissuance of the 2009 Rule.  Several environmental groups subsequently sued the Service  alleging that the law violated the constitutional separation of powers by directing the outcome of the appeals without amending the underlying substantive law.  While the district court agreed that Section 1713 is unconstitutional and violates the separation of powers doctrine, it entered summary judgment in favor of the Service because it was bound by precedent that constrained its ability to rule for the environmental groups.  The environmental groups then appealed the district court's decision to the Ninth Circuit. 

While the Ninth Circuit denied the emergency motion for preliminary injunction for an injunctive relief prior to oral argument, the Ninth Circuit will consider the motion for injunction pending outcome of the appeal at oral argument on November 8, 2011.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On October 17, 2011, U.S. District Judge Sullivan issued two opinions in the Polar Bear litigation previously blogged about here.  In the first opinion (pdf), Judge Sullivan held that the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by issuing a rule under section 4(d) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) regarding take of the threatened Polar bear (Ursus maritimus) without conducting an environmental assessment. 

As previously reported here, the 4(d) rule for the polar bear sets forth those measures and prohibitions the Secretary of Interior deems necessary and advisable for the conservation the polar bear, but it has the effect of specifically prohibiting the federal government from using the polar bear's threatened status to regulate GHG emissions of activities that occur outside the polar bear’s range.  Earlier this year, Judge Sullivan upheld the Service's definition of "endangered" and its decision to list the polar bear as threatened.

Until the Service completes its analysis of the 4(d) rule under NEPA, an interim 4(d) rule issued in May 2008 remains in place.  Because the interim rule has the same effect as the final rule, the polar bear will continue to receive the same protections.

In the second opinion (pdf), Judge Sullivan held that the Service did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the polar bear is a "depleted" species under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), and therefore sport-hunted polar bear trophies are not eligible for importation.

The Court also held that the Service did not abuse its discretion when it refused to process applications to import sport-hunted trophy polar bears that were pending at the time the Service determined that the species is depleted.   The Service stopped processing the applications because it determined that the applicants had not established that importing sport-hunted trophies would "enhance" the status of the polar bear by increasing the population or otherwise contributing to the recovery of the species.  Thus, the applications do not qualify for an exception to the MMPA's general ban on importing sport-hunted trophies of depleted marine mammals.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On September 30, 2011, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California upheld (pdf) a decision of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to approve management measures developed by the Pacific Fisheries Management Council in conjunction with the Council's decision to open the commercial and recreational fishery for Fall-run Chinook salmon in the Central Valley for the 2011 season.  The NMFS decision had been challenged by the San Joaquin River Group Authority, a California joint powers authority made up of member agencies that own or operate major water infrastructure facilities on the San Joaquin, Stanislaus, Tuolumne, and Merced Rivers.  The Los Angeles Times reported on the decision, stating that the federal court "killed an effort by a group of Central Valley irrigation districts to stop commercial salmon fishing off the California and Oregon coasts, rejecting claims that the federal government acted improperly when it reopened the season this year." (Los Angeles Times, Sept. 30, 2011, by Bettina Boxall.)

Plaintiff alleged that the decision by NMFS violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.  As a threshold matter, the court held that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate it had Article III standing under the Constitution to pursue its claims.  The court further held that, assuming, arguendo, Plaintiff had standing, Plaintiff nonetheless is not entitled to summary judgment on the merits of its claims.  Rather, the court held in favor of Federal Defendants.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a 279-page memorandum decision (pdf) on cross-motions for summary judgment in consolidated cases involving challenges to the June 4, 2009 biological opinion issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regarding the effects of continued operation of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project in California on five listed fish species. The court considered dozens of claims advanced by plaintiffs and held for plaintiffs in whole or in part with respect to about half of the claims while holding for defendants with respect to the balance of the claims. In light of the deferential standard of review of final agency actions under the Administrative Procedure Act, the fact that plaintiffs succeeded on so many claims is extraordinary. Furthermore, even where the court held in favor of federal defendants, in some instances the court expressed skepticism about the basis for federal defendants’ position. For example, while the court agreed with federal defendants that in light of the standard of review NMFS did not act unlawfully by failing to apply available life-cycle models, the court nonetheless indicated failure to apply any life cycle model “approaches bad faith.”

We will post a more detailed description of the decision shortly.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has approved (pdf) two settlement agreements among environmental groups and the Fish and Wildlife Service to address a backlog of species that are candidates for listing under the Endangered Species Act.  One (pdf) of the agreements was entered into with Wildearth Guardians, and the second (pdf) was entered into with the Center for Biological Diversity.  On the same day that the Court entered the settlements, it issued a decision (pdf) and order denying a motion by a hunting group to intervene in the matter.  We previously reported on the litigation here and here.  As the Los Angeles Times reported, "[t]he court gave the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service four years to clear the backlog of more than 850 plant and animal species that are awaiting determinations and bogged down in various stages of the process" (Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 2011).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a decision (pdf) invalidating the National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) 2008 and 2010 biological opinions for operation of the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS) by the Army Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation after the parties to the litigation challenging those decisions filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court held that NMFS improperly made a no jeopardy determination with respect to certain listed salmonids on the basis of unidentified habitat mitigation measures.

The FCRPS is comprised of 14 sets of dams and associated reservoirs, and the biological opinions covered operation of the facilities through 2018.  The 2008 biological opinion included a no jeopardy determination based, in part, on agreements with a number of entities including certain tribes and states. In response to concerns raised by the court, NMFS issued an adaptive management implementation plan in 2009 and then issued a supplemental biological opinion (pdf) in 2010 incorporating that plan. Plaintiffs National Wildlife Federation and the State of Oregon filed lawsuits challenging the 2008 and 2010 biological opinions.

In reviewing the parties' positions, the court noted that NMFS identified specific habitat mitigation measures through 2013 as the basis for its no jeopardy determination, but NMFS did not identify specific and verifiable mitigation plans beyond 2013.  For this reason, the court held that NMFS "improperly relies on habitat mitigation measures that are neither reasonably specific nor reasonably certain to occur, and in some cases not even identified."  Slip Op. at 11.  The court acknowledged federal defendants' argument that future habitat mitigation actions are certain to occur because the federal agencies committed to achieving specific, numerical improvements in habitat quality and survival.  Nonetheless, the court stated that the habitat mitigation program is "plagued with uncertainty."  Id. at 13.  The court went on to conclude that "Federal defendants simply cannot substitute their 'commitment' to survival improvement for specific actions they have evaluated and determined will provide the necessary biological response."  Id. at 16.

The court did not reach other claims advanced by plaintiffs including the arguments that NMFS used a flawed jeopardy standard in the biological opinions and failed to use the best available scientific data in measuring the effects of the action and the benefits of their proposed reasonable and prudent alternative on the listed species.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On July 22, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) erred when it designated 143 acres of private property as critical habitat for the endangered San Diego fairy shrimp (Branchinecta sandiegonensis) based on a single observation of the shrimp on the property in 2001.

The question presented in Otay Mesa Property L.P. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 10-5204, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 14998 (D.C. Cir. July 22, 2011) was quite narrow: whether a single confirmed sighting of the endangered fairy shrimp in a tire rut on 143 acres of land in 2001 provides substantial evidence that the land was "occupied" by the shrimp in 1997, the year the Service listed the species.  The court determined that that the single 2001 observation alone is not substantial evidence because the Service "has not reasonably explained how that one, isolated observation demonstrates that plaintiffs' property was 'occupied' by the San Diego fairy shrimp in 1997 (the relevant statutory date) . . . ."

The court emphasized that the Service had based its listing decision on one observation of the shrimp at one location on the 143-acre property, and that the Service failed to observe any San Diego fairy shrimp in any of the six follow-up surveys of the property in 2001.  During the litigation, the Service pointed out that an unidentified species of fairy shrimp was observed in 2001 in a pond next to the tire rut, and it also suggested that wherever adult fairy shrimp are observed, one can assume that they left behind buried eggs, that buried eggs can lie dormant for years, and that a property with dormant, buried eggs is, by definition, "occupied" by the fairy shrimp.  However, the court rejected the Service's additional evidence and reasoning, not because it was insubstantial or unpersuasive, but because the Service had not relied on it when it designated the land as critical habitat based on its determination that the shrimp "occupied" the land in 1997.

The court acknowledged that the substantial evidence standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act is deferential, but "deference is not abdication."  Moreover, while the Service is not required to conduct its own research to augment the "best scientific data available" under the Endangered Species Act, under the Administrative Procedure Act, the best scientific data must be enough to support the Service's designation of critical habitat. 

In the Court of Appeal's judgment, the best scientific data that the Service relied on for its decision to include the 143-acre property in the fairy shrimp's critical habitat simply fell short.

The decision leaves in place the Service's designation of 2,939 acres of land in Orange and San Diego Counties as critical habitat for the fairy shrimp.  And on remand, the Service may re-designate all or part of the 143-acre property as critical habitat.  But unless and until that happens, the owners may develop the land without the fear that they may adversely modify designated critical habitat for the fairy shrimp, an act that would be subject to numerous restrictions and requirements under the Endangered Species Act.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a closely watched and hotly contested challenge to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's decision to list the Polar Bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the final listing rule at 73 Fed. Reg. 28,212 (May 15, 2008) (pdf), the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a 116-page opinion (pdf) in which it upheld both the decision to list the bear as threatened, not endangered, and the Service's interpretation of "endangered species" as a species that is "on the brink of extinction."

As previously reported here, the Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) argued that "on the brink of extinction" or "in imminent danger of extinction" sets the bar for an endangered listing higher than the language, purpose, and legislative history of the ESA allows.  According to CBD, the Service should have determined that the polar bear is endangered because the best available science shows that the bear meets the "in-danger-of-extinction" standard in the ESA.  But the court held that "the Service's definition of an endangered species, as applied to the polar bear, represents a permissible construction of the ESA and must be upheld . . ." under the deferential standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

In addition, the court held that "[a]lthough the evidence emphasized by CBD is very troubling, the Court finds that the agency acted well within its discretion to weigh the available facts and scientific information before it in reaching its conclusion that the polar bear was not endangered at the time of listing."  In a footnote, the court further explained that "where global warming has been identified as the primary threat to the polar bear's sea ice habitat and the agency has acknowledged that the global warming trend is unlikely to reverse itself, a conclusion that the species is, in some sense, "in danger of extinction" has undeniable appeal.  The [United States Geological Service] population models, which predict a trend of extinction across three of the four polar bear ecoregions in as little as 75 years, particularly give the court pause."

Nevertheless, the court emphasized that under controlling Supreme Court precedent, "this Court is bound to uphold the agency's determination that the polar bear is a threatened species as long as it is reasonable, regardless of whether there may be other reasonable, or even more reasonable views."  Indeed, "[t]hat is particularly true where, as here, the agency is operating at the frontiers of science."  Thus, the court concluded that "[w]hile CBD would have weighed the facts differently, the Court is persuaded that FWS carefully considered all of the available scientific information before it, and its reasoned judgment is entitled to deference."

Notably, the court also rejected the claim, advanced by a host of other plaintiffs, that the polar bear should not have been listed at all.  Among other things, opponents of the listing decision argued that the science of climate change is too uncertain, and that the Service (1) failed to show that the polar bear is sufficiently likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, (2) failed to rely on the best available science, (3) failed to take into account foreign conservation efforts, and (3) failed to follow proper rulemaking procedures.

Although the court limited its deference to the Service's interpretation of "endangered species" as applied to the polar bear, and not as a regulatory interpretation that may apply in any listing decision, this aspect of the opinion is significant because the Service is likely to apply the same "on the brink of extinction" standard in other listing decisions, which could result in fewer species qualifying for full protection under the ESA.

While the court's ruling disposes of several cross-motions for summary judgment, it has yet to reach a related challenge to the special 4(d) Rule that the Service issued after listing the polar bear as threatened.  See Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and 4(d) Rule Litigation, No. 1:08-mc-00764-EGS (D.D.C. filed Dec. 4, 2008).  As previously reported here, environmentalists had hoped that listing the polar bear as threatened due to the impacts of climate change would force the federal government to use its considerable regulatory authority under the ESA to impose strict limits on emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs).  But a controversial rule issued by the Department of the Interior under section 4(d) of the ESA placed strict geographic limits on the authority of federal agencies to require projects in Alaska to curb or mitigate their GHG emissions.  As previously reported here, much to the dismay of environmentalists, the Department of the Interior under the Obama Administration chose not to overturn the polar bear rule.  Instead, the Obama Administration has called for new legislation to address GHG emissions, and EPA may assert its authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate GHGs.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Arizona entered summary judgment (pdf) for the United States Forest Service in a case filed by Defenders of Wildlife and other plaintiffs alleging the Forest Service failed to fulfill its duty to conserve under section 7(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).  The case focused on efforts to conserve the Mexican gray wolf (Canis lupus baileyi) by reintroducing an experimental population of the species into the Blue Range Wolf Recovery Area, which includes portions of east-central Arizona and west-central New Mexico.  Plaintiffs complained that too often wolves reintroduced into the Recovery Area were removed by the Forest Service for preying on livestock, arguing that the Forest Service's livestock permitting program is interfering with Mexican wolf recovery efforts.

Plaintiffs pursued two specific claims against the Forest Service under section 7(a)(1).  First, they argued that the Forest Service violated section 7(a)(1) by failing to develop and implement its own Mexican wolf conservation program.  In response, the Forest Service argued that it fulfilled its obligation under section 7(a)(1) by carrying out a conservation program, namely the Mexican wolf recovery plan (pdf), developed by the Fish and Wildlife Service.  The court interpreted section 7(a)(1) to impose a requirement on the Forest Service to "carry out a substantive conservation program for the Mexican gray wolf."  But the court went on to hold that Plaintiffs' position that the Forest Service must develop its own program and may not implement a program developed by the Fish and Wildlife Service "puts form over substance" and is not supported by the statute or relevant caselaw.

Second, Plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service has not contributed to the conservation of the Mexican wolf and, instead, demonstrated a preference for wolf removal to protect domestic livestock.  The court opined that, to the extent that the Forest Service took no action to conserve the species, such inaction would plainly violate the section 7(a)(1) duty to conserve.  But, in this case, the court held that the record demonstrates affirmative action to carry out the Fish and Wildlife Service wolf conservation program.

The court's holdings are consistent with the balance of the jurisprudence interpreting section 7(a)(1) of the ESA, which support the proposition that federal agencies "have substantial discretion in determining how best to fulfill their section 7(a)(1) obligations."  As a result, the decision reiterates the difficulty would-be plaintiffs will face if they pursue a claim under section 7(a)(1) of the ESA.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In a decision that addresses a number of the more difficult issues the federal wildlife agencies grapple with during the section 7 consultation process, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona recently struck down (pdf) a biological opinion (pdf) issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service for ongoing operations at Fort Huachuca that affect species in the upper San Pedro River area of southeastern Arizona. The court also held that the Department of the Army violated its section 7 obligation by relying on the legally flawed biological opinion.

Fort Huachuca is a major military base in southeastern Arizona. Base operations affect two listed species, the endangered Huachuca water umbel (Lilaeopsis schaffneriana ssp. recurva) and the endangered southwestern willow flycatcher (Empidonax traillii extimus). The court identified two categories of impacts to the species: direct and indirect effects of activities within the Fort’s boundaries and indirect effects on a portion of the San Pedro River including groundwater and surface water consumption.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has authorized (pdf) the states of Washington and Oregon to lethally remove California sea lions that eat thousands of endangered salmon and steelhead just below the Bonneville Dam on the Columbia River. According to NMFS, the small number of sea lions that prey on salmon and steelhead listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) have a significant effect on the ability of the fish stocks to recover. While the population of California sea lions is considered healthy and stable, the population of salmon and steelhead continues to decline – the authorization will allow state fisheries and natural resources agencies to reduce the sea lions’ effect on these vulnerable salmonid species.

NMFS originally gave the states authorization under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) in 2008 to permanently remove identifiable sea lions that were feeding on ESA-listed fish. Environmental organizations brought suit to challenge the action in 2009. Last November, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that NMFS had violated the MMPA by failing to adequately explain its finding that sea lions were having a “significant negative impact” on the decline or recovery of salmonid species. NMFS believes the memorandum decision (pdf) issued in support of the authorization addresses the problems identified by the court.  According to the Seattle Times, however, the Human Society of the United States, an environmental organization that was a party to the 2009 litigation, filed suit today in federal district court challenging the new authorization.  (The Seattle Times, May 20, 2011, by William McCall.)

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On April 20, 2011, the San Francisco Superior Court issued a peremptory writ of mandate (PDF) enjoining the California Department of Fish and Game (DFG) from implementing a pilot program to facilitate recovery of the Klamath Basin coho salmon (Coho) and compliance by farmers with the DFG's Lake and Streambed Alteration Program (referred to as the Shasta Valley and Scott River Watershed-Wide Permitting Programs).

In March 2005, the California Fish and Game Commission listed the Coho as threatened under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA).  Therefore, the taking of Coho is illegal without authorization from DFG.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On February 11, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded (pdf) the decision of a lower court, finding that the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation's implementation of a reasonable and prudent alternative may have resulted in a taking requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Pursuant to congressional authorization issued in 1902 and 1905, the Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) manages and operates the Klamath Irrigation Project (Klamath Project), which provides water to approximately 240,000 acres of irrigable crop land, as well as to several national wildlife refuges in southern Oregon and Northern California.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On April 7, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a United States Forest Service (USFS) District Ranger's decision that proposed recreational suction dredge mining in the Klamath National Forest may proceed according to the miners' Notices of Intent (NOIs) without a Plan of Operations is not an "agency action," and therefore consultation is not required under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.  Karuk Tribe of California v. U.S. Forest Service, No. 05–16801, 2011 WL 1312564 (9th Cir. April 7, 2011) (PDF).

Specifically, the majority held that the District Ranger's decision not to require a Plan of Operation for the dredging "is an agency decision not to regulate legal private conduct.  In other words, the USFS's decision at issue results in agency inaction, not agency action."  Id. at *11. 

The Karuk Tribe presented evidence that the cumulative impact of recreational suction dredge mining to threatened Coho salmon and their critical habitat in the Klamath River "may affect" listed species by killing salmon and other fish eggs, killing food sources, destabilizing spawning substrate, and otherwise disturbing the salmon and their reproductive activities.  But the court's holding turned on the more fundamental question whether the District Ranger's determination that no Plan of Operations is required constitutes an "agency action."

The Tribe argued that the Ranger's decision is a decision to authorize the operations described in an NOI, therefore, consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service is required under section 7. 

A majority of the three-judge panel disagreed, concluding instead that "the NOI process was designed to be 'a simple notification procedure' that would 'assist prospectors in determining whether their operations would or would not require the filing of an operating plan.'"  Id. at *6-7.  In other words, a decision not to require a Plan of Operations is not a "permit," as the Tribe contended.  Instead, the NOIs were agency inaction, not  "agency action" that could trigger a duty to consult under section 7.

The majority found it especially significant that under Organic Administration Act of 1897 and the General Mining Law of 1872, miners have a right to enter public lands to prospect and remove mineral deposits.  Under Forest Service regulations, a Plan of Operations for mining activities on national forest land is required only if the District Ranger determines that the mining is likely to cause significant disturbance of surface resources.  Under the Forest Service regulations, once an NOI is filed, the District Ranger is not required to respond at all unless he or she determines that the mining will likely cause a significant disturbance of surface resources.  Thus a Ranger's response to an NOI "is analogous to the NOI itself, a notice of the agency's review decision.  It is not a permit, and does not impose regulations on the private conduct as does a Plan [of Operations]."  Id. at *7.

In his dissenting opinion, Judge William A. Fletcher concluded that the Forest Service has taken affirmative agency action because "[t]he Forest Service makes an actual decision whether to allow suction dredging to proceed pursuant to an NOI."  Id. at *15.  In addition, Judge Fletcher concluded that the Forest Service exercised discretion in approving or disapproving the NOIs in three ways.  First, "the Forest Service exercised discretion in formulating criteria for the protection of critical habitat of listed coho salmon" that "governed the approval or denial of NOIs for suction dredge mining."  Id. at *23.  Second, the Forest Service exercised discretion in refusing to approve an NOI where it determined that the NOI provided insufficient protection of fish habitat and insufficient mitigation for the loose tailing piles left by the dredges.  Id. at *24.  And third, the Forest Service exercised discretion insofar as its employees applied different criteria for the protection of fish habitat in different districts of the Klamath National Forest.  Id.

The majority rejected these arguments, arguing that the Tribe failed to argue that the formulation of protective criteria was itself an agency action triggering a duty to consult under section 7 (id. at *3 n.6), and although the Forest Service exercised discretion in determining whether to require a Plan of Operations, the NOIs at issue were not "agency actions" but rather inactions (id. at *5 n.8).

It remains to be seen whether the Tribe will file a petition for rehearing or a petition for certiorari seeking to have the decision overturned.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

As reported by The Sacramento Bee, on April 5, 2011, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California approved (pdf) a stipulated settlement agreement (pdf), over the objections of intervenors, potentially ending the ongoing dispute over the alleged impacts of striped bass predation on listed salmonids and delta smelt.  (The Sacramento Bee, April 6, 2011, by Matt Weiser)  

In 2008, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Fish and Game ("Department") alleging that the enforcement of the striped bass sport-fishing regulations was resulting in the "take" of listed salmonids and delta smelt, in violation of section 9 of the federal Endangered Species Act.  Shortly thereafter, various sport fishing interests intervened in the lawsuit.

The settlement agreement obligates the Department to, among other things, collaborate with the National Marine Fisheries Service and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in the development of a regulatory proposal to modify the striped bass sport-fishing regulations.  The proposal, which must be based upon the best available scientific information, will be submitted to the California Fish and Game Commission along with a Department recommendation justifying the adoption of the proposal.  In addition to the development of a regulatory proposal, the settlement agreement obligates the Department to set aside $1 million to support research projects regarding predation on listed species in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and/or the anadromous waters of the Sacramento and San Joaquin watersheds.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the regulation of water deliveries from the State Water Project and Central Valley Project to protect the threatened delta smelt did not violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.  San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Salazar, No. 10-19152 (9th Cir. March 25, 2011). 

The decision is the latest in a series of decisions by the federal appellate courts rejecting Commerce Clause challenges to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The court concluded that the protection of endangered and threatened species (including wholly intrastate species such as the delta smelt) bears a substantial relation to interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has, to date, declined to review any of the ESA Commerce Clause decisions.

The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the argument of the Fish and Wildlife Service (and the conclusion of the district court below) that the farming company plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the lawsuit. The court concluded that the companies were not required to show a threat of imminent enforcement under the ESA. The coercive ability of the Fish and Wildlife Service to enforce the ESA is sufficient to satisfy the causation element of standing. The court’s decision provides additional support for the standing of economic interests in other pending Delta lawsuits brought under the ESA.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Columbia upheld a decision by the Fish and Wildlife Service to exclude an area from the designation of critical habitat for the endangered Cape Sable seaside sparrow in Florida.  Center For Biological Diversity v. Salazar (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2011) (PDF).  While conceding that the excluded area was “essential” to the sparrow’s conservation, the Service decided not to designate the area as critical habitat, in part, because of the conflict between critical habitat and the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Project. 

The court concluded that the “balance between designating a crucial swath of critical habitat for the Sparrow, a single species, and greater flexibility for restoration of the Everglades to benefit the entire ecosystem and its many inhabiting species, is left to the Secretary’s discretion.”  Slip Op. at 32.  The decision is important because it affirms the Service’s broad discretion under the ESA to weigh and balance economic and environmental costs and benefits in the designation of critical habitat.  The Service’s decision here to balance the protection of individual species with a broader ecosystem plan stands in sharp contrast to other recent decisions by the Service to designate critical habitat in areas with approved habitat conservation plans.  These other recent critical habitat decisions create a disincentive for landowners to participate in habitat conservation plans.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On March 2, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a biological opinion issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service ("Service") regarding the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") reregistration of pesticides is immediately reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act, reversing a lower court decision.  Dow Agrosciences LLC v. National Marine Fisheries Service, Case No. 09-1968 (pdf). 

The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") establishes specific requirements prior to EPA's registration or reregistration of a pesticide.  Among the requirements, EPA must find that the pesticide will perform without "unreasonable adverse effects" on the environment.  FIFRA further provides that all EPA registration determinations are subject to judicial review in the Court of Appeals in the first instance, rather than in district court.

In 2004, as a result of a previous action filed by several environmental groups, EPA initiated formal consultation with the Service on 37 active pesticide ingredients.  In 2008, the Service issued a biological opinion (pdf) concluding that 3 of the pesticide ingredients would jeopardize numerous salmonid species and adversely affect their critical habitat.  The biological opinion was accompanied by a reasonable and prudent alternative and an incidental take statement.

Shortly after the Service issued the biological opinion, but before EPA issued a registration determination, a group of pesticide registrants and manufacturers filed suit under the federal Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the biological opinion was not based on the "best scientific data available," a requirement of the federal Endangered Species Act.  The Service moved to dismiss the litigation on the ground that FIFRA provided the sole means of challenging the biological opinion, and an action under FIFRA could not be initiated until EPA made a registration determination.  The district court found the Service's argument persuasive, and dismissed the action, concluding that because FIFRA provided a means for reviewing the biological opinion, and because the APA is only implicated if there is a "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court" of competent jurisdiction, the litigation had to wait until EPA made a registration determination, after which the biological opinion and registration determination could be concurrently challenged via an action brought before the Court of Appeals. 

The Fourth Circuit reversed, interpreting FIFRA's judicial review provision as applying only to agency actions either by EPA or inherent in EPA's eventual registration determination, and finding that the biological opinion was a separate agency action by the Service with its own independent and ongoing legal consequences.  Therefore, the Court held that the biological opinion was immediately reviewable under the APA.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On February 25, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California entered a stipulated order (pdf) establishing operational criteria for the Central Valley Project and State Water Project through June 30, 2011, in lieu of the Reasonable and Prudent Alternative prescribed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 2008 biological opinion (pdf) regarding the effects of the Water Projects on delta smelt.  The settlement that led to the order received widespread media attention, including this story by Reuters.  The memorandum decision of the court holding that the biological opinion is unlawful and remanding it to the Service is available here (pdf).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The U.S. Supreme Court has denied (pdf) two petitions that sought to have the Court resolve a Circuit split regarding the evaluation of economic impacts of critical habitat designations under the federal Endangered Species Act.  The Court’s action leaves in place two recent decisions by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upholding the use of the so-called “baseline” methodology by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service").  Under the “baseline” methodology, the Service restricts the evaluation of economic impacts of a potential critical habitat designation to the impacts of the designation alone and does not consider the cumulative impact of the critical habitat designation and the listing of the endangered species.  Arizona Cattle Growers' Assn. v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2010) (pdf); Home Builders Assn. of Northern California v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (pdf). 

In sharp contrast to the above cases, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invalidated the Service’s use of the “baseline” methodology.  New Mexico Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (pdf).  The Tenth Circuit held that the Service’s use of the “baseline” methodology rendered an economic analysis relying on the baseline approach "virtually meaningless" because it allowed the agency, in all cases, to find no economic impact to the critical habitat designation.  As a result, in states within the Tenth Circuit, the Service evaluates the “co-extensive” economic impacts of listing and the critical habitat designation.  Use of the “co-extensive” methodology typically results in much higher estimates of economic impacts.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On January 20, 2011, the Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") proposed (pdf) to settle another lawsuit challenging its implementation of the National Flood Insurance Program ("Program"), agreeing to consult with the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service (the "Wildlife Agencies") regarding the Program's potential impacts on five species of sea turtles listed under the federal Endangered Species Act. 

The Program, which is administered by FEMA, enables property owners in participating communities to purchase flood insurance at a subsidized rate.  See FEMA's Program Description (pdf).  Plaintiffs, the National Wildlife Federation and Florida Wildlife Federation, filed a complaint in July of last year alleging that FEMA violated Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act by failing to consult with the Wildlife Agencies regarding the Program's potential impacts on the loggerhead sea turtle, green sea turtle, hawksbill sea turtle, leatherback sea turtle, and Kemp's ridley sea turtle.  Section 7 requires federal agencies to, among other things, consult with the Wildlife Agencies to ensure that any action "authorized, funded, or carried out" by the agency is "not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [designated critical habitat]." 

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, FEMA has 15 days from the entry of a court order approving the proposed settlement to send the Wildlife Agencies a written request to initiate informal consultation.  Further, within 11 months of the entry of a court order, FEMA is required to prepare and submit a biological assessment to the Wildlife Agencies, along with a written request  to initiate formal consultation.

As noted in our post of July 14, 2010, similar lawsuits are currently pending in the the District of New Mexico, the Eastern District of California, and the District of Arizona.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On December 14, 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a 225 page decision (pdf) granting in part plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment in The Consolidated Delta Smelt Cases, No. 09-407 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010).  The matter consists of five consolidated actions that all challenge the December 2008 biological opinion, jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, and reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA) for continued operation of the Central Valley Project (CVP) and State Water Project (SWP) issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).  The CVP and SWP provide water for approximately 25 million Californians.  The court held for plaintiffs on numerous grounds.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Wild Fish Conservancy v. Salazar, issued a decision (pdf) remanding a 2008 biological opinion for the operation of a hatchery for spring-run Chinook salmon to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service).  At issue in the biological opinion was the ongoing operation of the hatchery and its effects on the threatened bull trout due to the presence of a number of barriers to fish passage in Icicle Creek, which is in the Columbia River watershed.  The Service issued the biological opinion following intra-agency consultation, since the Service acts as both the action agency (as operator of the hatchery) and consulting agency (as the agency required to issue biological opinions for the species).

Plaintiffs challenged both the biological opinion and the incidental take statement issued by the Service on a number of grounds.  The Ninth Circuit summarized its holding as follows:

[T]he Service committed legal error by limiting the scope of the action to five years; failing to articulate a rational connection between its findings in the 2008 BiOp and its no jeopardy conclusion; and issuing an inadequate incidental take statement. The Hatchery’s reliance on a legally flawed biological opinion was arbitrary and capricious.

With respect to the Service's decision to limit the scope of the action to five years, the Ninth Circuit noted that the hatchery had been operating for 70 years "and is expected to continue operating into the future."  The court held that the Service's failure to take into account a long view of the hatchery's effects was arbitrary and capricious.  With respect to the Service's no jeopardy determination, the Ninth Circuit said it was not possible to square the conclusion that the population trend of bull trout in Icicle Creek is negative with the conclusion that the distribution and abundance of the species in the action area is not likely to change.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On November 23, 2010, in Humane Society of the United States v. Locke, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held (pdf) that NMFS violated the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) by failing to adequately explain its finding that sea lions are having a “significant negative impact” on the decline or recovery of salmonid species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in the Columbia River. The ruling invalidated NMFS’s decision authorizing the states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho to lethally remove California sea lions from the Bonneville Dam area. The 2008 decision (pdf) allowed the states to take the lesser of either 85 sea lions per year, or the number required to reduce the observed predation rate to one percent of the salmonid run at the dam. The authorization had been provided pursuant to section 120 of the MMPA, which allows “the intentional lethal taking of individually identifiable pinnipeds which are having a significant negative impact on the decline or recovery of salmonid fishery stocks which . . . have been listed as threatened . . . or endangered species under the [ESA].”

The court based its decision, in part, on the fact that NMFS had previously determined that fisheries that caused similar or greater mortality among the same salmonid populations were not having significant negative impacts. Specifically, NMFS had twice concluded in 2007 that the taking of ten percent of the local salmonid populations would not appreciably reduce the likelihood of recovery of the listed species. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that, absent a satisfactory explanation from NMFS, it was unable to reconcile this conclusion with the NMFS decision at issue, which determined a predation rate of one percent would negatively impact the listed species. In finding that NMFS failed to adequately explain these disparate factual determinations, the court ordered NMFS to provide an explanation sufficient to permit meaningful judicial review. According to the Seattle Times, NMFS is disappointed by the decision but hasn’t decided on its next step.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Two statewide snowmobile associations challenged the Fish and Wildlife Service's 2009 final rule designating critical habitat for the contiguous United States distinct population segment of the Canada lynx on the grounds the Service violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  In an order (PDF) dated September 10, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming rejected plaintiffs' NEPA claims but concurred with plaintiffs that certain lands were designated as critical habitat in the final rule due to the Service's failure to conduct a full analysis of the economic impacts of the rule.

The Service listed (PDF) the Canada lynx as threatened in 2000.  The range of the species spans 14 states from Maine to Washington.  In its final rule, the Service designated approximately 39,000 square miles of land as critical habitat.  Under the ESA, critical habitat is defined to include the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species on which are found those physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the species and which may require special management considerations or protection.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit amended an opinion it filed earlier this year in Butte Environmental Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which we wrote about here.  The case concerns a challenge to the Fish and Wildlife Service’s (Service) finding that a proposed business park would not adversely modify the critical habitat of three listed species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). While the Ninth Circuit did not change its holding from the June opinion (PDF), it did clarify previous dicta concerning the Service’s analysis of adverse modification under the ESA.  In a footnote, the opinion now states that the court “express[es] no opinion on whether the ‘adverse modification’ inquiry under section 7 of the ESA properly focuses on the effects of an action on a particular unit of critical habitat or on total critical habitat nationwide.”  The court had previously highlighted the fact that the proposed project would affect only a very small percentage loss of the total critical habitat for the species.  In its amended opinion (PDF), the court revised its analysis to include the percentage loss for each species’ unit in addition to the percentage of nationwide loss.  It concluded that the project would destroy only a very small percentage of each affected species’ critical habitat whether viewed on a unit or nationwide basis, and, therefore, the Service’s determination that critical habitat would be destroyed was not inconsistent with its finding of no “adverse modification.”

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Ninth Circuit issued a decision (PDF) recently in which it held that the removal of an endangered plant from privately-owned “waters of the United States” is not a violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Section 9(a)(2)(B) of the ESA makes it unlawful to “remove and reduce to possession any [endangered species of plant] from areas under federal jurisdiction.” The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the term “areas under federal jurisdiction” includes areas that qualify as wetlands and other “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act. The decision is important because it is the first circuit court decision to interpret the jurisdictional scope of the plant protection provisions of section 9 of the ESA.

Employees of the California Department of Fish and Game identified the endangered Sebastopol meadowfoam on private land within an area determined to be an “adjacent wetland” under the federal Clean Water Act. Suspecting that the plants had been unlawfully transplanted, a Fish and Game employee removed the plants to a Fish and Game evidence locker. Plaintiffs sued the Fish and Game employees and the landowner for violating the ESA. The plaintiffs argued that the term “areas under federal jurisdiction” in section 9(a)(2) of the ESA included areas within the regulatory jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers under section 404 of the Clean Water Act. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. It concluded that the term “areas under federal jurisdiction” was ambiguous, and interpreted the term “as not including all of the ‘waters of the United States’ as defined by the [Clean Water Act] and its regulations. The court acknowledged that the decision did not foreclose the possibility that the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service might adopt some other statutory construction. In this case, the Service sided with the defendants and argued that ESA prohibition on “removing” endangered plants applies to endangered plants on federal land and on federal property interests such as conservation easements, leasehold estates, and special management areas.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed (PDF) a lower court decision denying a petition for review submitted by Forest Guardians challenging the decision of the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) to reintroduce a nonessential experimental population of endangered Northern Aplomado Falcons into portions of southern New Mexico. The species was listed (PDF) as endangered in 1986 because it was believed extirpated from its historic range of portions of Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas in the United States though it persisted in northern Mexico. In 2001, individuals of the species were sighted nesting in Luna County, New Mexico. In subsequent years, other individual Falcons were sighted in the same area. In 2005, the Service proposed a rule (PDF) under section 10(j) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) that would authorize reintroduction of captive-bred Falcons in Arizona and New Mexico. Then in 2006 the Service issued a final 10(j) rule authorizing reintroduction in southern New Mexico. The Service noted the existence of a small number of individual Falcons in the wild in New Mexico in the rule, but it concluded that these individuals do not constitute a population. It also stated that the nonessential experimental population would be introduced in a geographically distinct area from naturally occurring Falcon populations.

Forest Guardians filed an action in 2006 in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico to compel the Service to respond to a petition to designate critical habitat for the Falcon it had previously submitted and to challenge the 10(j) rule on the grounds that the Service violated the ESA and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in promulgating the rule. The trial court held for Forest Guardians with respect to the critical habitat cause of action, but held for the Service with respect to the other causes of action. Forest Guardians then appealed. Forest Guardians challenged the Service’s application of its own definition of “population” under the ESA, but the Tenth Circuit held that the Service’s definition constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the Act and that substantial evidence supports the Service’s application of that definition in this instance. The court relied substantially on two factual conclusions reached by the Service: that a single breeding pair of falcons does not constitute a population and that dispersing falcons in New Mexico were too distant for the population in Mexico to form part of that population. Forest Guardians also challenged the Service’s issuance of the 10(j) rule on the grounds it violated NEPA, claiming that the Service predetermined the outcome of its analysis. The court rejected this claim as well.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink (PDF), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit  upheld the district court's decision that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) violated the Endangered Species Act in adopting amendments to BLM's grazing regulations and affirmed the district court's permanent injunction enjoining the amended regulations.  The Ninth Circuit held that BLM violated section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) regarding the amendments and also violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts of the proposed regulations and arbitrarily concluded that the proposed regulations would have no significant environmental impact.

BLM began the process of amending the grazing regulations in 2002 and assembled a total of three interdisciplinary teams to review the proposed changes.  Two of these teams criticized the new regulations and concluded they would ultimately lead to environmental harm and would cause a "slow long-term adverse effect on wildlife and biological diversity in general."  BLM ignored these conclusions and in 2006 issued a final rule (PDF) adopting the proposed regulations.  The 2006 regulations made three principal changes to the regulations:  (1) they decreased the level of public input in public rangelands management, (2) they generally made it more difficult for BLM to conduct environmental enforcement on public rangelands, and (3) they ceded ownership rights to permanent rangeland structures and water from the United States to private ranchers.  With respect to the ESA, BLM concluded that the 2006 regulations were merely administrative and would not have an effect on listed or candidate species or proposed or designated critical habitat and therefore no consultation with FWS was required under section 7 of the ESA.

Section 7 of the ESA requires a federal agency to consult with the Service if the federal agency determines that any action on its part may affect any listed species or designated critical habitat.  Here, the Ninth Circuit found that BLM's conclusion that the 2006 regulations would not affect listed species or critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious.  First, the court noted that the "sheer number of acres affected by the 2006 Regulations and number of special status species who reside on those lands alone suggest that the proposed amendments 'may affect' a listed species or its critical habitat."  Second, the Service itself concluded that the 2006 regulations would affect special status species and their habitat.  The Service was primarily concerned with the decrease of public input and change in water ownership, which would reduce habitat quality and have a long-term adverse effect on wildlife.  Third, even BLM's own scientists advised the agency that a section 7 consultation was necessary.  Finally, plaintiffs submitted extra-record testimony that the regulations would have an adverse effect on wildlife and biological diversity, listed salmonids, and many listed bird species.  Therefore, the court concluded that BLM had no rational basis to conclude that the 2006 regulations would not affect listed species or their habitat.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On August 20, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") did not violate the law when it omitted resident rainbow trout from the Distinct Population Segment of California Central Valley steelhead ("CV Steelhead"), despite the fact that rainbow trout and steelhead are the same species and can interbreed.  The court affirmed NMFS's listing of the DPS Steelhead as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").

In order to be listed as a threatened species, the ESA requires that, based on the best scientific information available, a species will, within the foreseeable future, likely be in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.  The ESA defines the term "species" to include "any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature."

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

For the second time in two months, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected an industry challenge to a designation of critical habitat under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).  In Home Builders Association of Northern California v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service (PDF), the court upheld the designation of 858,000 acres of land in California as critical habitat for fifteen vernal pool species.

The ESA prohibits federal agencies from approving actions that “adversely modify” critical habitat.  The court rejected Home Builders’ claim that the ESA limited the designation of critical habitat to those areas that contain all (rather than some) of the physical or biological features essential to the conservation of the vernal pool species. The court also rejected the claim that, in designating critical habitat, the Fish and Wildlife Service is required to determine when the protected species are required to be conserved.  Following its recent decision in Arizona Cattle Growers’ Assn. v. Salazar, 606 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.  2010), the court upheld the Service’s analysis of the economic impacts of the critical habitat designation.  The court concluded that, unlike the National Environmental Policy Act, the ESA does not require the Fish and Wildlife Service to evaluate cumulative impacts of the critical habitat designation.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Montana issued a decision (PDF) setting aside the 2009 Final Rule (PDF) that delisted the distinct population segment (DPS) of the gray wolf in the Northern Rocky Mountains, except in Wyoming.  The court found that the Endangered Species Act (ESA) does not allow the Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) to divide a DPS into a smaller taxonomy. 

The gray wolf was listed as endangered under the ESA in 1974.  The Service subsequently developed a wolf recovery plan, and the gray wolf was reintroduced in the northern Rockies in the mid-1990s.  Under the Bush Administration, the Service sought to delist the wolf in 2008 (including the Wyoming wolves), but environmental plaintiffs successfully enjoined implementation of that rule.  The 2009 Final Rule removed ESA protection for the gray wolves in Idaho and Montana, but preserved protection for the Wyoming Wolves noting that the state's regulatory framework failed to meet the ESA's requirements. 

In challenging the 2009 Final Rule, plaintiffs argued that the Service had violated the ESA by listing something less than a DPS (by only protecting the Wyoming wolves and excluding Idaho and Montana) as endangered and that the definition of a  "species" is nothing smaller than a DPS.  The Service defended its listing decision arguing that the ESA allows for listing of part of a DPS because the term "endangered species" means any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.  The court explained that the Service's argument could not be reconciled with the plain reading of the ESA and that the term "species" excludes distinctions below that of a DPS.  The court further concluded that the Service's interpretation of the ESA was not deserving of deference and was unreasonable.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the District of Montana issued a decision (PDF) on July 27, 2010, in which it held that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA) when those agencies issued an Environmental Assessment, Finding of No Significant Impact, and biological opinions for the use of chemical fire retardant to fight wildfires on Forest Service lands.  The decision is described in this article.

In 2003, the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics filed a lawsuit challenging the Forest Service’s use of chemical fire retardant. The court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on the grounds that federal defendants had failed to comply with NEPA and the ESA. Eventually, the Forest Service issued its Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) pursuant to NEPA and the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service issued their biological opinions pursuant to the ESA.  In response the Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics filed another lawsuit.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In South Yuba River Citizens League v. National Marine Fisheries Service (PDF), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) violated the Administrative Procedure Act in concluding that water diversion on the Yuba River would not jeopardize or adversely modify the critical habitat of the Central Valley spring-run Chinook salmon, Central Valley steelhead, and North American green sturgeon.

The court found that the NMFS biological opinion (BiOp) failed to provide a rational connection between the factual determination that the project would perpetuate unmitigated stressors and the conclusion that those stressors would not jeopardize the listed fish.  The court reiterated that an agency action can only “jeopardize” a species’ existence if that “agency action causes some deterioration in the species’ pre-action condition,” but that these effects can only be understood in the context of the current status of the species, the environmental baseline, and future cumulative effects. The court held that in order to determine that other stressors identified in the BiOp will not cause a decline in the identified viability factors for the species, “the BiOp must discuss (through some method) the magnitude of the stressors’ impact, the populations’ ability to tolerate this impact, and the reason why any decline will not reduce the overall likelihood of survival or recovery.”

The court also found that the BiOp failed to consider various other aspects of the problem, including hatcheries, the San Francisco Bay Delta, poaching, the species’ overall viability, and global warming. The court found that evidence in the administrative record suggested that each of the first four stressors is one that is likely to adversely affect the listed species and that failure to consider the effect of the stressor on the listed species rendered the BiOp’s no-jeopardy conclusion arbitrary and capricious. As to global warming, the court stated that it “cannot conclude that global warming’s potential impacts are so slight that NMFS could ignore them without discussion” and that while the BiOp discussed present impacts on water temperature, it did not address whether global warming will alter temperature or flow. Therefore, by failing to discuss global warming, NMFS failed to address an important part of the problem.

With respect to the BiOp’s critical habitat analysis, “the BiOp concluded that the project would not adversely modify critical habitat because the project’s net ‘impacts’ on habitat were at worst neutral when measured against conditions immediately preceding the BiOp.” The court concluded that this conclusion was arbitrary and capricious as the court could not discern the reason underlying the critical habitat analysis.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In Arizona Cattle Growers’ Association v. Salazar (PDF), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) determination that under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), critical habitat for the threatened Mexican spotted owl is not limited to areas where the owl actually resides, but can encompass areas that the owl uses with sufficient regularity that it is likely to be present during a reasonable span of time.  That standard means the thousands of miles of migratory bird flyways used by ESA-listed birds could become protected critical habitat. The decision also held that when implementing the ESA’s requirement to decide whether the costs of designating an area as critical habitat outweigh the benefits, the Service need not include costs caused by the critical habitat designation if such costs can also be attributed to listing the species.

Arizona Cattle Growers’ made two arguments on appeal: (1) that the Service impermissibly treated areas in which no owls are found as “occupied" under the ESA, and (2) in the Service’s determination of the economic impacts of the critical habitat designation, the Service used a “baseline” approach that did not account for economic impacts of the critical habitat designation that are also attributable to the listing decision.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The California Court of Appeal’s First Appellate District issued a decision affirming the lower court in a case of first impression regarding the interpretation of the term “person” in the California Endangered Species Act (CESA). The issue presented to the court was whether the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) is a person for the purpose of CESA. The court held that “a state agency is a ‘person’ within the meaning of section 2080, which prohibits any ‘person’ from taking an endangered or threatened species without appropriate permit authority from the California Department of Fish and Game.”  The court decided the matter – despite the fact that DWR complied with the trial court’s writ and obtained proper authorization from the California Department of Fish and Game thus rendering the case moot – due to the importance of the issue.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the Fish and Wildlife Service's ("Service') no "adverse modification" determination despite the fact that the proposed project would destroy some critical habitat.

In Butte Environmental Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (PDF), environmental plaintiffs challenged the Service's biological opinion finding that a proposed business park to be located along Stillwater Creek in Redding, California would not adversely modify the critical habitat of the threatened vernal pool fairy shrimp, endangered vernal pool tadpole shrimp, and the threatened slender Orcutt grass.  The Service had determined that the proposed project contained 356.6 acres of critical habitat shared by the vernal pool fairy shrimp and vernal pool tadpole shrimp.  The Service concluded that the project would destroy 234.5 acres of this critical habitat, which was equal to 0.04% of the fairy shrimp's total critical habitat nationwide and 0.10% of the tadpole shrimp's total critical habitat nationwide. 

The court rejected each of the plaintiff's arguments challenging the Service's determination that the project would not adversely modify the critical habitat of the listed species.  First, plaintiff argued that the Service applied an improper definition of "adverse modification" and did not account for the "recovery needs" of the affected species, as required by the court's previous decision in Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Services.  In Gifford Pinchot, the court held that the regulatory definition of "adverse modification" contradicted Congress's command and that the definition of adverse modification of critical habitat was properly a direct or indirect alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical habitat for the survival or recovery of a listed species.  The court rejected plaintiff's contention, citing the Service's statement in the biological opinion that it did not rely on the regulatory definition of "destruction of adverse modification" but relied upon the statute and the court's decision in Gifford Pinchot.  

Second, despite the fact that the proposed project would destroy 234.5 acres of critical habitat for the fairy shrimp and tadpole shrimp, the court explained that an area of a species' critical habitat can be destroyed without appreciably diminishing the value of the species' overall critical habitat.  The court noted that the project would only affect a very small percentage of the total critical habitat for the listed species. While the plaintiff argued that the Service's focus on the project's impact on the species' total critical habitat masked the project's localized impact, the court stated that where "there is no evidence in the record that 'some localized risk was improperly hidden by use of large scale analysis, we will not second-guess the [Service].'"  

Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the Service failed to address the rate of loss of critical habitat, stating that the Endangered Species Act did not require the Service to calculate rate of loss.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 27, 2010, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia issued a decision rejecting a challenge to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's critical habitat determination for the endangered San Diego fairy shrimp, concluding that the Service's determination was entitled to deference. 

Under the terms of the Endangered Species Act, the Service is required to designate, to the maximum extent practicable, critical habitat for an endangered or threatened species concurrently with a final listing rule.  Critical habitat is defined, in part, as "the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed . . . ." 

Although the Service issued a final rule listing the San Diego fairy shrimp as endangered on February 3, 1997, it did not issue a final rule designating critical habitat until October 2000.  This designation, however, was short lived, because in response to a legal challenge by several industry groups, the Service sought a voluntary remand for further consideration.  In December 2007, the Service issued a revised final rule designating critical habitat for the fairy shrimp, this time designating, among other tracts of land, approximately 275 acres of land owned by plaintiffs.  

Plaintiffs filed an action challenging the Services second critical habitat designation, asserting that there was no evidence that the fairy shrimp occupied their property in 1997, when the species was listed.  The Court rejected plaintiffs' challenge, finding that, based on surveys conducted in 2001, and the fairy shrimp's sedentary life cycle, it was reasonable for the Service to conclude that fairy shrimp occupied the premises in 1997.

Plaintiffs also challenged the critical habitat designation on the basis that the Service failed to properly consider the economic impact of its designation.  Again, however, the Court deferred to the Service's determination, and upheld the Service's analysis of the economic impacts of its designation.

The deference shown by the Court in this case is common in much Endangered Species Act litigation, as such litigation often falls under the Administrative Procedure Act, which authorizes a reviewing court to set aside an agency action only if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 27, 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued findings of fact and conclusions of law (PDF) regarding Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction in The Consolidated Delta Smelt Cases, No. 09-407 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2010).  The matter consists of five consolidated actions that all challenge the December 2008 biological opinion, jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, and reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA) for continued operation of the Central Valley Project (CVP) and State Water Project (SWP) issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).  The CVP and SWP provide water for approximately 25 million Californians.

While the Court did not issue an order, it did indicate that the Plaintiffs had already succeeded on their National Environmental Policy Act claims and were likely to succeed on at least some of their Endangered Species Act claims.  Specifically, the Court determined that "FWS’s reliance on analyses [of the effects of the CVP and SWP] that utilize raw (as opposed to population-normalized) salvage data is an undeniable failure to use the best available scientific methodology."  Findings & Conclusions at 52.  Furthermore, the Court determined that Reclamation erred by failing to ensure that "the RPA utilized the best available science."  Id. at 116.

The Court is holding a hearing to address whether to issue an injunction on May 28, 2010.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 17, 2010, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California approved a stipulated injunction and order submitted by the Center for Biological Diversity ("CBD") and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") establishing, among other things, an immediate prohibition on the use of certain pesticides in and around the greater San Francisco Bay area, and a series of deadlines for the EPA to make "effects determinations" and, as necessary, initiate consultations under the Endangered Species Act. 

EPA is responsible for registering pesticides under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, and ensuring that the pesticides uses it authorizes will not have unreasonable adverse effects on the environment, including on threatened and endangered species.  With respect to the 75 pesticides at issue in the CBD litigation, CBD alleged that the EPA failed to comply with section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act when it registered the pesticides for use in the United States without consulting with the the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding potential impacts on tidewater goby, delta smelt, California clapper rail, salt marsh harvest mouse, California tiger salamander, San Francisco garter snake, California freshwater shrimp, San Joaquin kit fox, Alameda whipsnake, valley elderberry longhorn beetle, and Bay checkerspot butterfly and their habitats.  All of these species are listed as either threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act.

Although CBD and EPA filed a joint motion for entry of stipulated injunction in January 2010, because defendant-intervenors had opposed the stipulation, final approval of the stipulated injunction was delayed until this past week.  As finally adopted, the stipulated injunction is comprised of four basic elements:  (1) a schedule for EPA to complete its "effects determination" for certain identified pesticides; (2) a general prohibition on the use of certain pesticides within and around the habitat of the 11 listed species; (3) the distribution of a bilingual notification brochure warning that certain pesticides may harm wildlife or their habitat; and (4) a similarly worded shelf-tag for certain pesticide containing products.  With respect to the prohibition on use, the stipulated injunction provides a list of exemptions for common household uses, such as spraying potted plants or controlling subterranean termites.         

CBD had obtained a similar stipulated injunction from the EPA in 2005 as a result of litigation concerning the California Red-legged frog and EPA's previous registration of 66 pesticides. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On May 18, 2010, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued findings of fact and conclusions of law (PDF) regarding Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction in The Consolidated Salmonid Cases, No. 09-1053 (E.D. Cal. May 18, 2010).  The matter consists of seven consolidated actions that all challenge the June 2009 biological opinion, jeopardy and adverse modification determinations, and reasonable and prudent alternative (RPA) for continued operation of the Central Valley Project (CVP) and State Water Project (SWP) issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). The CVP and SWP provide water for approximately 25 million Californians.

Plaintiffs challenged the implementation of two components of the RPA developed by NMFS, RPA Actions IV.2.1 and IV.2.3. Action IV.2.1 imposes minimum San Joaquin River inflow requirements in conjunction with maximum permissible exports (i.e., a 4 to 1 ratio between inflow and exports) and is effective April 1 to May 31.  Action IV.2.3 limits Old and Middle river flows to no more negative than -2,500 to -5,000 cfs, depending on juvenile entrainment levels, and is effective January 1 to June 15 or until a temperature trigger is hit at Mossdale (a location on the San Joaquin River).

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

On April 28, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Wild Fish Conservancy, holding that EPA and NMFS failed to use the best scientific and commercial data available in their informal consultation regarding EPA's approval of water-quality standards that exempted salmon farms from various state water quality standards.  Wild Fish Conservancy v. U.S.E.P.A., No. C08-0156, 2010 WL 1734850 (W.D. Wash April 28, 2010).

Specifically, the court held that when EPA and NMFS engaged in informal consultation over EPA's approval of the disputed water quality standards, they should have considered the recent recovery plans for Puget Sound Chinook salmon (2007) and for the Southern Resident Killer Whales (2008) (PDF).  Both recovery plans expressly stated that they were developed based on the best scientific data available regarding each species.  The letter that NMFS issued concurring in EPA's not-likely-to-adversely-affect determination referenced three earlier studies prepared by NMFS and one prepared by the Washington State Department of Natural Resources, but not the more recent recovery plans.  Indeed, the court found that the administrative record was devoid of any mention of the two recovery plans.

Ultimately, the court ordered EPA and NMFS to reconsider whether formal consultation is required taking into account the best available science.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) challenges to the approval of a rail line serving a limestone quarry in Texas. The court upheld the determination by the Surface Transportation Board (“STB”) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”) to limit the effects analysis in the biological opinion to the impacts of the first phase of the multi-phase quarry project. The court concluded that the subsequent phases were not an interrleated action, a cumulative effect or an indirect effect of the approval of the rail line under the ESA.

In Medina County Environmental Action Association v. Surface Transportation Board, the STB granted an exemption allowing a railroad company to construct and operate a rail line and loading loop to service a proposed limestone quarry in Texas. The proposed rail line was part of “Phase One” in the development of a 1,760-acre tract. Phase One consisted of the proposed rail line and development of 640 acres as a quarry. There were no specific plans for further development, although it was indicated that the rest of the tract might be quarried in additional phases over the next 50 years, depending on market demand.

An environmental group challenged the exemption alleging that the STB and the Service failed to comply with their obligations under section 7 of the ESA because they did not assess the potential for jeopardy posed by the entire 1,760-acre tract on the endangered golden-cheeked warbler and listed karst invertebrates and only assessed the potential effects for Phase One. The plaintiff made three arguments: (1) the entire proposed development is an “interrelated action” to the proposed rail (2) the entire proposed development should have been evaluated as a cumulative effect of the proposed rail; (3) the entire proposed development is an indirect effect of the proposed rail. The court rejected all three claims.
 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Two men were sentenced in federal court last week after admitting to the 2007 slaughter of over 100 federally endangered Indiana bats in Kentucky.  In light of the brutality of the attacks, one man received 3 years probation, while the second man, who was involved in two separate attacks on the endangered bat, was sentenced to eight months in federal prison.  

Both men pleaded guilty to violating the take prohibition in the federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), which provides for a maximum criminal penalty of $50,000 or one year in prison, or both.  While the criminal penalties provision of the ESA has been around since the adoption of the ESA, it is not common for the federal government to pursue criminal penalties.  Instead, the majority of take violations are pursued under either the ESA's civil penalties provision or citizen suit provision.  These convictions, however, are a stark reminder of the potentially significant consequence for those who dismiss the prohibitions in the ESA.   

Federal and state agencies attribute the convictions to an anonymous tip. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

In the latest round of litigation over endangered species impacts of water management in Southern Florida, a district court invalidated an incidental take statement applicable to actions of the Corps of Engineers to restore the Everglades.  The decision in Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States (PDF), is the latest in a line of decisions concluding that the Fish and Wildlife Service failed to provide a sufficient justification for the use habitat conditions in lieu of a numerical cap on incidental take.  The decision is an example of the willingness of the federal courts to undertake detailed review of biological opinions issued by the federal wildlife agencies.

In this case, the Miccosukee Tribe challenged the 2002 biological opinion and subsequent 2006 biological opinion (PDF) issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service regarding management actions by the Corps of Engineers to restore wildlife in the Everglades. The Tribe challenged the Amended Incidental Take Statement (PDF) to the 2006 biological opinion, specifically the Service’s use of ecological and habitat surrogates for a numerical limit on the incidental take of three listed species, the Cape Sable seaside sparrow, Everglade snail kite, and wood stork.  Federal courts have held that the Service has the burden of demonstrating that it is impractical to identify a numerical limit on incidental as the trigger for reconsultation under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.

 Here the Service argued that natural fluctuations in the population of the Cape Sable seaside sparrow made the identification of a numerical take limit impractical.  The District Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected the Service’s argument stating the “fact that sparrow populations may decrease due in part to low nest success rates does not unequivocally support the conclusion that the variability of nest success rates makes it impractical to establish a numerical trigger for incidental take.” 

The court found the Amended Incidental Take Statement was valid as to the Everglade snail kite and the wood stork. 

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

Finding its methodology “fatally flawed,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the Forest Service violated the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in its approval of grazing allotments in Southeast Montana.  In Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell (PDF), the court determined that the Forest Service’s use of a “habitat” proxy to evaluate impacts to the sage grouse was arbitrary and capricious without considering evidence concerning the sage grouse population. The court did not consider the recent determination by the Fish and Wildlife Service that the listing of the sage grouse under the Endangered Species Act is “warranted.” Nevertheless, the decision is evidence of the potential for future conflicts between the conservation of the sage grouse and economic activities on public lands in the West. The decision is another example of the reluctance of the Ninth Circuit to defer to agency decisions on biological issues.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link

The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a decision (PDF) granting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by adopting and implementing NMFS' biological opinion and reasonable and prudent alternatives regarding the long-term operations of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project in California.

The NMFS biological opinion (PDF), which covers five listed anadromous and marine mammal species, was released on June 4, 2009.  In it, NMFS determined that long-term operations of the Central Valley Project and State Water Project are likely to jeopardize the continued existence of all five listed species.  For that reason, NMFS identified reasonable and prudent alternatives that are expected to avoid the likelihood of jeopardy to the species.  Numerous plaintiffs filed lawsuits challenging the biological opinion and reasonable and prudent alternatives, and those suits were consolidated on September 25, 2009. On November 2, 2009, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment regarding their NEPA claims.

Plaintiffs argued that the adoption and implementation of the biological opinion and reasonable and prudent alternatives are major federal actions that will significantly affect the human environment and that NMFS and BOR erred by not preparing an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement as required by NEPA.  The Court agreed holding that the reasonable and prudent alternatives significantly revise the procedures for operating the Central Valley Project and will materially reduce water exports and, therefore, trigger NEPA.

• Email This
• Print
• Comments
• Trackbacks
• Share Link